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 Foreword 
The study that follows, on ‘Improving the Social 
Protection of the Urban Poor and Near-Poor in 
Jordan. The Potential of Micro-insurance,’ presents 
the results of a research project which was initiated 
by the German Development Institute (GDI) in 
May 2000. The research was carried out by a GDI 
country working group between November 2000 
and May 2001 in co-operation with the Social Secu-
rity Corporation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jor-
dan as its counterpart. 
The research project had two objectives: first, to 
analyse possible strategies to improve the social 
protection of urban low-income groups in Jordan 
and potential approaches for development co-
operation to support these strategies. Second, to 
study the potential of micro-insurance in Jordan 
along a list of criteria derived from recent experi-
ence with micro-insurance in other countries. In this 
sense, the study might be able to serve as an exam-
ple for research on the potential of micro-insurance 
in other countries. 
It addresses three different groups of readers: 
(i) Jordanian governmental and non-governmental 
decision makers, (ii) the German government and 
the implementing agencies of German development 
co-operation and (iii) researchers and consultants in 
the field of social protection and micro-insurance. 
Micro-insurance is a new concept in development 
policy, which is generally seen as a promising ap-
proach to social protection. Over the last ten years, a 
number of projects have got underway in many 
world regions. But the concept is not widely known 
in the Arab world. No initiative has been undertaken 
to promote micro-insurance in any of the countries 
of this world region.  
This study is part of the GDI’s many years of inten-
sive research on social protection in general and in 
the Middle East and North Africa region in particu-
lar. Earlier reports have focused on new trends in 
social policy in the Arab world, on the Social Fund 
for Development in Yemen and on social protection 
reform strategies in Egypt. 
The rationale of this study focusing on Jordan is 
fivefold: 
First, widespread poverty is Jordan’s major social 
problem and the incidence of poverty there is 
closely related to the occurrence of social risks. 
Second, the Jordanian government is highly com-
mitted to improving social protection. Officials re-
peatedly stressed that this policy field ranked high 
on the reform agenda. King Abdallah II and the  
present government are aware of the fact that pov-
erty alleviation is a prerequisite to stabilising the 
Kingdom's economic, social and political develop-
ment.  
Third, little research has yet been done on social 
protection in Jordan, although donor agencies re-
peatedly stress this sector’s importance. As early as 
in 1994, the World Bank recommended that infor-
mation be collected on poverty, labour markets and 
social protection. Since then, several poverty and 
labour market surveys have been carried out, but no 
systematic and comprehensive assessment of the 
country’s numerous social protection systems was 
done. 
Fourth, the German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Co-operation and Development has declared pov-
erty eradication to be the first objective of German 
development co-operation with the Arab world. 
Moreover, in 1999 it published a position paper 
stressing the role of social protection in attaining 
this objective and defining the poor and near-poor 
as the main target group of German development 
co-operation in the field of social protection. The 
Ministry has confirmed its interest in this study and 
highly welcomed the GDI’s initiative.  
Fifth, last but not least, Jordan appears ideal for a 
first try with micro-insurance in the Arab world. It 
is a small but stable country in which the govern-
ment is open to new ideas and the success and side-
effects of eventual micro-insurance projects would 
be easy to estimate in a reasonable period of time. 
Moreover, little has been published in general on 
how to conduct ex ante assessments of the potential 
demand and supply of micro-insurance products. 
 For the purpose of the study, empirical field re-
search was carried out in Jordan from 12 February to 
27 April 2001. It centred on a household survey 
which focused on low-income quarters of Amman. 
Additionally, interviews were conducted with donor 
representatives, academics and, of course, all gov-
ernmental, commercial and non-governmental insti-
tutions relevant for social protection in Jordan. At 
the end of the GDI mission’s stay in Jordan, the 
preliminary results of a draft of this study were pre-
sented for discussion, at the Al-Amra Hotel in Am-
man, to all persons interviewed as well as to other 
interested parties.  
When the authors of this study were in the last 
phase of editing it, the GDI learned that a first part-
nership aimed at offering micro-insurance had been 
established shortly after the GDI mission had left 
Jordan. The USAID-financed AMIR programme and 
the Near East Foundation are considering offering a 
type of life and disability micro-insurance product 
similar to that suggested by this study.  
The GDI team would like once again to seize the 
opportunity to express its gratitude for the great 
support provided by the Planning and Research 
Department of the Social Security Corporation for 
preparing and carrying out its research in Jordan. It 
extends its most cordial thanks to the Director Gen-
eral of the corporation, Mr. Ahmad Abdal-Fattah, to 
Mr. Nawaf Kalaldeh and his team from the Plan-
ning and Research Department and to the earlier 
Director General, Dr. Yaser Adwan, who got the co-
operation with the GDI on its way. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The GDI team also thanks all of its interlocutors in 
Jordan and in Germany, who have given useful in-
formation and their ideas and provided comments 
and suggestions aimed at making the research proj- 
ect a success. 
Special thanks, however, are due to Mrs. Khawla 
Salahat, Mrs. Rufeida Hanresh, Mrs. Sunya Urabi, 
Mr. Ghassan Abu Nasser and Mr. Issam Hamarsheh. 
They accompanied us into the households and intro-
duced us to our interview partners in the field. 
Without them, no empirical research would have 
been possible. 
Last but not least, the GDI team extends hundreds 
of thanks to our interpreters, who did a very fine job 
during the interviews. They were excellent partners 
and have become our dear friends. 
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 Abstract 
The present study proposes that non-governmental 
and commercial institutions in Jordan should seek 
partnership in micro-insurance projects and recom-
mends that donors support such initiatives. It argues 
that micro-insurance is a new promising approach to 
reducing the vulnerability of urban population groups 
that are difficult for conventional social protection 
strategies to cover. Nevertheless, social assistance 
and social insurance still have their role to play. 
The vulnerability of households to risks (such as the 
death, work disability or unemployment of their 
provider, illness or old age) is a major factor con-
tributing to widespread poverty in Jordan. Almost 
half the population lacks access to social protection 
instruments, and hence the occurrence of risks leads 
to serious declines in well-being – often below the 
poverty line. 
The present gap in social protection provision is of 
special concern for low-income groups. Most of 
them are informal sector employees and are thus not 
covered by social insurance. Private insurance is too 
expensive for them and their ability to save is lim-
ited. Traditional mutual support among relatives, 
friends and neighbours is limited in scope and not 
sufficiently reliable to constitute effective protec-
tion. Social assistance, finally, reaches less than 4 % 
of the population. 
Micro-insurance is a feasible approach to closing 
part of this gap. The study shows that a high number 
of urban households would be willing to provide for 
the future and are able to pay small insurance 
primes but lack adequate provisioning offers. The 
study presents the design of a suitable product and 
 
 
 
 
 
outlines the potential organisational shape of co-
operation between non-governmental organisations 
and commercial insurance companies. These part-
ners would, with the backing of the state, be able to 
offer a term life and work disability micro-insurance 
product at an affordable price. The insurance com-
pany would design the product, invest reserves and 
re-insure the scheme, while the non-governmental 
organisation (a welfare organisation or a micro-
finance institution) would assume responsibility for 
product marketing, underwriting and claim man-
agement. The idea behind such partnership is to 
combine the strengths of the actors involved, in this 
way reducing risk potentials and lowering transac-
tion and information costs. 
However, the study also stresses that micro-
insurance cannot provide for comprehensive social 
protection: for the time being, it would be possible 
to offer only life and work-disability insurance. 
Moreover, the micro-insurance approach is not an 
appropriate approach to covering the entire urban 
population. While it can reduce the vulnerability of 
the non-poor, it does not present a solution for the 
desperately poor, who have no extra-income for 
insurance. 
Accordingly, what is required is a threefold strategy. 
The study recommends the following measures: 
(i) launch of micro-insurance for the vulnerable 
non-poor, (ii) widening of the outreach of social 
assistance to all of the desperately poor and 
(iii) reform of the operating social insurance 
schemes with an eye to restoring their financial 
sustainability and making them fit for a future step-
by-step extension of their coverage to additional 
groups of the employed. 
  
Improving the Social Protection of the Urban Poor and Near-Poor in Jordan  I 
Executive Summary 
Introduction 
Background and Objective of the Study 
Poverty remains one of Jordan’s major problems. 
The extent of poverty is rising and the country’s 
social protection systems are unable to cushion this 
development. They cover only part of the popula-
tion, leaving the other part vulnerable to risks such 
as the death, work disability or dismissal of their 
main provider, old age or illness. 
The present study examines how the social protec-
tion of vulnerable groups in Jordan can best be im-
proved. It understands social protection systems as 
instruments of subsidiary support that help indi-
viduals or households to manage their risks and 
cushion the consequences of risks.  
Special emphasis is laid on exploring the potential of 
micro-insurance, a new concept in social protection, 
which is as yet little known in the Arab world. Mi-
cro-insurance policies are small and affordable con-
tributory risk-pooling products designed to meet the 
special needs and capacities of low-income groups. 
The urban poor and near-poor are at the centre of 
the analysis: urban groups living below the absolute 
poverty line - or above it, yet vulnerable to social 
and economic risks. Vulnerable, in this context, 
means to be at risk of falling into poverty whenever 
a risk occurs. 
Main Thesis of the Study 
The study’s results indicate that micro-insurance is a 
promising approach to improving the social protec-
tion of the urban near-poor. In the long run, extend-
ing social insurance coverage is an alternative. But 
beforehand reforms will have to be carried out in the 
health sector and social insurance schemes alike. 
The majority of the poor, however, can only be 
protected by social assistance.  
One of the study’s recommendations is that non-
governmental and commercial institutions in Jordan 
should co-operate in offering life and work-dis-
ability micro-insurance. The Jordanian government 
and foreign donors are called upon to support such 
initiatives by creating favourable framework condi-
tions and by providing technical and possibly finan-
cial assistance. 
Methodological Approach of the Study 
This study was conducted by a research team from 
the German Development Institute (GDI). Its results 
are based primarily on a household survey carried 
out during a eleven-week mission to Jordan from 
February to April 2001. The survey, based on a 
mixed quantitative and qualitative research method-
ology, covered a total of 139 households from nine 
quarters of East Amman. The sample is not repre-
sentative of the urban Jordanian population, but 
though its composition very closely resembles the 
structure of representative national surveys. The 
survey’s aim was to assess the current protection of 
the urban poor and near-poor, their need for addi-
tional protection and their potential demand for 
micro-insurance.  
During the survey phase, the potential demand for 
micro-insurance was compared with the potential 
supply: initial results of the survey were presented 
to commercial insurers. Their comments were taken 
into account during the second half of the survey, 
when their proposals were discussed with house-
holds. Moreover, several decentralised organisations 
were interviewed with an eye to analysing their 
capacity as micro-insurance agents; the criteria used 
were derived from recent experience with micro-
insurance in other countries. 
Information from earlier reports as well as inter-
views with government officials, organisations ac-
tive in the field of social protection, donor agencies 
and academics were used to complement the data 
generated by the survey. 
Organisation of the Study 
The study starts out by outlining a framework for 
the subsequent analysis. It goes on to show that 
poverty is Jordan’s major problem, that the coun-
try’s operating social protection systems suffer from 
serious deficiencies and that a high percentage of 
II Markus Loewe et al.  
households are trapped in a gap between these sys-
tems. The study finally analyses the potential of 
micro-insurance in Jordan and presents recommen-
dations for Jordanian actors to reform social protec-
tion as well as proposals for development co-
operation. 
Protecting the Poor and Near-Poor 
Vulnerability and Poverty 
Risks are important poverty factors. Every human 
being is exposed to risks such as the death, work 
disability and dismissal of a main provider, illness, 
old age, business failure, drought, inflation, defores-
tation, war etc. Without support, many households 
fall into poverty when these risks occur, because 
risks lead to a sudden decline in income and/or rise 
in spending, thus destroying a household’s capacity 
to meet its most basic needs. 
Risk Management and Social Protection 
Social protection systems help households to man-
age risks. They are a means designed to reduce pov-
erty in three ways: (i) They use transfer mechanisms 
to lift people out of poverty. (ii) They support peo-
ple in preventing the occurrence of specific risks 
and in providing for the negative effects of risks by 
pooling and diversifying specific individual risks. 
(iii) They reduce the insecurity perceived by house-
holds with respect to the future and thus promote 
long-term planning and human and productive capi-
tal investment and encourage households to assume 
new risks implied by new income-generating activi-
ties. 
Extending Social Protection to the Poor and 
Near-Poor 
However, in many countries large shares of the 
population are excluded from social protection and 
thus vulnerable to risks. This holds especially true 
for low-income earners: (i) Social insurance is usu-
ally based on formal employment and is often re-
stricted to middle- or even high-income groups: 
government employees and members of the armed 
forces and possibly employees of the large compa-
nies of the formal ‘modern’ sectors. (ii) Social assis-
tance is often insufficient in scope and scale. 
(iii) Market-based products such as credit and pri-
vate insurance are too expensive for low-income 
earners. (iv) Informal systems such as mutual sup-
port networks are insufficiently reliable and provide 
only limited assistance.  
Three strategies geared to closing part of the gap in 
social protection are conceivable: (i) extension of 
the coverage of mandatory social insurance; 
(ii) broadening of the outreach of social assistance 
and (iii) development of voluntary contributory risk-
pooling schemes designed to meet the capacities of 
the poor and near-poor (i.e. vulnerable non-poor).  
Micro-Insurance 
The concept behind micro-insurance is voluntary 
risk-pooling. Micro-insurance products are afford-
able insurance policies that meet the demand of 
low-income groups. This is a new approach in social 
protection, and experience with operating schemes 
is limited. Still, it is possible to say that micro-
insurance schemes are viable when certain condi-
tions are given:  
First, micro-insurance depends on a favourable 
framework: political and economic stability, in-
vestment opportunities, adequate insurance regula-
tion, socio-cultural acceptance of insurance and 
effective judicial institutions and procedures. 
Second, low-income groups must perceive a need 
for micro-insurance (demand). They must be vul-
nerable to risks, aware of these risks, willing to pro-
vide for the future, understand and accept the con-
cept of insurance and be able to pay contributions 
on a regular basis. 
Third, micro-insurance should start out with prod-
ucts that are easy to design and that initially cover 
non-covariant risks that are characterised by high 
uncertainty and high potential losses. Life, work-
disability and in-patient health insurance, for exam-
ple, pool risks that occur only infrequently but entail 
very high losses that are extremely difficult to meet 
with the aid of simple savings products. 
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Fourth, supply should be organised along the lines 
of the ‘partner-agent model’. Here, a decentralised 
organisation active at the grass-roots level (the 
‘agent’) co-operates with a solid institution with 
experience in the insurance business and access to 
investment opportunities (the ‘partner’). The idea of 
such a partnership is to overcome the high transac-
tion costs and the information asymmetries that are 
inherent in the provision of insurance and which 
constitute the major obstacles to offering low-
premium contracts to low-income groups. The part-
ner-agent model divides up the tasks involved in 
insurance business between different types of insti-
tutions, in this way combining their specific 
strengths. A private or public sector insurance com-
pany here plays the role of partner and assumes 
responsibility for designing the product, investing 
reserves and pooling risks among a high number of 
insured persons. The role of agent is played by a 
non-governmental organisation, a union, a co-opera-
tive or a micro-finance institution, which is unable 
to fulfil the tasks of the partner. Its staff, in turn, has 
intense, often personal, contacts with the target 
group and thus has both far fewer difficulties and 
lower costs than the partner in marketing the prod-
uct and underwriting and checking client claims. 
Risks and Urban Poverty in Jordan 
The Extent of Urban Poverty 
Combating poverty should be seen as a central tar-
get of Jordan’s development policy for the coming 
years. Poverty is the country’s major social prob-
lem. The most reliable study on social issues in 
Jordan found that 23 % of households and 31 % of 
individuals have incomes below the national pov-
erty line. Other estimates on the extent of income 
poverty among households diverge widely from 
these figures. They range between 11 and 27 %, but 
all researchers agree that the extent and the intensity 
of income poverty in Jordan have significantly in-
creased from their comparatively low 1980s levels 
and that they are continuing to rise. This holds true 
for urban and rural areas alike. (Throughout the 
present study, poverty is understood as income pov-
erty. Notwithstanding the acknowledged objections 
to the use of a one-dimensional indicator for a 
multi-facetted phenomenon, this is justifiable in the 
context of social protection, whose task is to smooth 
income and expenditure.) 
The Profile and Causes of Urban Poverty 
To reduce poverty, Jordan has to embark on a strat-
egy that includes poverty-oriented policy reforms at 
the macro-level and structural adjustments at the 
meso-level. A two-pronged strategy of this kind is 
necessary because widespread poverty can only be 
explained by a combination of factors at the macro-, 
micro- and meso-levels:  
At the macro-level, poverty can be understood as 
the result of low average income levels and an un-
equal distribution of income and human, physical 
and social assets among Jordanian households. The 
incomes of the majority of the population are above 
the poverty line, but not far above it. Fluctuations in 
individual incomes (usually caused by the occur-
rence of risks) and upward drifts of the poverty line 
(usually caused by a rise in prices) can thus pull 
additional households into poverty. For this reason, 
efforts have to be made to redistribute productive 
assets and foster per capita income growth. At pres-
ent, average income levels are declining due to de-
creasing labour productivity; unemployment and 
underemployment rates are rising, the labour force 
participation rate is still low and all income gener-
ated has to be shared by a growing population. 
At the micro-level, poverty emerges when risks 
occur. Though many households, rural and urban 
alike, are able to satisfy their basic needs, they often 
fall into poverty when a main provider dies, is laid 
off or retires because of old age or work disability, 
when a family member is in need of expensive 
medical treatment, when a couple is divorced or 
separated and the wife is left without any income, 
when the number of children rises or when these 
children marry and are no longer able to support 
their parents. 
Moreover, households are more likely to be poor 
when their potential providers have only elementary 
schooling or even less. 
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At the meso-level, the ineffectiveness of Jordan’s 
social protection systems is another poverty factor. 
These systems seem unable to cushion the negative 
effects of social shocks. This assumption is based on 
the observation that despite the country’s high num-
ber of different social protection schemes, poverty is 
most widespread among households headed by a 
woman only or by an unemployed or underem-
ployed, disabled, old-aged or undereducated male. 
Hence an improvement in social protection is neces-
sary to complement macro-level poverty reduction 
strategies. 
Social Protection Systems in Jordan: an 
Institutional Analysis 
Jordan’s social protection systems suffer from seri-
ous deficits in the areas of efficiency and social 
fairness. They are well-funded and pursue different 
risk management strategies: risk prevention, risk 
pooling, risk diversification and risk coping. Still, 
large segments of the population are not covered 
and the benefit conditions discriminate between 
different social groups. 
In Jordan, social protection is based on six different 
institutions: (i) the state, (ii) the international com-
munity, (iii) the market, (iv) civil society organisa-
tions, (v) co-operative self-help groups and 
(vi) individual households and society at large. 
Public Systems 
The state is still the major provider of social protec-
tion, but a large share of the Jordanian population is 
not covered by any public protection system. This is 
not due to a lack of diversity on the part of the sys-
tems. The state provides social insurance, social 
assistance, social credits, subsidised public health 
care and commodity subsidies. Moreover, public 
spending for social protection is high compared to 
other developing countries. In 1995, it accounted for 
6.6 % of GDP. 
Public social protection suffers from a lack of co-
ordination and harmonisation between different 
public institutions running similar programmes for 
different social groups. Other problems result from 
the discriminatory eligibility criteria of these pro-
grammes and the skewered generosity of their bene-
fit provisions. 
Social insurance coverage extends to little more 
than 50 % of the population. Moreover, benefit con-
ditions and levels differ among three groups of the 
employed: (i) public and formal private sector em-
ployees are insured by the Social Security Corpora-
tion (SSC), (ii) civil servants by the Civil Insurance 
Programme and (iii) the members of the armed 
forces by the Military Insurance Programme. All 
schemes provide for pension and work injury bene-
fits, but only the latter two include health insurance. 
The benefit-contribution ratio is also far more gen-
erous for the Civil and the Military Insurance Pro-
gramme. 
Social assistance spending is insufficient in scope 
and scale. It does not exceed 1 % of GDP and 
reaches less than 20 % of the needy (5 % of the 
population). Moreover, four public institutions are 
running social assistance programmes with different 
eligibility criteria and divergent annual per capita 
assistance, ranging from 54 to 307 JD. 
Social credits for income-generating projects are 
provided by the National Aid Fund, the Develop-
ment and Employment Fund, the Ministry of Social 
Development and four semi-governmental founda-
tions. In 1998, however, they approved a total of 
only about 2,500 social credits. 
Basic commodity subsidies hardly play a role any 
more in Jordan. But public health care facilities are 
highly subsidised and primary and secondary 
schools are completely free of charge. 
Market-based Systems  
Market-based social protection includes commercial 
insurance, credit and savings products. 
27 insurance companies, some self-insured firms 
and the professional associations offer health, acci-
dent and life insurance. Their products, however, 
are too expensive for low-income earners: Only 
1.7 % of the population have life insurance, while 
5 % are covered by private health insurance.  
Improving the Social Protection of the Urban Poor and Near-Poor in Jordan  V 
Savings accounts and credits from banks are not 
accessible for low-income groups either, a fact 
mainly due to rigid access criteria (e.g. collateral 
requirements). For this reason, donors have set up 
micro-finance institutions to finance income-gen-
erating projects. Most micro-credits, however, are 
granted to medium-sized enterprises rather than 
small companies or business starters.  
Programmes of the International Community 
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East is a quasi-pub-
lic institution that provides social assistance, pri-
mary health care and basic education programmes in 
refugee camps. But only registered Palestinian refu-
gees, who constitute less than 35 % of the popula-
tion, are eligible. 
Programmes of NGOs 
Most Jordanian non-governmental welfare organisa-
tions (NGOs) are members of the General Union of 
Voluntary Societies in Jordan. Their programmes 
focus on women’s literacy and education courses, 
family consultancy and disability rehabilitation. 
Some also run micro-credit programmes, others 
emphasise women’s empowerment. The agenda of 
international NGOs is very similar to that of domes-
tic NGOs, but they have only limited outreach. 
Group-based Systems  
The popular Ğamaciyyât are rotating savings and 
credit associations: Members pay monthly sums to 
the group leader, who pays out the money collected 
to a different member every month. The Ğamaciyyât 
thus constitute informal alternatives to bank saving 
and lending. They play an important role for house-
holds in smoothing out short-term fluctuations in 
income. But they do not pool risks and are hence not 
suited for the task of managing risks with lasting 
effects. 
There are also numerous mutual insurance groups 
based on kinship relations. Members pay regular 
contributions into a fund which provides small 
benefits in cases of emergency that have been de-
fined ex ante (to cover e.g. funeral or wedding 
costs). 
Household-based Systems 
Many households still rely entirely on the mutual 
support traditional among relatives, friends, and 
neighbours. But this risk-coping strategy is limited 
in scope in that most of the relatives and neighbours 
of those in need are poor themselves. One even 
more important consideration is that such strategies 
also lack reliability because provision of assistance 
is not based on legal entitlements and can thus not 
be enforced under the law. 
The Current Gap in Social Protection in 
Jordan and Strategies for Coping 
Despite the variety of strategies used by Jordan’s 
social protection systems, almost half the population 
remains without protection from even the most seri-
ous risks. This is one finding of the GDI household 
survey. While medium- and high-income groups are 
covered by public or private insurance and some of 
the desperately poor are eligible for public assis-
tance, the near-poor are caught in a gap in social 
protection. 
When social risks occur, households are forced to 
deal with their effects. The GDI survey found that 
the most common strategies used to cope with risks 
are to (i) use savings, (ii) borrow money from 
friends, (ii) mobilise additional income from labour 
and (iv) apply for social assistance. 
Old Age, Work Disability and the Death of a 
Main Provider 
No more than 50 to 60 % of the population are in-
sured against life-cycle risks like old age, work dis-
ability and the death of a main provider, though 
these risks entail very grave effects and often result 
in poverty. While social insurance schemes cover 
around 50 % of the population, the outreach of pri-
vate insurance and social assistance that address 
these risks is negligible. Family assistance is often 
the means of last resort. 
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Divorce and Separation  
Women face specific life-cycle risks. They are vul-
nerable to divorce and separation from their hus-
bands, because for women it is harder to find jobs 
than for men. By law, men are obliged to provide 
for their wives, even after divorce. The GDI house-
hold survey indicates, however, that many divorced 
and separated women are unable to enforce their 
legal rights. It is for this reason that 9.9 % of NAF 
beneficiaries are divorced women. 
Unemployment and Underemployment 
Dismissal and business failure are frequent eco-
nomic risks that are not covered by any insurance in 
Jordan. The GDI survey revealed that social assis-
tance is no substitute either, because families with 
employable males are not eligible.  
Health Risks 
Illness is another serious risk. However, little more 
than half of the population has public or private 
health insurance. Only some of the very poor (5 % 
of the population) hold green-cards from the Minis-
try of Health (MOH) allowing them to use public 
health facilities free of charge. All Jordanians can 
refer to the highly subsidised MOH facilities, but 
their standards are low and patients are often not 
admitted for a lack of vacant beds. 
High Number of Children 
No social protection systems specifically aim at 
compensating families with a high number of chil-
dren, although this group is much more likely to be 
poor than other families. 
Low Education 
Primary and tertiary schools are free of charge. 
Nevertheless, an above-average share of the poor 
have only basic education or even less. 
Micro-Insurance in Jordan 
Micro-insurance would be able to bridge at least 
part of the current gap in social protection in Jordan. 
Partnerships between non-governmental or micro-
finance organisations and commercial insurance 
companies are a realistic prospect, they would be 
able to offer a life and work-disability micro-
insurance product that most of the urban near-poor 
would be willing and able to pay for.  
Framework Conditions 
The framework conditions for micro-insurance in 
Jordan are favourable: the political situation is sta-
ble, and while macro-economic development is not 
brilliant, it is solid; inflation is low and investment 
is possible. Micro-insurance is reported to be in 
conformance with Islam under some non-restrictive 
conditions. Insurance regulation is good, though 
some amendments should be envisaged, e.g. con-
cerning the licensing conditions for insurance agents 
and the NGO law. 
Demand 
The potential demand for micro-insurance products 
is substantial. The GDI survey confirmed that at 
present a high number of urban households are vul-
nerable to risks; they lack access to any social pro-
tection instrument. Nevertheless, they are aware of 
the risks that may occur and wish to provide for the 
future. The majority of interviewed households had 
no difficulty in understanding and accepting the 
concept of micro-insurance. Only a minority ex-
pressed religious objections to insurance as a strat-
egy for mitigating risks. 
But the GDI survey also revealed that most of the 
urban near-poor - though only a limited number of 
the poor - would be willing to participate in micro-
insurance and able to pay regular premiums. 
Product Design 
Term life and work-disability insurance is a product 
that commercial insurers – in co-operation with a 
decentralised agent – could offer at affordable pre-
mium levels and that the urban near-poor would 
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demand. A product of this kind is viable, easy to 
design and manage and appropriate to protect 
households from the most serious risks they face 
(i.e. high-uncertainty / high-loss risks). 
Property or health micro-insurance, however, are 
not options for the time being. According to the 
results of the GDI survey, very few urban house-
holds would buy property insurance. The potential 
demand for health insurance is even higher than that 
for life or work-disability insurance, but viable 
products are too expensive for the majority of 
households. It is, on the one hand, not possible to 
design affordable contracts covering treatment in 
private health sector facilities. On the other hand, 
potential partners in micro-insurance are unwilling 
to insure treatment in the - far less expensive - pub-
lic health care facilities, since to them information 
problems such as adverse selection, moral hazard 
and fraud appear insurmountable.  
Organisation and Actors 
It would be recommendable for micro-insurance in 
Jordan to be organised along the lines of the ‘part-
ner-agent model’ outlined above. It is essential for 
partners of micro-insurance (public or private insur-
ance companies) to co-operate with decentralised 
agents in marketing the insurance product, under-
writing and managing claims with a view to 
(i) minimising transaction and administration costs, 
(ii) solving information problems and (iii) building 
confidence among clients.  
It is, though, not possible either, to run micro-
insurance without the experience of commercial 
insurers: Their capacities to pool risks, invest funds 
and minimise adverse incentives are essential here. 
The partner of micro-insurance in Jordan should be 
a private sector insurance company rather than the 
public Social Security Corporation (SSC). Both 
would be able to pool risks on a broad customer 
basis, but the SSC has shown little interest in par-
ticipating. Moreover, it lacks the necessary actuarial 
know-how, is unable to invest reserves in a profit-
able way, and its administrative and financial per-
formance is weak.  
On the other hand, some commercial insurers are 
interested in expanding into the micro-insurance 
business and flexible enough to co-operate with 
non-profit agents. Their incentives are fourfold: 
(i) to gain access to new markets and enlarge their 
total market share, (ii) to realise profits despite 
small premiums, (iii) to gain publicity by addressing 
the near-poor and (iv) to attract clients who might 
later, once their economic situation has improved, 
become clients for standard products. 
These companies nevertheless have some concerns. 
They fear that (i) potential demand may not trans-
late into effective demand and the number of clients 
be too low to make the scheme profitable, (ii) mi-
cro-insurance may find itself exposed to an adverse 
selection of high risk groups only and (iii) co-
operation with non-profit agents could threaten the 
profitability of micro-insurance. 
The role of agent could be played by a micro-
finance institution (MFI), the zakat committees af-
filiated with the Zakat Fund or Jordan’s founda-
tions. Other organisations such as the General Un-
ion of Voluntary Societies might be considered as 
well, but first have to build capacities. 
The role of the agent should not be an exclusive 
one. It would be recommendable to offer micro-
insurance through various agents in order to balance 
out their respective strengths and weaknesses, 
maximise outreach and address different social 
groups. 
The MFIs’ comparative strength is their experience 
with other micro-finance products. Their micro-
credit programmes have reached sustainability 
within two years. Moreover, the MFIs are adminis-
tratively and organisationally stable and their staff is 
well-trained and very professional. However, their 
outreach is relatively limited and few of their clients 
are low-income earners. 
The zakat committees affiliated with the Zakat Fund 
have no experience with financial products and most 
of their workers are volunteers, but their pro-
grammes are very efficient and perform well. Their 
major advantages, however, are their almost nation-
wide outreach and their intrinsic commitment to 
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serving low-income groups, which is motivated by 
the religious belief of their staff. 
Jordan’s foundations, particularly the Jordan 
Hashemite Fund for Human Development and the 
Noor-al-Hussein-Foundation, also have broad out-
reach and deal with low-income groups. Moreover, 
they have qualified personal and even experience 
with credit insurance. Their over-head costs, how-
ever, which account for up to 60 % of their total 
spending, constitute a real weakness. 
Opportunities and Limits 
Micro-insurance in Jordan would not only improve 
the social protection of the urban near-poor but also 
benefit the agents and partners involved. The insur-
ance companies would in this way gain access to 
new markets. The agents would gain experience in 
new fields of activity and could in this way build 
additional capacities and capabilities.  
Micro-insurance would also have beneficial effects 
for Jordan as whole: raise public awareness of risks 
and help to put the state in mind of its duty to guar-
antee social protection for all. 
Finally, experience in Jordan with micro-insurance 
could also serve as an example and provide lessons 
enabling other Arab countries to replicate the ap-
proach. 
At the same time, however, micro-insurance should 
not be seen as the one-and-only solution for all 
problems and deficits in social protection: 
— It does not address the poor and not all of the 
near-poor will subscribe. 
— It cannot redistribute income in favour of the 
poor because participation is voluntary. 
— Only life and work-disability insurance is fea-
sible.  
— Benefit levels would be low as a consequence 
of premium affordability. 
Recommendations for Reform in Jordan 
Of the three possible strategies for extending the 
overall coverage of social protection as outlined 
above, micro-insurance is the most promising ap-
proach for Jordan to cater for its urban near-poor. 
Extending the coverage of social insurance could 
become an alternative approach. In the short-run, 
however, it will be difficult to realise, because in 
Jordan amendments in legislation entail long and 
drawn-out procedures. Moreover, the operating 
schemes should be thoroughly reformed with an eye 
to sustainability before additional – mostly low-
income – groups are integrated within them. 
Micro-insurance is in no sense an instrument that 
can be used to improve the social protection of the 
poor. Most of them are unable to pay for insurance 
and thus the only avenue open to them is support 
through social assistance. 
We thus recommend a threefold strategy to reform 
social protection in Jordan: (i) establishment of mi-
cro-insurance, (ii) reform of social pension and 
health insurance and the health care sector and 
(iii) widening of the outreach of social assistance. 
A Schedule for Establishing Micro-Insurance 
The initiative in establishing micro-insurance in 
Jordan could be taken up by a neutral institution 
marked by its central position in social development 
in Jordan and its manifold contacts to public, private 
and third sector organisations.  
We propose that the Social Productivity Programme 
Unit or the Near-East-Foundation should play this 
role of promoter of micro-insurance, i.e. to make the 
concept better known throughout Jordan, convince 
potential partners and agents to co-operate and pre-
pare the ground for a pilot project. 
Prior to implementation, additional research on the 
feasibility of and the demand for micro-insurance is 
indispensable. On the one hand, it is recommend-
able that the Insurance Regulatory Law and the 
NGO Law be changed to permit non-profit organisa-
tions (voluntary societies, zakat committees and the 
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foundations) to become active as agents of micro-
insurance. On the other hand, in-depth market re-
search is required to analyse the structure of the 
potential micro-insurance market in terms of re-
gional and social criteria. 
Micro-insurance should start out with a pilot proj-
ect. The target area has to be carefully chosen and 
the product offered must be well designed to meet 
the specific local demand. At the end of the pilot 
phase, the project should be evaluated to decide 
whether or not it should be terminated or scaled up 
as well as with a view to possible modifications in 
insurance contracts. 
To replicate the pilot project, information and mar-
keting campaigns have to be launched to raise pub-
lic awareness about risks and make the concept of 
micro-insurance well-known throughhout the coun-
try. At the same time, it will be necessary to build 
up the capacities of additional potential agent or-
ganisations and train their staff.  
Finally, a discussion forum could be established by 
all organisations involved as well as other interested 
parties to (i) ease the exchange of information, 
(ii) solve possible co-ordination problems, (iii) settle 
disputes and (iv) lobby for favourable legal frame-
work conditions. 
An Agenda for Reforming Social Insurance 
The ultimate objective of extending the mandatory 
coverage of social pension and health insurance to 
all groups of the population should not be lost sight 
of. However, this objective should only be pursued 
in a step-by-step process and only after the schemes 
operation have been reformed. 
Reforms must aim at restoring the efficiency and 
financial sustainability of these schemes. They al-
ready rely substantially on budget transfers (cover-
ing up to 85 % of their total spending). Public pen-
sion and public health care subsidies account for 
13 and 8 % respectively of fiscal spending. 
Not even the SSC’s scheme is sustainable. Current 
surpluses are due to the fact that the system has not 
matured yet. Its annual spending is expected to ex-
ceed revenues before 2024, and by 2042 its reserves 
will be eaten up. Integrating additional groups of the 
employed into it, most of them earning low wages, 
would further exacerbate the SSC’s financial posi-
tion, as long as the scheme’s current design has not 
been reformed.  
This fact is mainly due to the scheme’s overly gen-
erous minimum pension and early retirement provi-
sions and its unsound benefit formula. The SSC’s 
distorted investment policy and over-staffing are 
other factors contributing to its inefficiency. Hence, 
reforms are due in five fields: 
— In general, the SSC must be granted more inde-
pendence from government interference. In par-
ticular, the scope of the SSC’s investment strat-
egy has to be widened to allow for a more di-
versified portfolio, investment abroad and 
higher rates of return. The SSC should also 
build an expert investment unit. 
— The legal age of retirement should be raised 
and early retirement benefits should be reduced 
and be computed on the basis of sound actuar-
ial principles. 
— The pension formula has to be reviewed. As 
long as pensions are computed on a last-salary 
basis, the benefit factor should not exceed 
1.6 % for each contribution year, while in fact 
it is scheduled to rise from 2 to 2.5 % in 2001.  
— On the other hand, however, pensions should 
be automatically adjusted for inflation. 
— Minimum pensions must either be reduced or 
financed by the government. At present, 80 % 
of the insured are eligible for minimum pension 
benefits. 
The Military and Civil Pension Programmes in turn 
should raise contribution levels and minimum years 
of contribution eligibility requirements. 
As far as health insurance is concerned, extending 
coverage is even more important than it is for pen-
sion insurance: At present micro-insurance is unable 
to provide health insurance. This can only be 
achieved by integrating additional social groups into 
the Civil Health Insurance or by creating a new SSC 
daughter agency. 
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Beforehand, the sustainability of the existing 
schemes should be restored by (i) raising hospital 
user fees to reduce the number of referrals that 
could be treated in primary health care facilities, 
(ii) reducing the number of false claims by means of 
more effective claim management procedures and 
(iii) raising the contributions of those already in-
sured. As far as new target groups are concerned, 
initially only in-patient care should be covered to 
keep their contributions low. 
Recommendations for Broadening the Outreach 
of Social Assistance 
Social assistance spending must be increased in 
scope and scale. This is a difficult task for a lower-
middle-income country like Jordan. But it is possi-
ble to increase the efficiency of the providers by 
intensifying their co-operation, improving their tar-
geting, reducing duplication of administrative struc-
tures and closing the loopholes that enable some 
households to obtain multiple aid. Such efforts 
would set free financial resources that could be de-
voted to additional beneficiaries. 
The National Aid Fund is currently in the process of 
a reform aimed at achieving these goals, but as yet 
little success has been reported. Moreover, the Zakat 
Fund is also in need of capacity-building and re-
structuring to reduce its overhead costs. 
Recommendations for German Develop-
ment Co-operation 
Possible initiatives to reform social protection in 
Jordan should be supported by development co-
operation. 
The Framework Conditions 
The general conditions required for a German com-
mitment in the field are given: (i) Social protection 
in Jordan needs to be reformed. Poverty and the 
vulnerability of households to risks are among the 
country’s most serious problems. (ii) The govern-
ment is willing to improve the outcomes of social 
policy, and a considerable number of reform pro- 
grammes are already underway. (iii) The capacities 
needed to carry out the recommended reforms are, 
however, limited. The relevant institutions lack the 
expertise, skills and, in some cases, even the fund-
ing necessary. 
Present Donor Activities 
As yet, little support has been provided by multi- 
and bilateral donors towards reforming social pro-
tection in Jordan. Some have funded the reform of 
the National Aid Fund, others run micro-finance, 
community development or vocational training  
projects. Little support, however, has been provided 
to reforming social insurance, and no micro-
insurance project has yet been initiated. 
Potential Approaches 
German development co-operation should consider 
to get engaged in this field in the future. Social pro-
tection is an instrument important to combating 
poverty, the uppermost goal of German develop-
ment co-operation with the Middle East and North 
Africa. 
Micro-insurance in particular should be supported. 
This would be in accordance with the German gov-
ernment’s position that reforms in social protection 
should focus on the poor and near-poor. Moreover, 
German development co-operation has valuable ex-
perience with micro-insurance and thus comparative 
advantages in the field. 
It is in line with a position paper of the German 
Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and 
Development to say that Germany should support 
possible micro-insurance schemes in four ways: 
(i) funding preparatory research, initial technical 
equipment and training of trainers, (ii) cushioning 
financial risks by setting up a re-insurance fund, 
(iii) providing expertise for preparing and monitor-
ing a pilot project, training the agent’s staff, launch-
ing marketing and information campaigns and 
building capacities, and (iv) providing the above-
mentioned discussion forum consulting services. 
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Part I: Introduction and Theoretical Back-
ground 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and Objective of the 
Study 
Poverty remains widespread in Jordan and has even 
increased since the late 1980s, when the country 
was hit by a financial crisis: overall economic growth 
took a negative turn and prices increased sharply. 
As a consequence, unemployment rates doubled and 
the extent and depth of poverty rose significantly. 
The situation of low-income groups further deterio-
rated during the 1990s as a consequence of the ensu-
ing structural adjustment programmes, which, among 
other things, eliminated basic commodity subsidies.  
As a consequence of Jordanian losses in purchasing 
power, the subsistence poverty line went up. This 
meant that a rising number of households found 
themselves living below the line and saw no way to 
escape poverty again because of the lack of jobs and 
opportunities to start business projects. Other 
households fell into poverty when social risks (like 
unemployment, work disability or illness) occurred.  
Jordan’s social protection systems are unable to 
cushion the detrimental effects of this development. 
Social protection systems are “subsidiary systems of 
support” that help individuals or households to 
“manage the risks faced in life and cushion their 
consequences”.1 A huge share of the Jordanian 
population is without any social protection; these 
people are not covered by social insurance and not 
eligible for social assistance. As a consequence, 
they are vulnerable to social risks. 
Against this background, this report focuses on 
those groups of the population that are insufficiently 
protected against social risks. This focus group con-
sists of two distinct subgroups: the poor and the 
                                                     
1 Cf. BMZ (1999), p. 5. 
Near-Poor.2 ‘The poor’ refers to all those house-
holds already living below the national poverty line, 
while the group of ‘the near-poor’ (elsewhere re-
ferred to as ‘vulnerable non-poor’3) is made up of 
households which are living above the poverty line 
but are at risk of becoming poor whenever eco-
nomic or social shocks occur. They are not covered 
by formalised risk-provisioning systems and lack 
the financial resources and appropriate means and 
assets to cope with social shocks. 
Meanwhile, a decision was taken to focus only on 
the urban poor and near-poor and to leave the as-
sessment of rural areas for future research. The ra-
tionale for this more pragmatic decision was three-
fold. It can be assumed4 that rural groups (i) face a 
higher variety of risks (from agricultural business), 
(ii) generate lower levels of cash income to spend 
for their own protection and (iii) are less well in-
formed on insurance products and are hence more 
difficult to cover by contributory social protection 
schemes than urban groups. 
The question is how the social protection of the 
urban poor and near-poor can be improved and 
whether micro-insurance is a promising strategy to 
achieve this objective. Micro-insurance policies are 
small and affordable contributory risk-pooling 
products designed to meet the special needs and 
capacities of low-income groups.5 
This study analyses the current state of social pro-
tection in Jordan, examines alternative reform 
strategies and presents proposals aimed at enabling 
Jordanian actors to build up micro-insurance sche-
mes and recommendations for foreign donors to 
support such efforts. Beside micro-insurance, the 
study also discusses reforms in other fields of social 
                                                     
2 Focusing on the poor and near-poor is in line with German 
development co-operation’s objective of targeting above 
all the poor as well as ”population groups that are threat-
ened with poverty due to social risks“; cf. BMZ (1999),  
p. 4. 
3  Cf. Sebstad / Cohen (2000), pp. 4, 9 and 33; Wright / 
Dondo (2001), p. 62. 
4  Cf. Mosley (2001). 
5  Cf. McCord (2001b), p. 25. 
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protection, though at far less length. This is due to 
the fact that the extension of social security cover-
age and the broadening of the outreach of social 
assistance have been extensively discussed else-
where. 
1.2 Main Thesis of the Study 
It turns out that micro-insurance is in fact a useful 
means to close part of the current gap in social pro-
tection and thus to reduce the extent of poverty in 
Jordan. As a consequence, the study suggests that 
the Jordanian government and non-governmental 
organisations take an active role in building micro-
insurance schemes and recommends that foreign 
donors support possible efforts in this field.  
However, to minimise the gap in social protection, 
several strategies should be pursued at the same 
time. Micro-insurance is a useful concept for reduc-
ing the vulnerability of parts of the population, but it 
is not able to cover all risks and all social groups 
lacking access to social protection at present. Dif-
ferent reform strategies should be used at one time 
to cover different risks and to meet the specific 
needs of different groups of the population: 
— Contributory micro-insurance schemes should 
be established to cover urban near-poor house-
holds and prevent them from falling into pov-
erty as a consequence of the death or work dis-
ability of their main providers. 
— The social assistance schemes already in opera-
tion should be reformed and their outreach be 
broadened to cater for the poor, who are unable 
to pay for their own protection. 
— Social insurance coverage should be extended 
to workers in formal employment, where com-
pliance can be easily monitored. This is espe-
cially true for the risks of illness and old age, 
which are difficult for micro-insurance to cov-
er. However, before social insurance coverage 
is extended, thorough reforms in both, the op-
erating pension and health insurance schemes 
and the health care sector are due. 
1.3 Methodological Approach of the 
Study 
These findings are based on three different sets of 
information sources: (i) available studies on social 
protection in Jordan; (ii) interviews with govern-
ment officials, academics, foreign donor agents and 
the representatives of public institutions, private 
insurance companies and non-governmental orga-
nisations active in the field of social development in 
Jordan and (iii) a household survey carried out 
among poor and near-poor households in East Am-
man by a team from the German Development Insti-
tute (GDI) during a three-month research mission to 
Jordan between February and April 2001. 
The interviews with public, private and third sector 
institutions constituted the first step in the research 
of the GDI team in Jordan. Their task was to 
— complement and scrutinise the information 
given by other studies about (i) the framework 
of social protection in Jordan; (ii) the living 
conditions and problems of the urban poor and 
near-poor in Jordan; (iii) the relation of poverty 
and social risks; (iv) the coverage and perfor-
mance of the existing social protection systems 
and (v) ongoing or planned reform projects and 
donor activities in the field; 
— assess the potentials and limits of alternative 
reform options and identify the most promising 
of these strategies; 
— explore possible approaches to support them 
through development co-operation; 
— gather opinions about the potential of micro-
insurance in Jordan and  
— adequately design a household survey method-
ology. 
The second step involved carrying out the house-
hold survey: 139 households from nine quarters of 
East-Amman were interviewed to assess (i) the cur-
rent gap in social protection in Jordan, (ii) the social 
protection needs of the urban poor and near-poor 
and (iii) their potential demand for micro-insurance. 
The research areas were defined on the basis of 
extensive consultations with empirical social re-
search experts in Amman. Within the quarters se-
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lected, the GDI team co-operated with well-known 
local grass-root NGOs which drew up a sample of 
households based on predefined criteria given by the 
GDI team, accompanied the team into the house-
holds and commented on the information given 
where necessary.  
The results of this survey are not representative for 
Jordan. They can even not be said to reflect the 
situation of all of the urban poor and near-poor in 
Jordan: The survey, based on a semi-structured in-
terview guideline (see end of Annex A) and a small, 
more or less randomly chosen survey sample, made 
use of qualitative research methodology. It is more a 
case study aimed at revealing some trends as re-
gards (i) the major socio-economic problems of the 
focus group, (ii) the relevance of single risks, (iii) 
the nature and magnitude of the gap in social protec-
tion, (iv) the ability and willingness of poor and 
near-poor households to pay for their own protec-
tion and (v) their preference for single risk coverage 
by possible micro-insurance schemes. 
However, it should be stressed that the demo-
graphic, income and risk profile of the survey sam-
ple is similar to that of Jordan's urban population as 
reported by nation-wide and other more representa-
tive surveys. For this reason, the information given 
by the interviewed households was evaluated by 
means of both, qualitative and quantitative data-
processing methods.  
The sample included households classified as 
‘poor’, ‘near-poor’ and ‘non-poor / non-vulnerable’. 
Annex A sets out in more detail the criteria applied 
for selecting research areas and households from 
within them, the composition of the sample and the 
survey’s results. 
At mid-term of the household-survey, as a third step 
in research, additional rounds of interviews were 
conducted with insurance companies. They were 
briefed about preliminary results from the survey as 
to the focus group’s potential demand for micro-
insurance and asked whether they felt able to offer 
an insurance product meeting this demand.  
During the second half of the survey, the proposals 
of the companies for the design of micro-insurance 
products were taken into account: Households were 
asked not only whether they would be interested in 
micro-insurance and able to pay for it but also 
whether they would be willing to buy a policy with 
the specific design offered by the insurance compa-
nies.  
At the end of the household survey, insurance com-
panies were once again informed about the concerns 
of the interviewed households and asked about pos-
sible solutions to meet them. This iterative process 
was intended to produce more exact findings during 
the household survey and to fine-tune the design of 
a potential micro-insurance product. 
In a fourth and last research step, institutions con-
sidered potential agents were interviewed and ana-
lysed to look into their capacities and interest in 
becoming involved in micro-insurance projects. The 
analysis of potential actors was conducted along 
seven criteria drawn from recent experience with 
micro-insurance in other parts of the world. The 
criteria included the institutions’ (i) commitment to 
dealing with low-income groups, (ii) their outreach 
and proximity to the target group, (iii) the profi-
ciency of their staff, (iv) their administrative capaci-
ties and performance, (v) their experience in manag-
ing financial products, (vi) their organisational and 
financial sustainability and (vii) their willingness to 
participate in micro-insurance. 
1.4 Organisation of the Study 
The study contains eight chapters. Chapter 2, which 
follows, constitutes a theoretical framework for the 
analysis of social protection as well as recommenda-
tions for reforms addressing the poor and near-poor. 
Moreover, the concept of micro-insurance is intro-
duced and specified with an eye to best-practice 
experience.  
Chapters 3 to 5 look into the current state of social 
protection in Jordan. Chapter 3 is an assessment of 
the extent, causes and profile of poverty. It high-
lights the correlation between poverty and the oc-
currence of risks and ranks single risks in accord-
ance with their contribution to the spread of poverty. 
Chapter 4 is an analysis of the most important oper-
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ating social protection systems from an institutional 
point of view, while Chapter 5 looks at these sys-
tems as a whole with an eye to estimating the cur-
rent gap in social protection, identifying groups 
most affected by this gap and making out their pref-
erence for different strategies to cope with risks. 
Chapters 6 to 8 assess the advantages of alternative 
reform strategies and formulate recommendations 
for Jordanian policy-makers, non-governmental 
institutions and foreign donors. Chapter 6 is central 
in that it contains a proposal to establish micro-
insurance in Jordan. It (i) explores the objective and 
subjective social protection needs of the urban poor 
and near-poor, (ii) assesses the potential demand for 
micro-insurance in Jordan, (iii) discusses the capaci-
ties of different organisations in building up micro-
insurance schemes and (iv) makes a proposal for the 
design of a suitable micro-insurance product. Chap-
ter 7 makes recommendations for Jordanian actors 
to reform social protection. Beside a possible action 
plan for establishing micro-insurance, it presents 
proposals for reforms in the fields of social assis-
tance and social insurance. Chapter 8, finally, dis-
cusses the role of German-Jordanian development 
co-operation in supporting these reforms. 
2 Protecting the Poor and Near-Poor 
2.1 Poverty Reduction and Social 
Protection 
In its 2000/ 2001 World Development Report, which 
addresses poverty reduction, The World Bank men-
tions three factors that can cause poverty among 
households.6 Households are likely to be poor if 
they suffer from: (i) a low endowment with assets 
(physical, financial, human, social and / or other); 
(ii) low returns to assets; and / or (iii) a high volatil-
ity of returns to assets. Each single factor can lead 
to poverty; however, the factors are closely interre-
lated and often combined, which makes it even 
                                                     
6  Cf. IBRD (2000a). 
more difficult for the poor to escape the ‘poverty 
trap’. 
To reduce the number of households living in pov-
erty, efforts have to be directed towards each of the 
factors: (i) The assets of the poor should be in-
creased by improving their opportunities through 
better education, better and more efficient health 
care or the redistribution of land or other assets, for 
example. (ii) Returns to assets should be increased 
by enhancing the facilities for the poor: fair access 
to institutions, creation of labour-intensive employ-
ment opportunities, political participation, etc. 
(iii) Volatility of returns to assets should be reduced 
by creating securities for the poor, e.g. by reducing 
their vulnerability by means of improvements in 
social protection.  
Social protection systems are subsidiary systems of 
support that help households to “manage the risks 
faced in life and cushion their consequences”.7 So-
cial protection systems can contribute to poverty 
reduction in three ways: (i) They lift individuals out 
of poverty by ensuring a minimum living standard 
through transfers (e.g. social assistance). (ii) They 
prevent households from falling below the poverty 
line by reducing the negative consequences of risk 
occurrences. (iii) They reduce the vulnerability of 
households to risks and the insecurity households 
perceive with respect to the future. Hence social 
protection systems also promote households’ long-
term planning capacities and their willingness to 
take new risks by encouraging investment in pro-
ductive capital. 
2.2 Risks and Vulnerability 
Though differing in degree, literally every human 
being is exposed to risks8: natural risks (e.g. 
droughts, floods, rainfall), economic risks (e.g. un-
                                                     
7  BMZ (1999), p. 5. Cf. also Holzmann / Jørgensen (2000); 
Del Conte (2000), p. 4. 
8  Cf. Holzmann / Jørgensen (2000); IBRD (2000a), p. 136. 
For other classifications of risks cf. Sebstad / Cohen 
(2000), pp. 34 - 43; Lund / Srinivas (1999), pp. 31 - 37; 
Wright (1999). 
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employment, business failure / bankruptcy, harvest 
failure), social risks (e.g. health risks and life-cycle 
risks like old-age, disability, death), political risks 
(e.g. wars, inflation, transition costs and economic 
reforms) or environmental risks (e.g. pollution, de-
forestation). Some of these risks are co-variant - 
they affect all members of a group, community or 
even nation at a time; others are idiosyncratic - the 
likelihood of their occurrence is related to personal 
characteristics of individuals only.  
But all risks can result in a temporary or permanent 
decline in the living standard of those affected: This 
may be due to (i) loss of income (e.g. in case of 
unemployment), (ii) a rise in expenditures (e.g. in 
case of an increasing number of dependants) or (iii) 
a combination of both (e.g. in case of chronic illness 
and work disability).  
2.3 Vulnerability and Poverty 
Vulnerable households are not necessarily poor. 
Poverty and vulnerability differ in conceptually 
different terms. Poverty is a static concept measured 
in terms of levels of income, consumption or wel-
fare, while vulnerability is a more dynamic concept, 
which encompasses the likeliness of a household to 
fall into poverty as a result of risk occurrence. The 
extent to which households are vulnerable to risks 
differs from one household to another and depends 
on two factors not including income levels: (i) the 
likelihood that households will be hit by risks and 
(ii) their individual access to social protection 
means and endowment with financial, physical, 
human and social assets that can be used to soften 
the negative effects of risks. The function of assets 
in risk management is threefold: they can be sold to 
cover emergency spending, they can diversify the 
income of households (e.g. from capital to labour 
income) and they constitute security for institutions 
providing loans to a household.9 
Nevertheless, low-income groups are usually more 
vulnerable to risks than high-income groups: (i) they 
                                                     
9  Cf. Morduch (1999), p. 202; Sebstad / Cohen (2000), 
pp. 9 - 12. 
are exposed to a higher number of risks and a higher 
probability of risk occurrence than higher-income 
groups. This fact is due to their inferior housing and 
living conditions (which, for example, increase the 
likelihood of disease) and their lower education 
levels (trained workers are more likely to find em-
ployment). (ii) Low-income groups tend to be un-
able to save or accumulate physical and human as-
sets. Moreover, they are more likely to fall into pov-
erty when their income decreases or spending in-
creases, because their real income is already only 
slightly above the poverty line. 
As a consequence, low-income households also face 
difficulties in generating income: they not only tend 
to be more vulnerable to risks but are also more 
averse to risks and less willing to engage in high-
risk high-return activities, which could lead them 
out of poverty: poverty reinforces vulnerability and 
vulnerability perpetuates poverty.10 
2.4 Risk Management and Social 
Protection 
In response to vulnerability, individuals, households 
and communities have developed elaborate risk 
management mechanisms. These can be categorised 
along two lines (see Table 1): First, risk manage-
ment strategies can be distinguished according to 
their objectives: (i) Risk reduction or prevention 
aims at reducing the likelihood that a risk will oc-
cur; (ii) risk mitigation focuses on reducing the im-
pact of a negative shock; and (iii) risk-coping com-
prises all actions taken in response to a shock and 
aims at cushioning the impact of the shock (risk 
relief). 
Second, risk management mechanisms can be cate-
gorised as to the providing institution: Some are 
based on the action of individual households or self-
help groups, others are provided publicly or by the 
market. Which strategy is the most adequate is a 
question that varies from risk to risk. In most cases a  
 
                                                     
10  Cf. Del Conte (2000), p. 4; Mosley (2001), p. 51. 
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mix of instruments is the most promising approach - 
where different risk management strategies (reduc-
tion, mitigation and coping) and different provider 
institutions are involved. Furthermore, one factor 
crucial to the success of social risk management is 
that it take place in a sound and consistent policy 
framework with respect to, e.g., macroeconomic, 
educational and environmental policy - creating 
possibilities and enhancing facilities for the poor. 
Despite the variety of potential strategies, the ability 
of the poor and near-poor to manage their own risks 
is limited. Hence social protection is of crucial im-
portance for them as a means of providing support 
Table 1: Risk Management Mechanisms 
 individual and 
household 
group-based market-based publicly provided 
Risk prevention  
(risk reduction) 
- hygiene & other 
preventive 
health practices 
- migration 
- more secure 
income sources 
- collective ac-
tion for infra-
structure, dikes 
& terraces 
- common prop-
erty resource 
management 
- in-service train-
ing 
- financial market 
literacy 
- labour stan-
dards at work-
ing place 
 
- sound macro-economic 
policy 
- environmental policy 
- education & training 
policy 
- public health policy 
- infrastructure (dams, 
roads) 
- active labour market 
policies 
Risk mitigation 
(provision for risks) 
    
Risk  
diversification 
- crop & plot 
diversification 
- income source 
diversification 
- investment in 
physical &  
human capital 
- occupational  
associations 
- rotating savings 
and credit asso-
ciations 
- multiple assets: 
e.g. savings ac-
counts in  
financial  
institutions 
- micro-finance 
- asset transfers 
- agricultural  
extension 
- liberalised trade 
- protection of property 
rights 
Risk pooling 
(insurance) 
- marriage & 
extended family 
- informal  
insurance 
- buffer stocks 
- investment in  
social capital 
(networks,  
associations,  
rituals, recipro-
cal gift -giving) 
- mutual insur-
ance 
- old age annui-
ties 
- accident,  
disability &  
other insurance 
- pension systems 
- mandated  
insurance for 
unemployment,  
illness, disability & 
other risks 
Risk coping 
(dealing with risks 
ex post) 
- sale of assets 
- loans from 
moneylenders 
- child labour 
- reduced food 
consumption 
- seasonal or 
temporary 
migration 
- transfers from 
networks of  
mutual support 
- sale of financial 
assets 
- loans from  
financial  
institutions 
- social assistance 
- public works 
- subsidies 
- social funds 
- cash transfers 
- disaster relief 
Source: Holzmann / Jorgensen (2000), p. 17. 
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for their risk management efforts. But in most de-
veloping countries the operating formal social pro-
tection systems are not accessible for low-income 
earners: (i) most of the poor and almost all of the 
near-poor are not formally employed and thus not 
covered by social insurance schemes (which are in 
general based on formal employment). (ii) Market-
based systems like private insurance are often not 
affordable for the poor and near-poor. (iii) Social 
assistance is often insufficient in terms of scope and 
scale. 
Hence the poor and near-poor often rely on house-
hold- or community-based risk management strate-
gies such as savings and credit associations, ‘infor-
mal insurance’ (based on reciprocated mutual sup-
port between relatives, neighbours, colleagues or 
friends) or non-reciprocated support based on bor-
rowing or granting.11 For the risk management of 
the poor and near-poor, such non-formalised social 
protection systems provide essential (and often their 
only) support, but their capacities are often limited 
in both, scale and scope, and they are highly suscep-
tible to economic stress. They are not comprehen-
sive, sustainable or even reliable. They therefore 
cannot fill gaps in formal social protection systems. 
2.5 Extending Social Protection to the 
Poor and Near-Poor 
To improve the social protection of the poor and 
near-poor, three basic options should be taken into 
consideration:12 (i) extending and reforming the 
existing mandatory social insurance; (ii) broadening 
the outreach of social assistance and (iii) building 
voluntary contributory schemes designed to meet 
the special needs of the poor and near-poor. A mix 
of strategies is once again the most promising ap-
proach, because the poor and near-poor have very 
different needs and capacities. 
In theory, the extension of mandatory social insur-
ance to all households is the first-best option. First, 
                                                     
11  Cf. Del Conte (2000), p. 5; Morduch (1999); Wright 
(1999); Lund / Srinivas (1999), pp. 54 and 68 - 71. 
12  Cf. van Ginneken (2000). Cf. also Beattie (2000), p. 135. 
its compulsory character ensures social protection 
for everyone.13 Second, mandatory schemes over-
come the problem of adverse selection. Third, social 
insurance allows for personal re-distribution and 
thus guarantees a minimum level of benefits. 
Fourth, implementation of new systems entails high 
initial costs, e.g. for establishing administrative bod-
ies.  
However, a number of practical problems are asso-
ciated with the extension of social insurance:14 
(i) the poor and near-poor usually lack a good lobby 
or self-organisation. Hence little pressure is put on 
the state to extend the coverage of social insurance 
in favour of this group. At present, the representa-
tives of formal labour and middle and higher in-
come classes often oppose any change in eligibility 
criteria for social security, fearing that such changes 
might undermine the privileges of the groups cur-
rently covered. (ii) Due to the scarcity of financial 
resources, governments are often reluctant to broad-
en social security systems. (iii) Administrations of 
social security systems are often unable to deal with 
the special circumstances of informal sector work-
ers. (iv) The problem of non-compliance is difficult 
to overcome.  
Tax-based social assistance can be targeted to the 
most needy of a society and benefits are not linked 
to contribution payments. Social assistance is the 
only income source for many people who cannot 
help and manage their risks themselves. Most de-
veloping countries have social assistance systems, 
but they are often limited in scale and scope and do 
not reach the target group effectively. The main 
constraints hampering the promotion of social assis-
tance are insufficient administrative capacities, lim-
ited financial resources and a lack of acceptance 
among taxpayers. 
Voluntary contributory schemes are a third option to 
extend social protection provisions to the near-poor. 
                                                     
13  However, the poor are not able to contribute to social 
insurance schemes. To ensure the coverage of all citizens, 
their contributions have to be taken over or by the state or 
by the group of the insured. 
14  Cf. Beattie (2000), pp. 135 - 137. 
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They can be designed to meet the special needs and 
capacities of this target group. Often they are the 
only promising option in the short run. However, 
they can rarely provide comprehensive social pro-
tection, either in scale or in scope. In addition, con-
tribution-based systems can cover only households 
capable of spending at least part of their income for 
their own protection. In other words: voluntary con-
tributory schemes may be an adequate instrument to 
cater for the needs of the near-poor, but not to meet 
the capacities of the poor. 
2.6 Micro-Insurance 
Micro-insurance is one way to cover the currently 
unprotected near-poor on the basis of voluntary 
contributory schemes. Micro-insurance is a rather 
new concept: like micro-credit and micro-saving, 
micro-insurance is intended to serve the needs of a 
specific social group: the near-poor who are not 
covered by formal social protection systems but 
could afford to pay for their own social protection. 
In that it addresses risk management, micro-
insurance can be seen as a straightforward supple-
ment to existing micro-finance products.  
For the purpose of this study, micro-insurance sche-
mes are defined as “essentially risk-pooling tools 
designed for the benefit and affordability of low-
income persons.”15 According to this definition, 
‘insurance’ is a risk-pooling financial instrument 
                                                     
15  McCord (2001b), p. 25. This definition has replaced older 
and less precise definitions in large parts of literature; cf. 
also Beattie (2000); Brown / Green / Lindquist (2000) , pp. 
2 - 3; Brown (2001b), p. 12; McCord / Isern / Hashemi 
(2001); McCord / Mutesasira (2000a); McCord / Mutsasira 
(2000b). Only two years ago, Brown / Churchill (1999) 
were still referring to micro-insurance as any kind of ‘in-
surance for low-income households’. According to other 
authors, micro-insurance refers exclusively to the so-called 
partner-agent model, one of three organisational models 
which will be explained below; cf. e.g. Dror / Jacquiers 
(1999). The World Labour Report 2000 refers to the ‘mu-
tual insurance model’ only: It considers “help being ex-
tended to those in need”, with the group of insured decid-
ing “on the size and source of the contributions” and the 
collection and investment of contributions to be managed 
by the insured to be constitutive for micro-insurance; cf. 
ILO (2000). 
based on contributions, a large number of partici-
pants and the sharing of risks between those ad-
versely affected by a covered risk and those not 
affected. The affix ‘micro-’ indicates that the con-
tribution payments are smaller than the premiums of 
ordinary commercial insurance contracts and af-
fordable for the near-poor as well as that the product 
meets this target group’s special needs as to suppli-
ers, covered risks, transaction formalities etc. In 
turn, of course, benefits are limited with respect to 
volume and number of covered risks.  
Micro-insurance is thus a broad concept; it can be 
designed in many different ways:  
— The product can cover all sorts of risks. 
— It can be offered by any government, private-
sector or non-government institution, or even 
by an alliance of several different institutions. 
— It can be offered in combination with other 
financial services (e.g. micro-credit). 
— Enrolment may be mandatory or voluntary. 
But the design must always take the needs and ca-
pacities of the targeted group and the given institu-
tional framework (e.g. availability and capacities of 
potential actors) into account. 
The objective of micro-insurance is poverty eradica-
tion. It approaches this aim in two different ways: 
by reducing the risks and by improving the opportu-
nities of the near-poor.16 First, it stabilises their liv-
ing standard and prevents them from falling below 
the poverty- line and adding up to the number of 
those that are already poor and find it very difficult 
to escape from poverty again. Second, and perhaps 
more important, micro-insurance encourages the 
near-poor to take measures to escape poverty in the 
long term: near-poor households usually spend all of 
their spare income to save for future crises. When 
protected against the most serious social risks, some 
of this saving is set free for alternative higher-yield 
investments. Moreover, a household will in this case 
be less averse to take new (economic) risks related 
to income-generating activities like starting up a 
business. Consequently, micro-insurance facilitates 
                                                     
16  Cf. Del Conte (2000), p. 4. 
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self-help activities of low-income households, re-
duces their vulnerability through income diversifica-
tion and fosters the accumulation of productive as-
sets. 
Micro-insurance enables people to better manage 
their risks and bridges part of the gap left open by 
formal protection systems. However, it is certainly 
not a panacea: insurance is only one solution for 
reducing the risks of the near-poor.17 It is limited in 
scope and scale and can rarely cover the whole tar-
get group. For many risks, for example, micro-
saving might be more appropriate. 
In the following, four important issues are dis-
cussed, which have to be taken into consideration 
when a micro-insurance scheme is established: 
(i) the framework conditions, (ii) potential demand, 
(iii) the design of the insurance product and (iv) the 
organisational shape of the scheme and the actors 
involved. These same issues will be discussed later 
below (Chapter 6) with reference to Jordan.  
It must be stressed that micro-insurance is a rather 
new concept. Most of the findings presented here 
are based on experience from existing micro-
insurance systems. However, since most micro-
insurance schemes have been established only re-
cently, the results are only preliminary. Moreover, 
no research has been published that discusses the 
micro-insurance approach from a more theoretical 
point of view. 
Framework Conditions 
Insurance is a sophisticated business and depends on 
favourable framework conditions such as, for exam-
ple, stability of the political and economic givens, 
modest inflation, opportunities to invest reserves, 
adequate insurance regulation, socio-cultural accep-
tance of the insurance business and effective judicial 
regulations, institutions and procedures or other 
kinds of mediation instruments. Some of these con-
ditions are self-evident, others are in need of 
explanation: 
                                                     
17  Cf. Brown / McCord (2001) , p. 2. 
High inflation may pose serious problems for micro-
insurance: Insurance schemes promise future bene-
fits for present-time contribution payments. For the 
time-span in-between, however, insurers and poli-
cyholders are exposed to inflationary risks. For 
policyholders, for example, inflation risks are high 
for contracts that for provide for fixed nominal sums 
of benefit payments (as is often the case with life 
insurance policies). The insurer, in turn, may incur 
losses with tangible benefits (e.g. reimbursement of 
costs for health care or damaged property) if he 
underestimates necessary contribution levels. Insur-
ance policies should therefore possibly include pro-
visions to offset any risk of inflation. 
A moderate inflation rate is crucial in that in this 
case the risks associated are acute for insured and 
insurer alike: Long-term policies with nominally 
fixed benefits, e.g. life insurance, lose their real 
value for policyholders when inflation is high. The 
insurer, in turn, is at risk of underestimating contri-
butions, a factor particularly relevant for medical 
insurance. 
Investment is another crucial condition for any in-
surance business. To increase the efficiency of life 
and disability insurance schemes (not health insur-
ance), annual surpluses should be invested. Hence 
an insurer’s performance depends on returns on 
investment, on the one hand, and on underwriting 
results, on the other hand.18 This requires capital 
markets that function efficiently and insurers that 
have access to them. Moreover, legal and economic 
conditions must permit investments in both national 
and foreign markets to diversify risks.  
Finally, regulatory issues concerning capital re-
quirements and the role of the insurer are of special 
importance for micro-insurance.19 (i) Minimum cap-
ital requirements generally aim at encouraging fi-
nancial stability; however, if capital requirements 
                                                     
18  Cf. Brown / Churchill (1999), p. 46. Underwriting profit 
means the assessment of the relation between premiums 
and claims. It reflects the insurer’s ability to calculate in-
surance products. 
19  Cf. Bennet / Creese / Moasch (1998), pp. 52ff.; Brown 
(2001b), p. 23; Loewe (2000a), p. 68; Lund / Srinivas 
(1999), p. 66. 
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are set too high, insurers are unwilling to offer low-
premium policies, since only a large business vol-
ume can ensure a sufficient return on investment. 
Also, they may impose significant barriers to market 
entrants willing to offer micro-insurance products. 
(ii) The insurers’ ability to offer micro-insurance is 
often limited as a result of overly rigid insurance-
market regulation: sometimes, for example, the 
integration of insurance products with other finan-
cial services (credit, savings) is restricted or the 
conditions for selling insurance contracts are too 
difficult to be met by micro-finance or other non-
governmental institutions.  
Demand 
The demand of households is, of course, the most 
important condition of micro-insurance. Before a 
micro-insurance project is built up, intense research 
must be carried out to find out 
— what kind of households are vulnerable to what 
kind of risks, 
— whether households are aware of their risks,  
— whether they are willing to provide for the fu-
ture and interested in being supported in their 
risk management efforts, 
— whether they would understand and accept the 
concept of insurance and consider insurance the 
most appropriate social protection strategy for 
them, 
— whether they are willingness and able to con-
tribute to micro-insurance on a regular basis. 
Product Design 
Insurance can be an efficient risk management strat-
egy for all risks characterised by high uncertainty 
and high potential losses. Outstanding examples 
include the early death or work disability of a fam-
ily’s main provider. By pooling the risks of a large 
group of insured, it is possible for households and 
individuals to exchange uncertain high losses in the 
future for calculable and regular contribution pay-
ments in the present.  
However, before a micro-insurance scheme is estab-
lished to cover a specific risks, it should be clear 
(i) that there is demand for the product; (ii) that 
insurance is a technically feasible solution to protect 
against the risk involved; (iii) that insurance is the 
most adequate solution (savings products are some-
times more appropriate for risks with low potential 
losses or for certain events such as, for example, 
marriage or children’s education) and (iv) that in-
surance can be financed.20 
Recent experience21 suggests that at least four risks 
are insurable under certain conditions: early death, 
work disability, health care and property damage.  
Life insurance is the simplest insurance line.22 It can 
be offered as term life insurance, permanent life 
insurance and endowment insurance: (i) Term life 
insurance is valid for a defined period of time, the 
term. The benefit is only paid out to the survivors if 
the death of the insured occurs during the term. 
(ii) Permanent life insurance is valid until the death 
of the policyholder and includes a savings compo-
nent. (iii) Endowment life insurance combines the 
term and the savings components. In case the poli-
cyholder dies within the term, the sum insured is 
paid out; if not, he or she withdraws the savings plus 
interest when the term is over. 
The design of term life insurance can be applied for 
permanent and total work disability insurance as 
well. However, if the policy includes permanent and 
partial work disability, information costs increase. 
Temporary work-disability insurance that provides 
continued income payments in case of illness or 
injury is one of the most complex insurance prod-
ucts. The assessment of income losses for self-
employed persons and potential fraud creates addi-
tional risks for the provider. 
                                                     
20  Cf. Brown / Green / Lindquist (2000), pp. 5 - 7; Brown / 
McCord (2000), p. 3; Del Conte (2000), pp. 12 - 14; Lund / 
Srinivas (1999), pp. 75 - 79. 
21  Cf. Del Conte (2000), pp. 7 and 12; Lund / Srinivas (1999), 
pp. 47 - 48. 
22  Cf. Brown  / Churchill (1999), pp. 4 - 5, 16 - 18 and  
25 - 29; Del Conte (2000), pp. 7 - 9; Roth (2001), p. 48. 
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Benefits for life and disability insurance are lump-
sum payments. Monthly pension schemes over a 
non-defined period are in principle possible but 
require special know-how and a stable insurance 
scheme making it possible to pool risks across a 
sufficient number of insured parties. These condi-
tions are usually not given for micro-insurance 
schemes. 
Health insurance can theoretically cover all costs 
linked to health care services, but practically all 
micro-insurance schemes limit benefits. Health in-
surance is a much more complicated product than 
life and work-disability insurance. There are three 
reasons for this: (i) To calculate premiums, the in-
surer needs detailed information about the risk pro-
files and costs of health care services. (ii) Voluntary 
health insurance attracts bad risks, i.e. those who are 
more likely to need medical treatment. Hence the 
minimum insurable unit should be a household or 
family. (iii) Claim abuses by both, policyholders 
and health care providers, require effective control 
mechanisms. For these reasons, none of the operat-
ing health micro-insurance has thus far been able to 
develop complete financial sustainability: all 
schemes depend on continued subsidisation and 
have been unable to reach the poorest households. 23 
Property insurance usually covers the damage, loss 
and/or theft of assets for a limited period of time. 
Property insurance is more risky and more complex 
to administer for the insurer than life insurance be-
cause the value of assets is difficult to determine 
and households can easily make false claims or 
neglect their insured assets.  
Most other risks cannot be insured through micro-
insurance or, at least, are very difficult to cover. 
This is especially true for unemployment, an impor-
tant risk for this study’s target group. Information 
problems such as adverse selection and moral haz-
ard make it impossible to insure the risk of unem-
ployment through any other than mandatory 
schemes.  
                                                     
23  Cf. Bennet / Creese / Moasch (1998); Brown / Churchill 
(1999), pp. 47 - 48 and 51 - 58; Brown / McCord (2001), 
p 3; McCord (2001b); ILO / PAHO (1999), p. 20 and 23. 
Organisation and Actors 
Any insurance business involves four groups of 
tasks:24  
— Product design includes the development of the 
product (decision on coverage, premiums and 
conditions), testing and pricing. 
— Product management (risk management, finan-
cial management, monitoring) includes final 
verification of claims, settlement of claims, in-
vestment of funds and pooling of risks among 
those insured by the scheme as well as by other 
schemes of the supplier (possibly through re-
insurance).  
— Product sale includes marketing of the policies 
(advertising, promotion, delivery), verification 
of clients (underwriting, initial screening and 
monitoring of the clients) and processing of in-
surance applications.  
— Product servicing, finally, includes all ongoing 
contacts with policyholders: collection of 
primes, management and payment of claims, 
and transfer of benefits. 
Insurance is normally provided by commercial 
companies (private insurance) or by government 
agencies (social insurance). Both offer insurance 
contracts not attuned to the specific needs and ca-
pacities of low-income groups. Social insurance is 
usually linked to formal employment and commer-
cial insurance is too expensive. Neither the state nor 
the private sector offers low-premium low-benefit 
insurance contracts that the near-poor would de-
mand. The reasons are twofold25 and have to be 
taken into consideration when micro-insurance 
schemes are designed: 
First, the insurer faces more information asymme-
tries when dealing with low-income informal sector 
employees: It is much easier to obtain any necessary 
information about the risk-profile of a formal sector 
worker registered with the government administra-
                                                     
24  Cf. Brown / Churchill (2000), pp. 21 - 22; Brown / 
McCord (2001), p. 11. 
25  Cf. Freiberg-Strauß (1999). 
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tion. Moreover, low-income earners are more likely 
to be hit by social shocks because of their hazardous 
living conditions and more likely to behave care-
lessly once they are insured (moral hazard) or to 
claim unjustified benefits (fraud). 
Second, fixed per capita costs do not allow for 
small-premium insurance contracts: the costs of the 
above-mentioned administration and transaction 
tasks do not depend on the amount insured. The sum 
per policyholder is constant and may even exceed 
collected premiums when these are low. Hence mi-
cro-insurance cannot be run by commercial insurers 
alone.26 
Basically, four organisational models27 are conceiv-
able: (i) the ‘full-service insurance model’, (ii) the 
‘partner-agent model’, (iii) the ‘community-based’ 
or ‘mutual insurance model’ and (iv) – for health 
micro-insurance - the ‘provider insurance model’. 
The decision for one model or another depends on 
many factors, such as, for example, the risk to be 
covered, the framework conditions, the institutional 
landscape (institutions operating in the field and 
willing to participate) and the trust of potential cli-
ents in the institutions involved. 
Each of these models involves different actors and a 
different division of the four above-mentioned 
groups of tasks among them. The criteria28 used to 
decide on the involvement of institutions within 
these models and their respective roles should be  
— minimising administration and transaction 
costs, 
— overcoming information asymmetries, 
— creating confidence among the target group, 
                                                     
26  Cf. Brown / McCord (2001), pp. 4 and 10. 
27  Cf. Bennet / Creese / Moasch (1998), pp. 23 and 81ff.; 
Brown / Churchill (2000), pp. 24 and 50 – 53; Del Conte 
(2000), p. 8ff.; Lund / Srinivas (1999), pp. 69ff.; McCord 
(2001b), pp. 26ff.; Mosley (2001), p. 26; Wright (1999), 
pp. 5 - 8. 
28  Cf. Beattie (2000); Del Conte (2000), p. 12; Lund /  
Srinivas (1999), p. 55 – 57; McCord (2001b), p. 32 – 33 
and 36 – 37; Morduch (1999), p. 197; Mosley (2001), p. 52 
and 58. 
— investing funds adequately (at high yields and 
low risks), 
— pooling risks sufficiently among a high number 
of insured parties and 
— reducing adverse incentives due to contradic-
tory interests of actors involved. 
The full-service insurance model involves only one 
actor, who is solely responsible for all activities, 
product design, sales and servicing (see Figure 1). 
Obviously, the full-service insurer needs a very high 
capacity to deal with the problems described above. 
In theory, his role could be assumed by public, pri-
vate or non-governmental institutions or, in some 
cases, by micro-finance institutions that have ex-
perience in the marketing of financial products and 
are capable of keeping track of detailed information 
on the client.  
Commercial private insurers and centralised gov-
ernment agencies, which, however, are as a rule far 
distant in social and spatial terms from the low-
income groups themselves. Products offered by such 
institutions usually do not address the needs of low-
income households - they are too expensive and too 
difficult to understand. Moreover, these institutions, 
lacking direct contact with the target group, are in 
most cases unable to overcome problems related to 
asymmetric information (adverse selection, moral 
hazard, fraud). Finally, low-income groups often 
shy away from direct relationships with insurance 
companies, because (i) they are not familiar with the 
concept of micro-insurance and do not expect insur-
ance companies to offer products fitting their needs; 
(ii) insurance companies are often difficult to access 
for them; and (iii) they are suspicious of insurance 
companies and fear being cheated. 
Micro-finance institutions and non-governmental 
institutions, on the other hand, have intense contacts 
with the target group and thus do not face these 
problems. But they are usually unable to pool risks 
among a sufficient number of insured parties and 
lack the actuarial and managerial capacities required  
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Figure 1: Organisational Models of Micro-Insurance 
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to develop and run micro insurance and to manage 
access to financial markets to invest reserves.29 
It is against this background that the partner-agent- 
model has been developed. It seeks to overcome the 
difficulties of the full-insurance model by interpos-
ing an intermediary between the insurer and the 
policyholder.30 The four tasks involved are divided 
between the intermediary – the ‘agent’ - and the 
insurer – the ‘partner’ (see Figure 1).  
The role of the agent is crucial in this model. It can 
be played by non-governmental organisations, un-
ions, co-operatives, micro-finance institutions or 
solidarity groups with strong cohesion, with the 
partner assuming the task of to designing and man-
aging the product. 
The division of responsibilities, benefits and costs 
allows each actor to focus on doing what he can do 
better than the other.31 The agent incurs only limited 
costs in marketing the product, collecting premiums, 
monitoring clients, managing claims and paying out 
benefits, since it already has well-established rela-
tions with the target group. He knows potential cli-
ents well, and thus information asymmetries are 
weak. Moreover, decentralised organisations have 
the appropriate organisational structures and the 
know-how needed to deal with low-income groups.  
However, such organisations often lack the capacity 
to design an insurance product, this being a highly 
demanding task. As a consequence, the product 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
29  Cf. Brown / Churchill (2000), pp. 16 - 17 and 54; Musau 
(1999), pp. 18 - 19 and 25. 
30  Cf. Brown / McCord (2000), p. 8; Lund / Srinivas (1999), 
pp. 48 - 49 and 67. 
31  Cf. Del Conte (2000), p. 5; Lund / Srinivas (1999), p. 55. 
 design should be provided by a private or public 
insurance company – the partner. Such companies 
have the necessary actuarial know-how as well as 
the capacities needed to pool risks and invest funds.  
Micro-insurance can also be organised as commu-
nity-based or mutual insurance. In this model the 
insured and the insurer are identical, i.e. the insured 
pool their risks within a self-help group. This group 
forms a mutual insurance association and performs 
all four groups of tasks: product design, scheme 
management, prime collection and claim settlement. 
Mutual insurance is the least formalised of the four 
potential models of micro-insurance, but also the 
least reliable and secure: often it is based on oral or 
implicit contracts between its members, and this 
may make legal enforcement of claims difficult. 
Moreover, the cohesion of self-help groups under-
goes significant fluctuations and their capacities to 
price products adequately and pool risks sufficiently 
are very limited.32 
Additionally, health insurance can be offered 
through the so-called provider model, where a 
health care provider (e.g. a hospital or a rural health 
clinic) offers insurance contracts at reasonable 
prices. Here the main problem is that the insuring 
provider is in a difficult situation marked by con-
flicting interests: on the one hand, he is interested in 
maximising the volume of health care sales. On the 
other hand, he has to control costs so as to safeguard 
the financial viability of the insurance scheme.33 
                                                     
32  Cf. Brown / McCord (2000), p. 8. 
33  Cf. McCord (2001b), pp. 31, 33 and 35. 
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Part II: Analysis of the Present Situation 
3 Risks and Urban Poverty in Jordan 
Widespread poverty is Jordan’s major social prob-
lem and it is correlated with the occurrence of social 
shocks. While the spread of poverty is the result of 
several macro-economic factors (high unemploy-
ment, income inequality, high demographic growth, 
low labour force participation), social risks like, e.g. 
illness and the work disability, old age and death of 
the main provider, play an important role in initiat-
ing poverty at the micro-level of the individual 
household. 
To illustrate these findings by empirical evidence, 
this chapter attempts to assess the extent of poverty 
in Jordan (3.1), to determine the interdependence of 
poverty and unfavourable factors at the macro-level 
(3.2) and to sketch a profile of poverty, i.e. for iden-
tifying social groups that are disproportionately 
affected by poverty (3.3). This poverty profile per-
mits conclusions on the predominate risks initiating 
urban poverty at the micro-level as well as some 
preliminary speculations on structural deficiencies 
at the meso-level, i.e. gaps in Jordan’s social protec-
tion system that will be verified in Chapter 4. 
3.1 The Extent of Urban Poverty 
It is difficult to determine the exact extent of pov-
erty. In the present study poverty is defined as abso-
lute income poverty. Hence the extent of poverty is 
given by the number of households with an income 
below the subsistence level (see Box 1).  
The estimates of different Jordanian and interna-
tional organisations diverge widely, although they 
use almost the same national poverty line (see Table 
B7 in Annex B). A recent World Bank report34 sug-
gests a poverty rate of 11.7 %, while a study of the 
                                                     
34 Cf. IBRD (1999e), p. 7. 
independent Norwegian FAFO institute35 indicates 
an absolute poverty rate of 27 %. Both estimates are 
based on surveys carried out by the Jordanian De-
partment of Statistics (DOS). However, their meth-
odology of computing poverty rates is weak: In the 
first place, they count the incidence of poverty 
among households – not individuals. In the second, 
they use one single poverty line for the whole of 
Jordan, and this does not take into consideration that 
the costs of living differ greatly between gover-
norates as well as between rural and urban areas. 
The most reliable study found 23 % of households 
and 31 % of individuals to be poor.36 It was carried 
out by DOS and the Ministry of Social Development 
in co-operation with UNDP and has not been pub-
lished yet. It takes regional price differentials into 
consideration and computes the extent of poverty by 
household and individual. According to this study, 
the extent of poverty has increased over the last ten 
years, while the above-mentioned World Bank re-
port states that poverty rates dropped until 1997, 
rising again only after that year.37  
As for the intensity of poverty, the World Bank 
states that parameters declined between 1992 and 
1997: While in 1992 the income of the average poor 
was 24.9 % below the poverty line, the shortfall was 
only 21.7 % in 1997.38 
Poverty is prevalent in both urban and rural areas. It 
is difficult to draw a direct comparison because of 
differing price levels.39 According to UNDP, the 
extent of poverty is 29 % in urban and 37 % in rural 
                                                     
35 Cf. Hanssen-Bauer / Pedersen / Tiltnes (1998). 
36  Cf. Bakir (2001), p. 4. 
37 Cf. IBRD (1999e), p. ii. The World Bank reports decreas-
ing poverty rates between 1992 and 1997 despite a marked 
fall in average income levels. It argues that the reduction in 
poverty during the 1990s is due to a reduction in inequality 
of income distribution. 
38 Our calculations, based on IBRD (1999e), p. 7. 
39 For example, housing is much more expensive in the big 
cities like Amman, Irbid or Zarqa than in rural areas. 
Moreover, many rural households supply themselves with 
water or food. 
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areas.40 In absolute terms, however, 75 % of the 
poor live in urban areas, a fact due to the country’s 
high urbanisation rate (78 %). A third of the poor 
live in urban Amman alone. 
3.2 The Causes of Urban Poverty 
At the macro-level, the high national and urban 
poverty rates are mainly the result of widespread 
unemployment and underemployment, low and 
decreasing wages, income inequality, high popula-
tion growth and low labour force participation.  
This sub-chapter outlines the magnitude of these 
problems and discusses their causal relation to pov-
erty. There is no need to stress that higher economic 
growth and a more even distribution of incomes and 
assets would do much to reduce the problem of pov-
erty in Jordan. Higher growth rates would create 
additional demand and thus enlarge business oppor-
                                                     
40 Cf. Bakir (2001), p. 5.  
tunities and create additional employment. Jordan’s 
recent economic development is highlighted in 
Box 2. 
The Lack of Productive Employment 
Widespread unemployment and underemployment 
(see Box 3) are two of the most crucial causes of 
poverty in Jordan. In 2000 nearly one third (32 %) 
of the labour force was unemployed (14.4 %) or 
underemployed (17.6 %).41 Unemployment in Jor-
dan is of a structural, not cyclical, nature. Long-term 
unemployment is widespread: one quarter of the 
unemployed have been looking for work for more 
than two years. 
High unemployment rates in Jordan result on the 
one hand from low economic and high demo-
graphic growth rates. Per capita income growth was  
                                                     
41 See Tables B10, B11 and B12 in Annex B. 
Box 1: Assessing the Extent of Poverty 
This study defines poverty as income poverty. Other definitions of poverty (that follow the basic human needs ap-
proach and take an insufficient supply of infrastructure, nutrition, drinking water, education, housing along with low 
income levels into account) are not considered here. Such a purely financial definition of poverty is usually not ac-
ceptable, though it can be justified in the context of social protection, where the major aim of policy is to smooth out 
income and expenditure. 
It is important to draw a clear distinction between the terms relative, absolute, and subjective poverty: Subjective pov-
erty is given when a person considers himself poor. A person is poor in the sense of relative poverty when her or his 
income (or spending) is inferior by a certain percentage (usually 25%) to the country’s average per capita income (or 
spending). Absolute poverty means that a person is unable to cover the spending required for her or his most basic 
consumption needs. 
The extent of poverty in a country is given by the share of the poor of the country’s total population (head-count 
rate). This ratio can be expressed by household or by individual. Both ways of counting have their advantages: It is 
easier to determine the income or consumption of an entire household, though individual counting is more precise. 
The latter usually ends up in higher head-count rates, because poor families usually have more members.  
The depth of poverty is measured by the poverty gap index, which captures the percentage shortfall below the pov-
erty line for the whole population. The absolute magnitude of the total poverty gap amounts to the money needed to 
completely erase poverty, if it were perfectly targeted and each poor person were given exactly the value of his or her 
income shortfall below the poverty line.  
The intensity of poverty can be derived from the depth of poverty by dividing the poverty gap index by the total num-
ber of the poor. It describes the percentage shortfall of the average poor below the poverty line. 
Source: Loewe (2000a), p. 10. 
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Box 2: Jordan’s Economic Development and Transition Process during the Last Decade 
In 1989 Jordan was hit by two currency crises and a debt service default, which marked the starting point of the coun-
try’s transition process. The crises were due to an intolerable balance of payment deficit and a huge public debt burden. 
Over decades, Jordan had followed a rentierist mode of development: National income levels were highly dependent on 
remittances from Jordanian migrant workers in the Gulf and official development assistance from Western and Gulf oil 
countries. These flows of income decreased substantially in the mid-1980s because of eroding oil prices in the world 
market. Jordan, unwilling to adjust its fiscal and economic policy, used international borrowing at commercial rates to 
finance extensive government spending. The 1989 currency devaluation and subsequent inflation were consequences of 
this policy. Low-income groups in particular were negatively affected by the declining purchasing power of their sav-
ings as well as by rising prices for consumer goods.  
With the financial support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and following debt rescheduling by the Paris and 
London Clubs of creditors, Jordan managed to regain macroeconomic stability.  
In 1992 a structural adjustment programme was launched. It aimed at raising competitiveness for an export-led growth 
strategy. Inefficient state-owned enterprises were set to be privatised, budget expenditures to be cut and the trade regime 
to be deregulated. Most of the planned institutional and legislative reform measures remained on paper only and imple-
mentation has clearly lagged behind. The Jordanian authorities introduced a general sales tax (to be converted into a 
full-fledged value-added-tax in 2001) and an investment promotion law, abolished discrimination against foreign inves-
tors and made the Amman Financial Market more transparent. But bureaucrats at all levels possess great discretionary 
power and continue to make heavy use of personal relationships (wasţa), a practice that entails individual gains but 
losses in social welfare. High rates of economic growth materialised for a short period, but they were based on large 
capital inflows from Jordanians returning from Kuwait and other Gulf countries. 
As these transitory capital inflows passed by, the postponed structural measures and the disappearance of Jordan’s main 
trading partner, Iraq, resulted in a sudden fall of GDP growth rates. In combination with persistently high population 
growth rates of about 3 % p.a., low national growth rates even resulted in negative per capita growth rates. The trade 
deficit remains high, because Jordan’s strong dependence on imports has not been overcome and the volume of exports 
has failed to rise. The country continues to depend on the export of mineral resources. As a result, unemployment and 
poverty have stagnated and even started to rise again. 
Jordan’s economy depends strongly on the economic development in its neighbouring countries and the world market 
price of oil. The ups and downs of the Middle East peace process decide on the development of the tourism sector, the 
possibility to attract foreign direct investments, the volume of external trade and access to Mediterranean ports. With its 
scarcity of exploitable resources, Jordan has only limited prospects of growth in the traditional export sectors such as 
phosphate, potash and some derivatives. The major natural constraint, however, is water scarcity.  
The new King, Abdallah, has shown a strong commitment to economic reforms since the beginning of his reign. Three 
major steps of Jordan’s new reform drive are accession to the World Trade Organisation, participation in the 
EUROMED Agreement, which will lead to free trade for manufactured goods with the European Union, and a recently 
signed free trade agreement with the United States. After long periods of hesitation, the privatisation process finally ac-
celerated in 1999, when stocks of strategic enterprises were sold to foreign investors. The government began selling 
shares of the then state-owned Jordan Investment Corporation, in this way stimulating trading on the Amman stock 
market. The Palace clearly emphasises the development of an information-technology industry and is promoting the 
tourism sector. 
Source: IBRD (1999b); Schlumberger (2000b) 
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negative for several years and the economy was 
unable to provide the required number of additional 
jobs that a rapidly growing population calls for. 
On the other hand, the lack of productive employ-
ment is the result of a misguided education and 
training policy. On the whole, Jordanians tend to be 
either without any vocational training or overquali-
fied. Many have university degrees, but the country 
lacks skilled workers. Unemployment rates are 
highest among labour market entrants (people under 
the age of 30) as well as among university graduates 
(Table B12 in Annex B). An above-average inci-
dence of unemployment is found among women - 
especially unmarried and divorced women.  
At the macro-level, the lack of productive employ-
ment is a severe constraint for Jordan’s economy, 
because productive resources are thus unable to be 
fully utilised. Moreover, the oversupply of labour 
depresses real wages. Many of the poor accept 
whatever employment they can get, notwithstanding 
long working hours, low output and low rates of 
return to income.42 
Income Inequality  
Uneven distribution of income and assets is another 
poverty factor. In the past, poverty has increased 
when income inequality rates have risen. This is true 
for the period between 1987 and 1992, when the 
Gini coefficient rose from 0.45 to 0.49 (Table B9 in 
                                                     
42  Cf. IBRD (1994d), p. 61; cf. Shakhatreh (1999), p. 28. 
Annex B) as a result economic development in these 
years (see Box 2).  
However, reduction of the Gini coefficient to 0.38 in 
1997 was unable to prevent another increase in the 
extent of poverty. Despite the country’s ambitious 
structural adjustment programme, which was started 
in 1992, real wages declined due to stagnating or 
even falling nominal wages and rising price levels. 
Inflation was high due to a significant devaluation 
of the Jordanian Dinar (JD) and the elimination of 
basic commodity subsidies. 
High Demographic Growth 
Jordan’s high population growth is outstripping 
GDP growth, thus preventing the economy from 
providing a sufficient number of new jobs and so-
cial services (see Box 2). The country’s demo-
graphic growth rate has slowed down, but it is still 
among the highest in the world. Jordan’s population 
(about 5 million in the year 2000) is forecasted to 
double by 2020. This trend is due to the country’s 
high fertility rate (4.2 children per woman) and ris-
ing life expectancy (71 years at birth in 1999).43 
Almost half the population (46.6 %) is either under 
the age of 15 or above the age of 65 and depends on 
income transfers from a small number of income 
earners.  
 
 
                                                     
43  Cf. IBRD (1999e), Annex III, p. 3. 
Box 3: Unemployment and Underemployment 
The unemployment rate is defined as the percentage of persons in the labour force who are not employed but are ac-
tively looking for work.  
Effective unemployment, however, is often higher. Apart from the visibly unemployed, there is invisible unemploy-
ment, consisting mainly of discouraged potential workers. They are neither employed nor actively looking for jobs: 
Persons of working age who have given up seeking employment. 
Underemployment can also be distinguished in terms of visible and invisible underemployment. Persons not able to 
work as many hours as they wish are visibly underemployed. Persons working at a job that does not fully utilise their 
skills are invisibly underemployed. 
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Low Labour Force Participation 
Jordan’s low labour force participation rate is an-
other cause of poverty. In 1998, the labour force 
included less than half the overall working-age 
population. 58.1 % of the working-age population 
were unable or unwilling to work or had given up 
looking for employment (Table B10 in Annex B). 
As a consequence, Jordan’s dependency ratio is at a 
high 80 %, which means that one salary must feed 
five persons. Average households count 7.1 mem-
bers, of whom only 1.5 are income providers. The 
low labour force participation among women 
(14.1 % compared to 69 % for men) is particularly 
striking.44 The main reason for this fact is that 
women tend to stop working when they marry. 
Among urban poor people, labour force participa-
tion is even lower, amounting to only 55 % for men 
and 5 % for poor women.45 
                                                     
44  Cf. Shakhatreh (1999), p. 28. 
45 Cf. Khayri / Nasir (1995), p. 39. 
3.3 The Profile of Urban Poverty 
For households, social risks are individual poverty 
factors. In Jordan poverty is most widespread 
among typical risk groups such as (i) the disabled, 
(ii) the old-aged, (iii) the unemployed and underem-
ployed, (iv) women-headed households, (v) people 
with health problems, (vi) families with high de-
pendency ratios and (vii) the undereducated. 
The profile of urban poverty is similar to the na-
tional poverty profile. This fact is shown by the 
findings of a case study carried out by Khayri /  
Nasir (1995) among 418 families in East-Amman 
and the results of the GDI household survey carried 
out in March / April 2001 (see Annex A).  
Work Disability 
The disabled have a high above-average incidence 
of poverty. Households with a handicapped house-
hold head are twice as likely to be poor than aver-
Table 2  Characteristics of Poor and Rich Households 1996 
Characteristics % of 
bottom 
income 
decile 
% of 
top 
income 
decile 
% of 
all  
relation 
between 
lowest / 
highest 
decile 
relation 
between 
lowest 
decile / 
mean 
share of lowest 
income decile in 
group character-
ised 
Without economically active members 37 6 10 6.2 3.7 37 % 
Main provider is at least 60 years old 32 7 9 4.6 3.6 36 % 
Without employed member 54 8 17 6.8 3.2 32 % 
Household head is woman 31 9 10 3.4 3.1 31 % 
Main provider chronically ill 32 7 12 4.6 2.7 27 % 
Household head illiterate 51 7 19 7.3 2.7 27 % 
Living in refugee camp 19 1 5 13.0 2.6 26 % 
Household head is at least 60 years old 41 14 17 2.9 2.4 24 % 
Main provider unemployed 17 2 7 8.5 2.4 24 % 
Main provider in agriculture 11 4 7 2.8 1.6 16 % 
Household head has only basic education 93 33 67 2.8 1.4 14 % 
Mean 10 10 100 1.0 1.0 10 % 
Source: Hanssen-Bauer / Pedersen / Tiltnes (1998), Table 6.3; authors’ calculations. 
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age. These persons are unable to work and generate 
income and therefore depend on the assistance of 
others. Table 2 shows an incidence of poverty al-
most three times above-average for households with 
the main provider suffering from chronic health 
problems. During the GDI household survey chronic 
illness was the most frequently mentioned risk af-
fecting the economic situation of households (see 
Table A19 in Annex A). Furthermore, the survey 
revealed a strong correlation between poverty and 
disability: 64 % of the households with at least one 
disabled member were classified as ‘poor’ or 
‘probably poor’ (see Figure 2). Both findings were 
confirmed by the UNDP report, which found 42 % 
of the disabled to be poor.46 
Old-age 
The old-aged are a second risk group. The FAFO 
report states that a household’s risk to be poor is 
three times above average when the household head 
is older than 60 years (see Table 2).47 The GDI 
household survey, however, did not find a correla-
                                                     
46  Bakir (2001), Annex, p. 4. 
47  Cf. Hanssen-Bauer / Pedersen / Tiltnes (1998). 
tion between the number of old-aged persons in a 
household and the incidence of poverty (see Table 
A11 in Annex A). According to the UNDP study, 
the incidence of poverty among households with 
members aged 60 years or more is even slightly 
below average.48 
Death of the Main Provider, Divorce and 
Separation 
Female-headed households are more often exposed 
to poverty than male-headed households. These may 
be single unmarried women or households with 
widowed, divorced or separated (abandoned) female 
household heads. According to the results of the 
2001 GDI household survey in East Amman, the 
correlation between urban households headed by 
women and incidence of poverty is highly marked: 
54 % of the interviewed female-headed households 
were classified as ‘poor’ or ‘probably poor’ the 
figure for male-headed households being only 34 % 
(see Figure 3). Similarly, the Norwegian FAFO 
Institute found the incidence of poverty among 
women-headed households to be three times above 
                                                     
48  Cf. Bakir (2001), annex, p. 3. 
Figure 2: Relation between Poverty and Work Disability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: GDI household survey (see Table A10 in Annex A) 
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average (see Table 2). Surveys commissioned by 
UNDP and the World Bank, however, did not con-
firm this finding: They even indicate a slightly be-
low-average poverty rate among female-headed 
households.49 
But they do confirm the concentration of poverty 
among divorced or separated women. The single 
most serious risk for a woman is divorce or separa-
tion from her husband, but the correlation between 
poverty and widowhood is not significant, though a 
huge percentage of Jordanian divorced and aban-
doned women are poor. These findings are con-
firmed by the UNDP report50, which found that 
47 % of separated women live below the national 
poverty line. A possible explanation might be that 
widows, on the one hand, are often entitled to a 
social security pension or supported by their own 
relatives or family-in-laws. Divorced women, on the 
other hand, are cut off from all their relations and 
refused any further support.  
                                                     
49  Cf. Bakir (2001), p. 7; IBRD (1994c), p. 20; IBRD 
(1999e), Annex III, p. 3. 
50  Cf. Bakir (2001), Annex, p. 3. 
Women, in general, are more exposed to social 
risks: They are more likely than men to be illiterate, 
without employment or low wage earners. 
There are three reasons why female household 
heads find it more difficult than males to find the 
employment (or well-paid employment) they need 
to care for themselves and their children: First, 
many women lack vocational education or work 
experience. The education level among women is 
much inferior to that of men. Second, work for in-
come is less well accepted for women than for men. 
The female labour force participation rate signifi-
cantly dropped over the last decade, when migrant 
workers returned from the Gulf and the unemploy-
ment rate rose among males and females alike. 
Third, women find it hard to work and at the same 
time care for their children. 
Poverty rates are highest for female double-risk 
groups like single women over age 60 or single 
women with less than basic education. Here the 
incidence of poverty is as high as 67 % and 64 % 
respectively.51 
                                                     
51  Cf. Hanssen-Bauer / Pedersen / Tiltnes (1998), 
pp. 212 - 214. 
Figure 3: Relation between Poverty and Gender of Household Head 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: GDI household survey (see Table A13 in Annex A) 
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Unemployment and Underemployment 
The lack of productive employment in Jordan is not 
only a serious social problem for the economy as a 
whole, but it also constitutes a significant individual 
risk. A World Bank poverty assessment from 199952 
finds the incidence of poverty to be far above aver-
age among households whose head is unemployed 
or underemployed (see Box 3, p. 18). Another study 
carried out by the Norwegian FAFO Institute in 
1998 shows that the share of bottom-income decile 
households characterised by unemployed household 
heads is 2.4 times higher than among the overall 
Jordanian population (see Table 2).53 Khayri / Nasir 
found above-average unemployment rates for the 
Amman poor (28 % compared to an average of 
20 %).54  
The incidence of poverty is even higher among 
households without any member in employment. 
When the main provider is dismissed, households 
often use the labour income of other household 
members to replace his income. When no single 
member is economically active, a household’s prob-
ability of being poor is almost three times above 
average (see Table 2). 
Bad Health 
Chronic or acute illness is another poverty factor. 
More than 40 % of the families from the GDI 
household survey that were found to be poor had 
been affected by health risks in the past, while this 
was the case for only 21 % of the non-poor house-
holds (see Table A19 in Annex A). On the one 
hand, illness requires financial resources to cover 
treatment. This fact is further highlighted by the 
large number of poor Jordanians insufficiently cov-
                                                     
52  Cf. IBRD (1999e), Annex III, p. 2 and Table AIII.1a, p. 6.  
53  Cf. Hanssen-Bauer / Pedersen / Tiltnes (1998), pp. 143 -
 148. 
54  Cf. Khayri / Nasir (1995), p. 36. The GDI household sur-
vey found no correlation between unemployment and pov-
erty (see Table A19 in Annex A), but this result is not sig-
nificant, because only six household heads from the sample 
were classified as ‘unemployed’ (see Table A14 in Annex 
A). 
ered by health insurance (see Table A5 in An-
nex A). On the other hand, illness may affect one of 
a household’s income providers and, at least for a 
time, result in income losses. Moreover, chronic 
disease can ultimately even mean total work disabil-
ity. 
High Number of Children 
Having many children is a severe social risk for 
Jordanian families. This effect is highlighted by two 
findings:  
First, large households are characterised by a high 
dependency ratio and are very likely to be poor. 
Here, the dependency ratio is defined as the ratio of 
non-working household members to all members of 
the household. Poor households have 40 % more 
household members than non-poor households.55 
According to the, a household with twelve members 
is almost five times more likely to be poor than a 
household with only six members. Similarly, 44 % 
of the GDI sample households from East Amman 
with a dependency ratio of 0.75 or more were classi-
fied ‘poor’ or ‘probably poor’, the figure being 16 % 
for households with a dependency ratio below 0.75 
(see Figure 4). 
High dependency ratios can be due to a high number 
of children, old-age persons, work-disabled or un-
employed persons or persons outside the labour 
force. Such household members depend on the in-
come of others of working age. In Jordan, however, 
there is strong evidence that the concentration of 
poverty among households with high dependency 
ratios can be traced back to a correlation between 
poverty and high number of children.56  
Second, the incidence of poverty among children is 
far above average. 21 % of children younger than 7 
                                                     
55  Cf. Bakir (2001), p. 7. 
56 Cf. Bakir (2001), p. 7; Hanssen-Bauer / Pedersen / Tiltnes 
(1998), p. 54. The dependency ratios are dominated by 
persons under 15 (42.5 %) rather than old people (2.9 %). 
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and 25 % of children between the ages of 7 and 15 
years live in poor households.57  
Jordanians themselves often perceive the large size 
of their household as the principal cause of pov-
erty.58 For urban areas, Khayri / Nasir found the 
share of children under the age of 15 among the 
urban poor (45.9 %) to be higher than among the 
urban non-poor (37.8 %).59 This finding was con-
firmed by the results of the GDI household survey. 
Meanwhile, it can also be argued that the large size 
of Jordanian households is a result of poverty, since 
a high number of children is considered to be a 
strategy of providing for old age.  
Low Levels of Education and Training 
The incidence of poverty is far above average 
among the undereducated. Only 32 % of Jordan’s 
non-poor households have elementary schooling or 
                                                     
57  Cf. IBRD (1994c), p. 22. 
58  Cf. IBRD (1994c), pp. 21f.  
59 Cf. Khayri / Nasir (1995), p. 35.  
less; but the figure is 53 % for the poor.60 According 
to the Norwegian FAFO Institute61, the share of 
households with illiterate household heads is almost 
three times higher among the bottom-income decile 
than among the entire population; the share of 
households with the head having basic education or 
less is 1.4 higher (Table 2). The World Bank reports 
the poverty incidence among households with illit-
erate household heads to be 28%.62 Similarly, 
Khayri / Nasir found only 3.3 % of the urban poor 
to have higher education, while this figure was 
6.5 % of the non-poor.63 
The correlation of poverty and low education levels 
can be explained by the fact that people with low 
education levels usually work in low-productivity, 
low-wage industries. The poverty risk of unskilled 
                                                     
60  Cf. Bakir (2001), p. 18. 
61  Cf. Hanssen-Bauer / Pedersen / Tiltnes (1998), p. 225. 
Jordanians with basic education or less are eight times 
more at risk to become poor than university graduates. The 
incidence of poverty of illiterates is double the national av-
erage, cf. IBRD (1994c), p. 14; IBRD (1999e), Annex III, 
p. 3. 
62 Cf. IBRD (1999e), Annex III, p. 3. 
63 Cf. Khayri / Nasir (1995), p. 36.  
Figure 4: Relation between Poverty and Dependency Ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: GDI household survey (see Table A9 in Annex A) 
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workers is twice an average employee’s risk of liv-
ing below the poverty line. 
Low education is not only an important poverty 
factor but also an outcome of poverty incidence. 
School dropout rates remain high among low-
income groups in Jordan, even though the country’s 
public education system is free of charge and ten 
years of basic school are compulsory. One of the 
main reasons is that poor parents’ children are urged 
to work and contribute to family income as soon as 
possible.  
This correlation may be interpreted in two different 
ways: On the one hand, people with chronic health 
problems may be unable to work, and thus have no 
wage income. On the other hand, those who are 
already poor tend to be unskilled workers active in 
dangerous economic sectors like construction, 
where they are highly exposed to work injuries and 
occupational diseases.  
4 Social Protection Systems in Jordan: 
an Institutional Analysis 
The Jordanian ‘social protection net’ breaks down 
into a great number of different social protection 
systems (see Table 3). We can distinguish, on the 
one hand, systems based on risk prevention or risk 
mitigation from other systems based on risk-coping 
strategies. Risk pooling (e.g. social insurance) and 
saving (e.g. on bank accounts) are the most impor-
tant mitigation strategies in Jordan, while among the 
risk-coping strategies family assistance and public 
social assistance are by far more prominent than 
borrowing.  
On the other hand, these systems are based on dif-
ferent institutions: the state, the international com-
munity, the market, civil society, co-operative ar-
rangements and social norms. 
The social protection sector in Jordan does not suf-
fer from a lack of funding. It is well endowed with 
financial resources. At least one fifth of GDP is 
spent on social protection (see Table B14 in An-
nex B). 
But only part of the population benefits from this 
spending, leaving the other part without any social 
protection: The greater share of social protection 
spending goes into market-based saving (that only 
the better-off can afford) and to public social insur-
ance, which exclusively covers the armed forces, 
civil servants and employees of private and public 
medium- and large-scale enterprises. A much 
smaller share of social protection spending (far be-
low 5 % of GDP) goes to redistributive transfer 
schemes (social assistance, subsidised health care). 
Yet low-income groups living slightly above the 
poverty line are neither covered by private or social 
insurance nor eligible for social assistance. 
This chapter presents the most important social pro-
tection systems, sorted in terms of (i) the institutions 
on which the systems are based and (ii) their social 
protection strategy (risk prevention, risk-pooling, 
risk diversification and risk-coping). 
4.1 Public Systems 
At present, the state is the most import provider of 
social protection in Jordan. It runs a variety of 
schemes intended to support household social pro-
tection efforts based on: insurance, assistance, loans, 
public health care and commodity subsidies. These 
schemes are administered by a number of different 
public institutions. 
However, the public social protection network is far 
from comprehensive: A large share of the popula-
tion is not covered by any of the schemes and re-
mains unprotected against risks such as old age, 
unemployment, illness or work disability. 
This is not due to a lack of funding. The total share 
of public spending for social protection is high 
compared to other Arab or non-Arab developing 
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countries.64 In 1995 public social sector spending 
(including health and education) accounted for 
16.1 % of GDP, 6.6 % of which went to social pro-
tection. 
Insufficient co-operation and co-ordination between 
the different public institutions active in the field, 
however, are serious problems. They result in partial 
                                                     
64  Cf. Tzannatos (2000), p. 19. 
overlaps of provisions and non-harmonisation of 
targeting rules. Considerable financial means are 
lost because of these deficiencies.  
Even more serious perhaps, public means budgeted 
for social protection are spent in an ineffective way. 
Reallocating funds bears considerable potentials for 
improving efficiency and social fairness. 
Table 3: Risk Management Mechanisms and Social Protection Schemes in Jordan 
 household-
based 
group-based market-based provided by 
non-
governmental & 
international 
organisations 
publicly  
provided 
Risk 
reduction 
preventive 
health practices 
labour migra-
tion to the Gulf 
  UNRWA school 
system 
UNRWA health 
policy 
education and training 
policy public health 
policy 
Risk 
Diversifica-
tion 
income source 
diversification 
among house-
hold members 
education 
ğamaciyyāt 
(pp. 39 - 40) 
investment in 
social capital 
(wasţa- 
seeking) 
saving with 
banks  
(p. 36) 
micro-finance  
institutions 
(p. 37) 
micro-finance  
programmes of 
NGOs  
(pp. 38 - 39) 
income generat-
ing projects 
income-generating pro-
jects 
vocational  
training 
Risk-Pooling 
(Insurance) 
marriage and 
mahr 
extended  
family 
mutual insur-
ance: family 
and solidarity 
funds 
(p. 40) 
private life, 
health & acci-
dent insurance 
(p. 35) 
occupational 
associations:  
insurance  
programmes 
(p. 36) 
social insurance:  
MPP/ RMS, CHIP/ CPP, 
SSC 
(pp. 25 - 30) 
Risk-coping mutual support  
(pp. 40 - 42) 
philanthropic 
assistance 
(p. 42) 
out-migration 
child labour  
reduced con-
sumption 
ğamaciyyāt 
(pp. 39 - 40) 
micro-finance  
institutions  
(p. 37) 
loans from mon-
eylenders 
borrowing from 
employer 
dis-saving 
sale of assets 
UNRWA special 
hardship & 
health care 
programmes 
(pp. 37 - 38) 
NGO Credit & 
Social Assis-
tance pro-
grammes 
(pp. 38 - 39) 
social assistance  
programmes: 
e.g. NAF, Zakat Fund 
(pp. 30 - 32) 
social loans  
(pp. 32 - 34) 
public health care  
(p. 35) 
subsidies 
(pp. 34 - 35) 
NB: This table lists only systems relevant for urban groups.  
 All systems presented in this chapter are listed in italics. 
Cf. Table 1, p. 6 
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4.1.1 Social Insurance 
Social insurance is provided by three subsystems: 
— The public Social Security System, which is run 
by the Social Security Corporation (SSC). It 
covers public and private sector employees 
(Jordanians and non-Jordanians) in enterprises 
with at least five employees. However, em-
ployees in agriculture, fishing, domestic ser-
vices and unpaid family work are excluded. 
Since 1995, the SSC has also been responsible 
for newly recruited civil servants, who used to 
be covered by the CPP.65 
— The civil insurance programmes covering civil 
servants: The Civil Health Insurance Pro-
gramme (CHIP) is administered by the Ministry 
of Health (MOH), and the Civil Pension Pro-
gramme is administered by the Ministry of Fi-
nance. The CPP is still in charge of civil ser-
vants recruited before 1995, while the SSC has 
taken on responsibility for almost all govern-
ment employees hired after that year. On the 
other hand, all civil servants and employees of 
major state-owned enterprises are still covered 
by the CHIP. They enjoy free treatment in any 
of the MOH’s health care facilities. 
— The military insurance programme, which 
breaks down into the Royal Medical Services 
(RMS), an entity under the governance of the 
Ministry of Defence, and the Military Pension 
Programme (MPP), administered by the Minis-
try of Finance (MOF). Both programmes cover 
all members of the armed forces, the public se-
curity forces and the intelligence service. 
All systems provide for old-age, survivor and work-
disability pensions as well as for work-injury com-
pensations. However, only the CPP and MPP in-
clude health insurance. Other risks, such as unem-
ployment, are not addressed by either of these three 
public insurance systems. 
Nearly half the population is not covered by any 
social insurance system. This fact is due to the rigid 
                                                     
65  Mr. Umar Umari, Civil and Military Pension Commission, 
Ministry of Finance, 26 February 2001. 
eligibility criteria of the three schemes. The pension 
schemes cover no more than 50 - 60 % of the total 
population, although the legal coverage of the social 
security system has been extended significantly over 
the last twenty years. As to health insurance, the 
coverage of the public insurance schemes is even 
lower - ranging between 35 and 45 % of the entire 
population (see Tables B15 and B17 in Annex B) - 
because the social security system does not provide 
for health insurance, although it is legally entitled to 
build up this social insurance component. 
Moreover, the breakdown of social insurance into 
three systems distinguishes between three classes of 
insured. Table 5 shows that the eligibility and bene-
fit conditions diverge greatly – especially between 
the social security system on the one hand and the 
civil and military insurance programmes on the 
other hand. 
The generous conditions of the civil and military 
insurance programmes are not only a matter of eq-
uity, they also pose an immense financial burden to 
the government budget66. These programmes rely 
substantially on budget transfers (85 % in case of 
RMS expenditures) and cover only 8 % of their 
expenditures through contributions (see Table B 17 
in Annex B). Public pensions account for more than 
13 % of fiscal spending and the RMS and MOH 
health systems add another 8 %.67 
Not even the social security system (see Table 4) is 
financially sustainable. Current surpluses are due to 
the fact that the system has not matured yet. Given 
the system’s current design, insurance payments 
will exceed contribution revenues in 2024 and capi-
tal reserves will be exhausted by 2042. The gov-
ernment will have to cover the deficit.68 This lack of 
sustainability can be traced back to four major fac-
tors: (1) an unsound benefit factor, (2) a very high 
minimum pension, (3) the overly generous early-
retirement regulations and (4) the SSC’s distorted 
investment policy. 
                                                     
66  Mr. Lutfi Abu-Hazeem and Dr. Mohammad Abu-
Hammour, Ministry of Finance, 22 April 2001. 
67  Cf. Brosk et al. (2000), Table ES-2; MOF (2001), p. 13. 
68  Cf. Muhanna (1997). 
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Table 4: Benefits and Qualifying Conditions of the Social Security System in Jordan 
Insured risks benefits qualifying conditions 
(1) old age pension 
monthly pension: 
2 % of average monthly salary during last 24 
months times years of contributions, limited to 
75 % of average monthly wages 
+ 10 % for 1st dependant 
+ 5 % for 2nd and 3rd dependant 
age of 60 (men) or 55 (women) 
120 months coverage (36 of which are continu-
ous contributions within last 5 years) or 15 
years of total coverage 
(2) early-retirement pensions 
discounted retirement pension: 
-10 % if age 46-50 
-5 % if age 51-54 
age of 45 
180 months of contributions 
(3) natural disability pensions 
50 % of average monthly salary during last 12 
months 
12 consecutive or 24 intermittent contributions 
(4) survivors pensions 
50 % of average monthly salary during last 12 
months 
12 consecutive or 24 intermittent contributions 
(5) lump sum compensations 
Old age, disability 
and death 
15 % of annual average wage in the last two 
years times years of contribution (retirement 
age, disability, or death) 
10-15 % of average annual wage (insured 
ceases to work prior to retirement age) 
requirements for monthly pensions not met 
(1) permanent total disability pension 
75 % of wage  
(+ 25 % if the insured is in constant need of 
assistance) 
 
(2) permanent partial disability pension 
percentage of the permanent total disability 
pension, depending on degree of disability 
 
(3) survivor pension 
60 % of the injured person’s monthly wage  
(4) lump-sum compensations 
equivalent to the percentage of disability of the 
amount payable for total disability for 36 
months 
permanent partial disability of less than 30 % 
(5) other benefits 
Work injuries and 
occupational dis-
eases 
medical care 
transportation fees 
daily allowances 
 
NB: All monthly benefits are subject to a minimum pension (JD 65) and raised by 10 % per annum  
 (at least JD 15) to adjust for inflation. 
Source: SSC (1999); SSA (2000), pp. 199 - 200. 
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The benefit factor is far too generous. As long as 
pensions are computed on a last-salary basis, the 
factor should not exceed 1.6 % for each contribution 
year.69 As a partially-funded scheme, the social 
security system relies on favourable conditions as 
regards demographics, wages and employment. The 
Jordanian population is still young, the share of 
persons aged 60 or more being 5.2 % (1999).70 But 
the ratio between pensioners and contributors will 
worsen over time, because life expectancy is in-
creasing and the total fertility rate is decreasing. 
                                                     
69  Cf. Cichon (2000). 
70  Cf. DOS (2000b), Table 1/1. 
The minimum pension is set at a very high level. 
80 % of retirees receive a pension amounting to the 
minimum pension level.71 Their benefits exceed 
accumulated contributions. The difference can be 
interpreted as a direct subsidy financed by the 
SSC’s general budget. 
The situation is further aggravated by early-re-
tirement regulations that are far too generous. Al-
though the early-retirement age is 45 and the mini-
mum period of contribution is only 15 years, 
                                                     
71  Mr. Nawaf Kalaldeh, Social Security Corporation,  
14 February 2001. 
Table 5: Basic Indicators of the Three Social Insurance Schemes 
 SSC CPP / CHIP MPP 
Contributions 
Pensions 13 % of salary 8.75 % of basic salary 8.75 % of basic salary 
Work injury 2 % of salary free free 
Health not covered 3 % of basic salary (maxi-
mum: 30 JD p.m.) 
1.5 JD p.m. 
Old-age pension 
Qualifying  
conditions 
minimum coverage 120 
months  
 
Age of 60 (men)/ 55 
(women) 
minimum coverage 240 
months (men) or 180 con-
tinuous months (women) 
 
minimum coverage 192 con-
tinuous months (men)  
 
― 
Benefits 2 % of average salary during 
last 24 months times years of 
contributions 
2.5 % of last salary times 
years of contributions 
2.5 % of last salary times 
years of contributions 
Survivor pension 
Qualifying  
conditions 
12 consecutive or 24 inter-
mittent contributions 
none none 
Benefits 50 % of average salary over 
last 12 months 
flat rate JD 28.5 p.m. plus 
75 % of old-age pension, but 
minimum JD 12.5 p.m. for 
each survivor  
flat rate JD 28.5 p.m. plus 
75 % of old-age pension, but 
minimum JD 12.5 p.m. for 
each survivor 
Health care provisions 
Benefits no health insurance free health care in MOH 
health centres and hospitals 
pharmaceuticals with very 
limited cost-sharing only 
free health care in RMS and 
MOH health centres and 
hospitals 
pharmaceuticals free of 
charge 
Information from Dr. Umar Umari, Civil and Military Pension Commission, Ministry of Finance, 26 February 2001. 
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monthly pensions are not substantially reduced for 
early pensioners. Furthermore, the early-retirement 
provision is susceptible to misuse for two reasons. 
First, if the employee’s salary does not exceed a 
certain income level, which is close to the minimum 
pension, the insured has strong incentives to retire at 
age 45 and to rely instead on an early-retirement 
pension and possibly on income from informal la-
bour. Second, if an employer wants to cut back on 
employment, he can shift substantial costs to the 
social insurance systems by using the early-
retirement provision and paying his former employ-
ees the difference between their last salary and the 
early-retirement pension.72 The last years have al-
ready seen a substantial and rising number of early 
retirees imposing a huge financial burden on the 
system. 
The system’s sustainability is also adversely af-
fected by a distorted investment policy which is not 
based on economic criteria. The SSC is not allowed 
to invest abroad but only in Jordan, where invest-
ment opportunities are limited. The Amman Finan-
cial Market is not capable of absorbing the financial 
resources, which, in 1999, amounted to 24 % of 
GDP.73 Thus investment in equity is rather low 
(18.3 % of total investments in 1999). However, a 
huge, though shrinking, share of investments 
(17.7 % in 1999) is still directed to government and 
state-owned enterprises. About 60 % is invested in 
deposits and treasury bills. As a consequence of this 
distorted investment policy, average nominal rates 
of return to investment are low. In 1998 they did not 
exceed 7.5 %, and at that time the average interest 
rate of time deposits was 8.3 %.74 
Some of the SSC regulations are expected to be 
amended in the summer or autumn of 2001.75 A new 
law is on its way through parliament. Some of the 
SSC’s deficits will be reduced, others, however, will 
                                                     
72  Cf. Kalaldeh (2000). 
73  Cf. SSC (1999), p. 33. 
74  Cf. CBJ (1999).  
75  Mr. Ahmed Abdel-Fattah, Social Security Corporation,  
17 February 2001. 
further deteriorate 76. The most important amend-
ments address the scheme’s coverage, the level of 
contributions and benefits and the administration 
procedures: 
First, the level of contributions and benefits is to be 
increased. Contribution ratios will rise from 10 % to 
11 % for the employer share and from 5 % to 5.5 % 
for the employee share. In turn, all pensions will be 
raised on an ad hoc base by 10 % - but no less than 
15 JD and no more than 50 JD. This rise will also 
increase the minimum pension level from 65 to 
80 JD as well as increasing the number of pension-
ers receiving minimum pensions. Moreover, the 
accrual rate of the pension formula will be raised 
from 2 to 2.5 for each contribution year. The net 
effect of these changes will further aggravate the 
long-term financial position of the SSC. 
Second, some amendments are intended to extend 
the coverage of the system. Employers with fewer 
than five employees will be entitled to register with 
the SSC to insure their employees on a voluntary 
basis. Apart from this, any employed person may 
opt to enrol with the SSC on an individual basis, 
though in this case he has to pay both the employer 
share and the employee share of contributions total-
ling 16.5 % of labour income once the new law has 
passed. This opening of the SSC to all workers in 
Jordan is a step towards social fairness, but it could 
have a negative impact on the financial situation of 
the SSC: Most of the newly insured earn low in-
comes and hence benefit from the generous mini-
mum pension regulations. 
Third, administrative and planning procedures are 
expected to be improved by the recruitment of new 
staff, the enlargement of the planning and research 
department and the establishment of a monitoring 
department to control worker compliance and con-
tribution deductions. Moreover, data-processing will 
be computerised and thus accelerated. 
Plans for reforming the CPP focus on transferring 
all remaining CPP-insured to the SSC. The IMF has 
made an initial proposal and is expected to consult 
                                                     
76  Cf. Cichon (2000). 
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the government on this issue. No reforms are 
planned, however, for the MPP.77 
4.1.2 Social Assistance 
Jordan has built up several social assistance pro-
grammes during the last two decades. The funds 
spent on these programmes are limited, though they 
have been increased over the last five years. In 1999 
total social assistance spending amounted to about 
0.5 % of GDP78, the National Aid Fund (NAF) and 
the Zakat Fund being the most important providers: 
36 % and 39 % of total social assistance spending 
respectively are distributed by these two institu-
tions.79 Besides, social assistance is granted by 
JOHUD, local NGOs and UNRWA. Table B24 in 
Annex B provides an overview of all operating so-
cial assistance providers in Jordan. 
However, the lack of co-ordination between the 
different social assistance programmes and insuffi-
cient targeting efforts results in an inefficient alloca-
tion of funds: Almost a quarter of the social assis-
tance recipients within the GDI household sample 
were not found to be in need. Moreover, the pro-
grammes suffer from inefficient administrative pro-
cedures and high overhead costs. 
The National Aid Fund 
The National Aid Fund (NAF) is the most important 
provider of cash assistance in Jordan. It was estab-
lished in 1986 and is financed by the Ministry of 
Finance. 
                                                     
77  Mr. Umar Umari, Civil and Military Pension Commission, 
Ministry of Finance, 26 February 2001. 
78  Cf. DOS (1999), p. 177; Shteiwi (1999b), p. 283 ff. This 
figure was computed by summing up the spending of all 
social assistance providers. Alternative estimates of social 
assistance spending in Jordan are in a wide range between 
0.2 to 1.5 % of GDP. See also Tables B13, B14 and B24 in 
Annex B. 
79  Cf. Khairi / Nasir (1995), p. 45. 
The NAF administers two programmes. The first 
targets the unemployable poor. Applicants are eligi-
ble for support once a means test has proven their 
need and provided they have no other source of 
income and none of the male household members is 
considered employable. Particular attention is given 
to widows, divorced women, orphans, the work-
disabled and dependants of prisoners. In 2001, 
53.000 families received an average annual assis-
tance of JD 106 per person. Apart from this, they 
are granted free access to the MOH’s health care 
facilities, and some school leavers are given voca-
tional training or university stipends. 
NAF’s second programme addresses the work-
disabled. It provides interest-free loans for families 
with disabled children and other services for the 
handicapped. The loans are intended to finance re-
habilitation and vocational training courses to rein-
tegrate the handicapped. 
The NAF suffers from three major weaknesses, the 
first being its insufficient funding and outreach. The 
assistance granted is insufficient in scope and scale. 
Despite its growing budget, in 2000 the NAF sup-
ported less than 20 % of the poor.80 Even house-
holds whose applications have been approved are on 
waiting lists because of the insufficient funding of 
the NAF’s programmes. This finding was confirmed 
by the results of the GDI household survey: No 
more than 26 % of the households classified as 
‘poor’ or ‘probably poor’ reported being supported 
by the NAF (see Table 6). A high number of needy 
households had applied for assistance from the NAF 
but were turned down. 
NAF’s most frequent reason for refusing assistance 
is applicant household heads with unmarried of-age 
sons in the household. The GDI household survey 
found that many applicants complain about the ter-
mination of support on the day on which their eldest 
sons have reached the age of 18. 
Moreover, the transfers granted are insufficient in 
scope. They average only 33 % of the poverty line. 
                                                     
80  Dr. Fayiz Suyyagh, The National Aid Fund, 20 February 
2001.  
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The results of the GDI household survey confirm 
that the size and nature of benefits often do not meet 
the expectations of the recipients.81 
The second weakness of the NAF is its application 
process. The NAF claims to check whether appli-
cants are being supported by potential alternative 
social assistance providers. In practice, however, 
applicants themselves are obliged to prove that they 
are not in receipt of income from any other source. 
This procedure is difficult and bureaucratic. Appli-
cants interviewed during the GDI household survey 
even described the procedure as time-consuming 
and humiliating.  
The third weakness of the NAF is the institution’s 
administration. It is highly centralised, the conse-
quence being that flexible decision-making is im-
possible. Moreover, internal administrative capaci-
ties are weak, especially in the fields of data-pro-
cessing, programme monitoring and screening of 
applicants. 
A reform of the NAF is on track. Restructuring and 
expansion of outreach is one of the four components 
of the Social Productivity Programme (SPP), which 
was launched by the Ministry of Planning (MOP) in 
co-operation with donors in 1998 to tackle the prob-
lem of poverty and raise overall social productivity 
in Jordan. The ongoing NAF reform aims at improv-
ing the institutional capacity and the targeting me-
chanisms of the NAF, establishing more effective 
                                                     
81  Cf. IBRD (1994c), p. 110. 
services for the applicants, raising the number of 
beneficiaries and increasing the average assistance 
granted to households. Moreover, the NAF’s data-
base of is expected to be computerised over the 
coming years, allowing for an on-line exchange of 
information with other institutions active in the field 
of social protection.82 
The Zakat Fund and the Zakat Committees 
The Zakat Fund is the second social assistance pro-
vider in Jordan in terms of total funding and average 
funding per beneficiary.83 It is a public institution 
administered by the Ministry of Awqâf, though it is 
independent of the government budget. 
The Zakat Fund is financed by private zakat dona-
tions and provides support to needy households via 
co-operation with 167 affiliated local zakat commit-
tees. In 2000 the public zakat system transferred 
JD 5.2 million to more than 15,000 households as 
regular and occasional social assistance. Moreover, 
it granted university stipends, free medical treatment 
in hospitals, vocational training and emergency 
support to selected families.84  
                                                     
82  Mr. Mustafa Basbous and Mr. Omar Al-Rafie, Ministry of 
Planning, Social Productivity Programme Unit, 15 Febru-
ary 2001. Dr. Fayiz Suyyagh, The National Aid Fund, 20 
February 2001. Cf. MOP (2000). 
83  See Table B24 in Annex B. 
84  Mr. Abdel-Fattah Salah, Ministry of Awqâf, 25 February 
2001. 
Table 6: Social Assistance Outreach in GDI Household Sample 
 number of  
beneficiary  
households 
in % of  
household class 
in % of  
classified  
households 
Poor 7 50 28 
Probably poor 12 43 48 
Non-poor 6 7 24 
Not classified 2 14 --- 
Total 27 19 100 
Source: GDI household survey (see Table A24 in Annex A) 
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Like the NAF, the Zakat Fund is rather limited in 
scope and scale. In 2000 it supported no more than 
7.5 % of the poor, and average monthly transfers did 
not exceed JD 29 per household.85  
However, the administration of the zakat social 
transfer system is by far more efficient than the 
NAF, as it is based on the voluntary work of relig-
iously motivated social workers from local zakat 
committees.86 During the GDI household survey, 
beneficiaries reported application for zakat to be 
easy compared with application for NAF assistance. 
However, the eligibility criteria are the same for 
both institutions: No zakat is granted, for example, 
to families with at least one male able to work. 
4.1.3 Social Loans 
It is useful to draw a distinction between social and 
small business loans: These two types of credit aim 
at different goals. Social credits are granted to the 
poor to bridge temporary income gaps and to fi-
nance very small income-generating projects (usu-
ally within the household), while business loans are 
markedly larger and directed to small and medium 
entrepreneurs. Moreover, the conditions of social 
loans are softer, and they are often subsidised and 
usually have lower repayment rates. 
Most public credit institutions provide social 
loans.(see Table 7) They include the Development 
and Employment Fund (DEF), the NAF, the Minis-
try of Social Development, the Orphan’s Corpora-
tion, the Noor al-Hussein Foundation, the Jordan 
Hashemite Fund for Human Development (JOHUD) 
and the Housing and Urban Development Corpora-
tion. The same is true of Jordanian and international 
NGOs running micro-credit programmes (see sub-
                                                     
85  Cf. IBRD (1994c), p. 112; IMF (1995), p. 76; Shteiwi 
(1999a), p. 18. See also Table B24 in Annex B. The out-
reach of the public zakat system covered by the GDI 
household sample was slightly higher (19 %), but the sur-
vey focused on urban low-income quarters of East-
Amman, where the spread of zakat committees is reported 
to be comparatively wide. 
86  Mr. Yasser Abu Hilala, Al-Jazeera Channel, 11 April 
2001. 
chapter 4.4, p 38.). In 1998, a total of about JD 23 
million in social loans was granted to 20,000 house-
holds. Meanwhile, two public banks, four commer-
cial micro-finance institutions and six non-
governmental organisations were catering for the 
needs of micro-business entrepreneurs. Table B23 in 
Annex B lists all small credit providers active in 
1998. 
The Development and Employment Fund 
The DEF was established in 1992 by the Jordanian 
government to support the unemployed poor in tak-
ing up productive work again. In 2001 DEF was still 
the main provider of loans for income-generating 
projects. These loans are granted directly or indi-
rectly through intermediary institutions. In 1999 
DEF directly financed about 800 projects with a 
total of JD 3.9 million, in this way creating 953 
jobs.87 Over the entire period between 1991 and 
1999, DEF granted a total of JD 18 million for cred-
its.88  
DEF suffers from an extremely low repayment rate, 
even though it appears to be unable to reach the 
poorest segments of society. This is indicated by 
DEF’s high average loan size, which by far exceeds 
the annual per capita income of the poor. Moreover, 
it is striking that no more than 11,700 jobs have 
been created since the establishment of DEF.  
In 1999 DEF adopted stricter lending conditions. 
This new lending strategy could, on the one hand, 
raise the repayment ratio and increase the pro-
gramme’s sustainability but, on the other hand, this 
may well further reduce DEF’s orientation towards 
low-income groups.  
The Ministry of Social Development 
The Ministry of Social Development (MOSD) is the 
central public institution in the field of poverty re-
                                                     
87  Cf. CBJ (2000), p. 23; Shteiwi (1999a), p. 9. 
88  Cf. DEF (1999b), p. 18. 
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duction and development. It is responsible for fam-
ily and child affairs, support of families with dis-
abled children, special education of the handi-
capped, community development and social welfare 
in general. The MOSD runs a number of nursery 
homes, centres for the handicapped and special 
training classes. However, most of the ministry’s 
social work is outsourced to local NGOs. 
The MOSD does not have its own social assistance 
programme. However, in co-operation with non-
governmental organisations such as the Near East 
Foundation (NEF) or CARE International, the 
MOSD’s ‘productive family programme’ has estab-
lished social credit funds with local partner NGOs. 
In 1998 the programme supported 700 income gen-
erating projects with a total funding volume of JD 
500,000.  
The Foundations 
In the field of social protection in Jordan, an impor-
tant role is played by three semi-governmental 
foundations chaired by members of the royal family: 
the Noor al-Hussein Foundation (NHF), the Jordan 
River Foundation (JRF) and the Jordan Hashemite 
Fund for Human Development (JOHUD), the for-
mer Queen Alia Welfare Fund (QAF). 
All of them are of significant size and have consid-
erable outreach and administrative capacities.  
JOHUD, for example, works through a network of 
50 community development centres. Like the NHF, 
it is mainly active in rural areas, while the JRF’s 
focus is on urban areas. The activities of the founda-
tions include awareness campaigns, vocational 
training and skills development, child and family 
health care, the promotion of productive activities of 
women and micro-enterprise development as well as 
education and cultural programmes. All of the foun-
dations address women in particular. 
As for micro-credit, JOHUD and NHF have built up 
micro-enterprise development programmes for low-
income groups, while the JRF concentrates on de-
veloping business skills by providing training to 
micro-business starters. The micro-credit pro-
gramme of NHF was developed only recently (in 
July 1999). It is run in close co-operation with the 
newly established micro-finance institution Jordan 
Micro-Credit Company and offers credits ranging 
from JD 100 to JD 500.89 The credit programme of 
JOHUD is much older; it was founded in 1991. It is 
managed on a decentralised basis by 24 community 
development centres, each of them administrating a 
fund of JD 11,500. The maximum credit sum is JD 
1,000.90  
Within their possibilities, the foundations have un-
dertaken a wide range of poverty reduction meas-
ures. However, the foundations depend to a large 
extent on external financing and reach only part of 
the population because of the narrow eligibility 
                                                     
89  Mrs. Mitri Shahin, Noor Al-Hussein-Foundation, 19 Feb-
ruary 2001. 
90  Mr. Munif Abu Rish, JOHUD, 18 February 2001. 
Table 7: Outreach of Credit Institutions in GDI Household Sample 
number of households that have ever taken out a loan from  total  
number of 
households commercial banks 
DEF NGOs micro-credit  
companies 
other  
institutions 
Poor 14 1 0 1 0 0 
Probably poor 28 4 0 0 0 0 
Near-poor 55 7 0 1 1 4 
Not vulnerable 28 5 0 1 1 2 
Total classified 125 17 0 3 2 6 
Source: GDI household survey (see Table A24 in Annex A) 
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criteria of their programmes. Moreover, administra-
tive overhead costs are high, limiting the pro-
grammes’ potential outreach: JOHUD spends 56 % 
of its total budget on its own administration91. Fi-
nally, only part of the population is eligible, since 
the three institutions concentrate their programmes 
on women. 
4.1.4 Subsidies 
As in most other countries, a variety of commodities 
and services are subsidised by the Jordanian gov-
ernment. Apart from the provision of free education 
to every inhabitant of the country, subsidies for 
public health care and basic consumer commodities 
are the most highly relevant for social protection. 
Commodities 
Until the late 1990s, basic commodity subsidies 
were one of the central pillars of social protection 
policy. Foodstuffs, such as wheat, sugar, rice, bar-
ley, milk and meat, were universally subsidised – as 
were fuel, water and electricity. But the high costs 
represented an unsustainable burden on the govern-
ment budget. Food subsidies alone amounted to 
JD 102 million or 3.9 % of GDP in 1990. These 
were successively replaced by food coupons, gen-
eral cash transfers and means-tested transfers, and 
finally eliminated altogether in 1999.92  
Only subsidies on flour and bread have been re-
introduced. Their level is defined in such a way as 
to stabilise the price of bread in the local market. 
Annual spending for these subsidies did not exceed 
JD 15 million in 1999 and decreased to zero in 
2000. But this was due solely to favourable world 
market conditions. The price of wheat is extremely 
low and as soon as it rises, subsidy spending will 
again begin burdening the government budget. 
Moreover, it has to be taken into consideration that 
                                                     
91  Mr. Munif Abu Rish, JOHUD, 18 February 2001. 
92  Cf. IBRD (1994c), p. 131f.; IBRD (1999d), p. 19 and 32; 
IMF (1997c), p. 13.; Tzannatos (2000), p. 24.  
the JD 15 million spent on subsidies in 1999 
amounted to as much as 68 % of the NAF budget.93  
Subsidisation of Public Health Care Facili-
ties 
The public health care sector is made up of the fa-
cilities of three different providers: the Ministry of 
Health (MOH), the Royal Medical Services (RMS) 
and the state universities (e.g. the Jordan University 
Hospital). Its total spending ranges between 3 and 
5 % of GDP. All of the three systems are mainly 
funded by the government budget, which covers 80 
to 85 % of total MOH and RMS spending and 60 % 
of the budget of the Jordan University Hospital, the 
rest being financed by social health insurance con-
tributions (6 to 9 %) and user fees (6 to 40 % of 
total spending).94 
Access to public health care facilities is free of 
charge for those insured with the CHIP, the RMS or 
the university hospital insurance programmes. The 
non-insured have to pay. However, user fees in 
MOH facilities are highly subsidised. The treatment 
of cancer or diabetes and kidney dialyses are com-
pletely free of charge.95 All other treatments cost 
between 10 and 20 % of the respective treatments in 
private health care facilities, although the MOH’s 
real costs are much higher. 
These subsidies, however, do not favour low-
income earners for two reasons. First, they are not 
targeted, instead benefiting all income groups. For 
the time being, they are financed by general tax 
                                                     
93  Dr. Mohammad Abu-Hammour, Ministry of Finance, 23 
April 2001. Cf. IBRD (1999e), p. 13. See also Tables B13 
and B14 in Annex B. 
94  See Table B15 in Annex B. 
95  However, there is no legal claim to these treatments, so 
people cannot rely on treatment free of charge. Exemplary 
prices in MOH hospitals are: JD 0.5 for a usual consulta-
tion, JD 5.5 for thorax X-ray, JD 17 for a delivery, JD 20 
for a one-week stay in hospital (everything included). Ex-
emplary prices in RMS: JD 0.02 for a usual consultation. 
Exemplary prices in private hospitals: JD 250 for a deliv-
ery, JD 6000 for heart surgery, JD 1000 for a one-week 
stay in hospital (everything included). 
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revenues paid by the rich and the poor alike. Sec-
ond, the total transfer to the insured is relatively 
high (two thirds of their treatment costs) compared 
with transfers to the non-insured (40 % of their 
treatment costs), but most of the insured are better-
off persons. In 1999, the MOH spent JD 106 million 
for curative health care (after subtracting construc-
tion costs and costs for vaccination, medical educa-
tion, etc.). Of these funds, 28.8 % are for the treat-
ment of the non-insured (about JD 40 million), 
21.3 % for persons insured under the RMS, 43.2 % 
for persons insured under the CHIP and 6.7 % for 
green-card holders. The return from the non-insured 
(only user fees) accounts for JD 16 million (60 % of 
spending), while the CHIP-insured contribute only 
JD 14 million (35 % of spending). 96 
The very poor can apply for a green-card, which 
entitles them to use all MOH health treatment ser-
vices for free. The total number of green-card hold-
ers, however, does not exceed 4 % of the popula-
tion, or 20 % of the poor (some 160,000 cards were 
valid in 2001).97  
Public hospitals are a target of criticism because 
they tend to be overcrowded and their services are 
of poor quality. This finding was not unambigu-
ously confirmed by the GDI household survey. 
Some interviewed households were even afraid of 
entering public hospitals.  
4.2 Market-based Systems 
The market offers alternative options for social pro-
tection for the Jordanian population. Saving in bank 
accounts and via commercial insurance must be 
considered market-based risk mitigation strategies, 
while borrowing from banks is seen as risk-coping. 
However, lower-income groups usually have no 
access to these protection instruments: They are 
either too costly or linked to conditions hard to fulfil 
by the poor and near-poor. 
                                                     
96  Dr. Fakhri Al-Smairat, Civil Health Insurance Programme, 
Ministry of Finance, 4 April 2001. 
97  Dr. Fakhri Al-Smairat, Civil Health Insurance Programme, 
Ministry of Finance, 20 February 2001. 
4.2.1 Private Insurance Markets 
The role of private sector insurers in social protec-
tion is at present marginal. In 1999, 27 companies 
were registered with the Insurance Regulatory 
Commission, and they collected almost JD 100 mil-
lion in premiums.98 But their business is dominated 
by insurance lines which are not very relevant for 
the social protection of lower-income groups (mari-
time, aviation and motor vehicle insurance). Only 
fire, accident and life insurance contributes to the 
objective of social protection, but premiums are not 
affordable for poorer strata of the population. The 
better-off, on the other hand, are often covered by 
other insurance schemes.  
Most commercial insurers offer life, fire, health and 
accident insurance, and some have motor vehicle 
insurance as well. Motor vehicle and life insurance 
account together for about 75 % of all premiums 
collected in 1999. Health insurance is generally 
coupled with life insurance and accounted for 15 % 
of total premium revenues. Some companies are 
about to offer new pension insurance products. 
Life insurance is highly profitable for commercial 
insurers in Jordan. It accounted for almost 30 % of 
all premiums collected in 1999. But only 1.7 % of 
the country’s households hold life insurance con-
tracts.99 It is claimed that many of them buy life 
insurance for the sole reason that private health 
insurance was in the past coupled with life insur-
ance.  
Private health insurance offers very limited cover-
age as well. According to the results of the GDI 
household survey, health insurance ranks highest in 
the demand of all social groups in Jordan (see Table 
A28 in Annex A). No more than 134,000 Jordanians 
held private health insurance contracts in 1999. The 
major reason for this contradiction is the high pre-
mium level of private health insurers, which range 
from JD 51 to JD 155 per beneficiary and annum.100 
                                                     
98  See Tables B31 and B32 in Annex B. 
99  Dr. Khaled Abu-Goura, The National Ahlia Insurance 
Company, 21 February 2001. 
100 Cf. Hollander / Rauch (1998), p. 10. 
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Moreover, providers of private health insurance tend 
to limit their coverage to certain treatment catego-
ries, specified illnesses, or maximum benefits per 
annum or per illness. Most contracts fix consider-
able co-payments. Nevertheless, health insurance 
directly sold to clients is not very profitable, a fact 
which is due to the high administration and claim 
management costs in this insurance line. 
However, health insurance is also offered by some 
of the country’s larger companies and professional 
associations. Enterprises with a minimum of 100 
employees are obliged to insure their employees 
with commercial health insurers or to cover all of 
their health treatment costs. The outreach of health 
insurance provided by these ‘self-insured firms’ is 
estimated to range between 390,000 to 650,000 
insured persons.101  
The professional associations not only concentrate 
on health insurance but offer pension insurance as 
well. The Jordan Engineers Association, for exam-
ple, runs a survivors and work-disability pension 
insurance scheme. Enrolment is compulsory for all 
JEA members (45,000 in 2001) and the annual pre-
mium of JD 15 is included in the membership fee 
(JD 30). In case of the early death or work-disability 
of the insured party, his family is entitled to a lump-
sum payment of JD 1,000 and a monthly pension of 
JD 60.102 
Moreover, the Jordanian Engineers Association 
offers old-age and health insurance on a voluntary 
basis. The old-age insurance is doing well. It pro-
vides for old-age pensions after the age of 60 and a 
minimum enrolment term of twenty years. The in-
sured can choose between three contribution levels, 
the pensions correlating with contributions paid and 
number of contribution years. The number of per-
sons insured is 20,000. The offer is financially sus-
tainable; the surplus is invested in Jordan.  
                                                     
101  Cf. Brosk et al. (2000), p.49; Hollander / Rauch (1998), 
p 11. 
102  Mr. Dawoud Subeihi, The Jordan Engineer’s Association, 
15 March 2001; Mr. Mohammed Ahmad Nufil, The Jor-
dan Engineer’s Association, 19 March 2001; Mr. Samer 
Akroush, Amman Insurance Company, 14 April 2001. 
While the Jordanian Engineers Association organ-
ised the old-age scheme on its own; since 1996 it 
has been co-operating with a private insurance com-
pany on its health insurance. In spite of this ar-
rangement, the scheme suffers from low and unsta-
ble demand. Only 900 engineers have subscribed, 
while 2,500 persons were envisaged as a minimum 
number. The reasons are fourfold: First, the market-
ing campaign has failed. Second, the reputation of 
the insurance company in charge is bad. Third, the 
premiums fluctuate by up to 100 % from year to 
year due to yearly subscriptions and calculations, 
thus making long-term customer relationships more 
difficult. Fourth, many engineers are already cov-
ered by government health insurance programmes. 
For most of the insured covered by the SSC or the 
CPP, the associations’ schemes function as an addi-
tional provision for old age, early death and work 
disability. Some 35,000 Jordanian engineers, physi-
cians, dentists and lawyers are enrolled in these 
voluntary or mandatory schemes.  
Generally, private insurance schemes may co-
operate with third-party administrators in processing 
medical claims and administering their health plans. 
The sophisticated techniques of the Jordanian ad-
ministrators in managing medical claims has been 
able to substantially lower the costs and the premi-
ums of their partner companies during the last few 
years.103 
4.2.2 Saving 
Saving in bank accounts is another risk mitigation 
strategy. The average Jordanian has deposits with 
banks of no less than JD 920 (84 % of per capita in-
come)104. But these savings are concentrated among 
a small number of households. Only 14 % of all 
families and 4 % of poor families have any savings 
in formal financial sector institutions.105 The latter 
often prefer to save with rotating savings and credit 
                                                     
103  Mr. Sameer Gammoh, NatHealth, 22 April 2001. 
104  Own calculation based on CBJ (2000), p. 86. 
105  Cf. Hanssen-Bauer / Pedersen / Tilnes (1998), p. 221. 
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associations together with their neighbours or col-
leagues. 
The reasons for the low number of savings accounts 
are threefold: (i) during the second half of the 
1990s, real interest rates on ordinary savings ac-
counts were low. With inflation ranging between 2 
and 4 %, interest rates on savings only slightly ex-
ceed the inflation rate. (ii) Domestic financial ser-
vices suffer from a lack of confidence in the long-
term stability of the Jordanian Dinar. (iii) Minimum 
deposit requirements, service commissions and 
other fees additionally hamper the access of the 
poor to savings products. However, religious con-
siderations and a general distrust of banks may con-
stitute more important explanations for the low de-
mand for formal savings products. 
4.2.3 Credit and Micro-credit 
Total commercial lending is of a significant volume 
in Jordan. In 1992 about 18% of total commercial 
bank lending was granted to private households and 
consumer credits amounted to a total of about 13 % 
of GDP.106 
For the poor, however, personal consumer credits 
are not available, because Jordanian banks charge 
relatively high interest rates and have rigid guaran-
tor or collateral requirements, the latter peaking at 
more than 200 % of the credit volume.107 
For this reason, micro-credit programmes have been 
established during the last years to satisfy the de-
mand of lower-income groups for credit. Public 
institutions, UNRWA and NGOs have become ac-
tive in the field. However, most of the programmes 
are not sustainable: They are not able to cover their 
costs because of low repayment and interest rates. 
                                                     
106  See Table B30 in Annex B. More recent data are not avail-
able because of a change in the Central Bank of Jordan’s 
classification of credits for its regular documentation. 
107  Mrs. Terry Kristalsky, The AMIR Programme, 31 October 
2000. 
The private sector has offered micro-credit since 
1999, when the USAID financed AMIR Programme 
(‘Access to Microfinance and Improved Implemen-
tation of Policy Reform’) built up four micro-
finance institutions (MFIs): the Ahli Microfinancing 
Company, the Cooperative Housing Foundation, the 
Jordan Micro Credit Company and the Microfund 
for Women. The institutions reached sustainability 
and repayment rates of more than 90 % in only one 
year. Today they are able to cover their running 
costs through the interest paid by clients. For 2002, 
The AMIR Programme plans to reach 25,000 active 
borrowers yearly.108  
However, the MFIs’ clients are not poor. The credits 
are de facto targeted to the lower-middle income 
class. The break-even point for MFI credits to be 
profitable is JD 700. For this reason, all the four 
institutions, having started from a credit size level of 
JD 350 to 800, nowadays prefer to provide credits 
markedly above JD 700. By doing so, their focus 
has shifted from business starters to clients who 
have already built up small businesses and are now 
seeking to expand them. Moreover, the MFIs’ inter-
est rates are far above market levels, which is an-
other obstacle to access for low-income groups. 
Although the MOSD, UNRWA and commercial 
banks are the best-known credit providers in Jordan, 
borrowing from relatives remains far more wide-
spread than loans from all of these institutions. Ac-
cording to the results of the GDI household survey, 
75 % of all loans stem from relatives. The major 
reasons for this preference are the rigid eligibility 
criteria and high interest rates of commercial and 
public credit providers.109 
4.3 Programmes of the International 
Community (UNRWA) 
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was 
established in 1949 to provide assistance to Palestin-
                                                     
108  Mr. James Whitaker, The AMIR Programme, 21 February 
2001. Cf. AMIR (2000b).  
109  Cf. also Khairi / Nasir (1995), p. 46. 
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ian refugees in the Arab Near East. In 1999, of the 
three million Palestine refugees living in Jordan, 
1.5 million were recognised as ‘registered refugees’ 
and hence eligible for support from UNRWA.110 
Today UNRWA’s activities are grouped into three 
social programmes: relief and social services, health 
services and the education programme. All of these 
services are provided to registered Palestine refu-
gees only, who represent no more than 35 % of the 
entire Jordanian population. 
The most important component of UNRWA’s relief 
and social services is the Special Hardship Assis-
tance Programme, which provides regular cash and 
in-kind food support to needy registered refugee 
families. Moreover, the programme provides occa-
sional cash assistance for shelter rehabilitation. In 
2000, 5.5 % of all registered refugees (205,114) 
were eligible as special hardship cases.111 The regu-
lar assistance is provided three times a year. 
UNRWA’s social workers distribute the assistance 
to eligible families for three subsequent days in each 
quarter. During this time, one family member has to 
cue up to be given a parcel containing some basic 
food commodities and some cash (the total value 
being about 30 JD per person).  
UNRWA’s Poverty Alleviation Programme also 
forms part of the relief and social services. In co-
operation with the Jordan Bank, it provides social 
credits to 1,500 refugee families a year to finance 
small business projects. The budget of the credit 
fund is about JD 2.5 million.112  
UNRWA’s health services are provided through 23 
health care centres and three mobile dental units. All 
registered refugees are eligible for free primary 
health care. If further treatment is needed, UNRWA 
                                                     
110  Mrs. Maha Abdulhamid, UNRWA, 22 February 2001. Cf. 
UNRWA (1999), p. 41. Only refugees from 1948 are eligi-
ble for registration with UNRWA. Only refugees who left 
Palestine in 1967 have the status‚ persons displaced within 
one state thus are not eligible as registered refugees.  
111  Cf. UNRWA, Jordan Field (2000d), p. 8. 
112  Mrs. Maha Abdulhamid, UNRWA, 22 February 2001. Cf. 
UNRWA, Jordan Field (2000d), p. 18. 
refers patients to hospitals (government hospitals in 
general and private hospitals for complicated preg-
nancies only) and reimburses 75 % of the costs. 
However, the number of referrals to hospitals has 
been declining significantly over the past ten 
years.113 
UNRWA’s education programme runs special 
schools for Palestine refugees; these, however, have 
the same curricula as the government schools. Most 
of them are in refugee camps. Apart from this, 
UNRWA provides university scholarships and runs 
eight centres that cater for pupils with learning dif-
ficulties.114 
The GDI household survey found that the benefici-
aries of UNRWA’s social programmes are content 
in general with the education and health services 
provided. However, the hardship assistance was 
criticised for the humiliating distribution procedures 
and waiting times for assistance parcels. Moreover, 
decreasing frequency, reliability and real value of 
assistance were reported. 
4.4 Programmes of Non-Governmental 
Organisations 
A substantial number of non-governmental organi-
sations (NGOs) are active in the field of social wel-
fare; these can be classified as national and interna-
tional NGOs. The major difference is not in the 
focus of their activities but in their status and regis-
tration processes. National NGOs have to register 
with one of the central government’s ministries. 
According to the Jordanian Law for Associations 
and Social Organisations (Law 33 from 1996), so-
cial welfare NGOs are obliged to register as chari- 
table organisations with the Ministry of Social De-
velopment (MOSD). The registration process is 
expensive, tedious and time-consuming. Applica-
tions have to be accredited by several authorities. 
Even after successful registration, charitable organi-
sations are constantly at risk of being liquidated by 
                                                     
113  Cf. UNRWA (1998), p. 6; UNRWA, Jordan Field (2000d), 
p. 4. 
114  Cf. UNRWA, Jordan Field (2000d), p. 1. 
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arbitrary decisions made of government officials. In 
1999, 756 national charitable organisations had 
registered with the MOSD.115 
The General Union of Voluntary Societies 
The General Union of Voluntary Societies in Jordan 
(GUVS) is the umbrella organisation for most of the 
social welfare NGOs in Jordan.116 GUVS was built 
up to co-ordinate the activities of small grass-roots 
NGOs and represent their interests vis-à-vis the 
government. GUVS is entitled to receipts from the 
National Lottery, which are distributed among its 
member NGOs. However, in 1996 only 19 % of the 
income of GUVS was generated by the lottery,117 
the rest of the budget being financed by donations.  
Co-operation between the members of GUVS re-
mains rather limited. Most NGOs have only limited 
organisational and operational capacities and out-
reach. Services provided by all of GUVS members 
reach no more than 300,000 Jordanians.118 
Most NGOs focus on women’s literacy and educa-
tion courses, family planning and programmes for 
handicapped children. Some NGOs run micro-credit 
funds. In 1999, 46 NGOs financed some 1,200 mi-
cro-business projects.119 Others, such as the Jorda-
nian Women’s Union or the Jordanian National 
Commission of Women, emphasise the role of wom-
en in society.120 Some NGOs, however, provide 
social assistance. In 1998 they reached about 12,000 
needy Jordanian families, with average per capita 
transfers (JD 167 per capita and annum) ranking 
lowest among all social assistance providers in Jor-
dan.121 
                                                     
115 Cf. DOS (1999), p. 160; GDF (2000), p. 5. 
116  Cf. Hermann (2000), p. 73. 
117  Cf. El-Khatib (1996), p. 26. 
118  Cf. Hermann (2000), p. 61. 
119  Cf. IBRD (1999d), p. 34. For details see Tables B23 and 
B28 in Annex B. 
120  Mrs. Nadia Shamrukh, JWU, 20 February 2001; Mrs. 
Amal Sabbagh, The Jordanian National Committee for 
Women, 25 February 2001. 
121  See Tables B24 to B28 in Annex B. 
Affiliates of International NGOs 
About 30 international affiliates of NGOs are work-
ing in Jordan, the most important of them being the 
Near East Foundation (NEF), Care International, 
Save the Children and Caritas. Their programmes 
are similar to those of the national NGOs. However, 
the focus is less on social assistance than on small 
business credits, and they are more active in rural 
areas. 
4.5 Group-based Systems 
Rotating Saving and Credit Associations 
Rotating saving and credit associations (ROSCAs) 
are very popular in Jordan. Every month their mem-
bers pay a fixed contribution to the group leader, 
who on the spot pays out the collected funds to one 
of the group members. Every month the fund turns 
to different member. 
ROSCAs are very popular in Jordan. They are re-
ferred to as Ğamaciyyât Fardiyya. According to the 
results of the GDI household survey122, half of all 
urban households have participated in a Ğamaciyya. 
Most of the participants contribute between JD 10 
and 50 per month and use the benefit repayment to 
repair their houses or buy new equipment, durable 
consumer goods (e.g. a refrigerator) or clothes. 
While women tend to build up ROSCAs with 
neighbours or friends, men prefer to share them with  
colleagues. The Ğamaciyyât are more common in 
urban than in rural parts of the country, where sav-
ings tend to be invested in livestock.123 
                                                     
122  See Table A15 in Annex A.  
123  Cf. Hanssen-Bauer / Pedersen / Tilnes (1998), p. 221; NEF 
(n.d.). 
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The Ğamaciyyât serve as an effective informal 
means of cheap borrowing during crisis or of saving 
to provide for transitory social shocks in the future. 
Repayments can be timed so as to coincide with an-
ticipated or even unexpected shortages of cash. For 
example, a person in need can be granted the first 
repayment. However, the Ğamaciyyât are not insur-
ance, because benefits always equal contributions 
and risks are not pooled. Moreover, they are not a 
helpful instrument to provide for long-term crises, 
since the loan granted is repayable.  
Mutual Insurance Associations  
Mutual insurance is less popular than ROSCAs. 
Some elements of insurance can be found, however, 
among the widespread ‘family funds’ and the soli-
darity funds shared by Palestinians originating from 
the same town or village in Palestine. In the GDI 
household survey, 20 % of the families reported 
participating in a family fund, and almost half of 
them have been in a family fund. Contribution lev-
els of family funds are low (about 5 JD per annum), 
and contributions are usually paid by the working 
males only. Most funds provide assistance to family 
members for weddings, births, studies, or funerals. 
The concept of solidarity funds shared by Palestin-
ian families from the same origin is very similar. 
Each family head pays a small annual contribution 
into a fund that provides assistance to its members 
in specified cases. However, these funds are some-
times organised as NGOs, and the element of soli-
darity is important. Hence these funds can also be 
seen as a means of transferring donations to the 
needy (see Box 4). 
4.6 Household-based Systems (Solidarity 
Networks) 
Solidarity networks are operate at the household 
level and are based on solidarity among the mem-
bers of social groups. Such networks can be based 
on two principles of solidarity: mutual and philan-
thropic solidarity. In the first case, support is pro-
vided on the basis of reciprocated assistance, while 
in the second case it is motivated by humanitarian or 
religious values. 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 4: The Falūğī-Fund 
The Falūğī -Fund was established in the end-1960s to support needy refugee families from Al-Falūğe, a small town in 
the former Gaza Governorate. Like other funds of its kind, it is self-organised by the Palestinians from Al-Falūğe and 
based on a strong solidarity felt among the families stemming from the same town.  
Currently about 3,500 members from 15 extended families (Ħamūlāt) are contributing on a regular basis. The fund is 
registered as a charitable organisation with the MOSD and is also a member of GUVS. It runs five branches in Am-
man, Irbid, Baqca, Zahab and Madaba and has its main office in Amman. It is headed by a Board of Directors, which is 
elected every two years by the General Assembly. 
For its contributing members, the fund offers only limited benefits: a ‘wedding hall’, loans for the education of their 
children, a cheap kindergarten in Irbid, a ‘funeral car’ and – in some branches – the provision of food in case of the 
death of a family member.  
In addition and more important, the fund also runs a social assistance programme targeted to needy families. Depend-
ing on certain characteristics of the households (e.g. income, family size, number of work-disabled, employment 
status, endowment with assets), a regular monthly sum is paid, which can add up to JD 40. It is noteworthy that eligi-
bility for this kind of support is not restricted to current or former membership in the fund; all needy families that can 
prove their origin from Al-Falūğe can be supported.  
These benefits are mainly financed through a yearly membership fee of JD 3-4. Membership is restricted to adult 
males. The contributions are collected family-wise, one family member being responsible for collection. Non-payment 
for two consecutive years results in exclusion from the fund. Other sources of funding are donations, fees and some 
self-funding from investments.  
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Mutual support networks are among the most im-
portant social protection systems in Jordan. In 1996 
as many as 38 % of the population reported provid-
ing some kind of assistance to relatives, neighbours 
or friends, while 26 % received assistance (see Ta-
ble 8). However, when it comes to financial assis-
tance (excluding in-kind assistance and support 
within the household), no more than 13 % of the 
households report receiving support, while 14 % 
provide support. The total volume of private cash 
transfers received by Jordanian households in 1997 
amounted to 2.1 % of GDP.124 
Mutual support within the core family plays the 
most important role in social protection (see Ta-
ble 8). One fifth of all households in Jordan receive 
support from relatives. For 6.1 % of households, 
family support is the most important source of in-
come, while public pensions are the most important 
source for 5.9 % of households only. In most cases 
the support is given to typical risk groups such as 
women, the old or people outside the labour 
force.125 
Meanwhile, it is much less common to provide sup-
port to more distant relatives (in the Ħamūla) or 
                                                     
124 Cf. Hanssen-Bauer / Pedersen / Tiltnes (1998), p. 282; 
IBRD (1999d), p. 33f. 
125 Cf. Hanssen-Bauer / Pedersen / Tiltnes (1998), p. 260. 
even non-relative neighbours or friends. While al-
most 13 % of households receive financial assis-
tance from relatives, less than 1 % are supported by 
neighbours or fiends. 
Often, mutual assistance is referred to as ‘informal 
insurance’126 because households that provide assis-
tance to others invest in social capital and hope to 
be supported once they are in need. For the recipi-
ent, however, asking for assistance from neighbours 
or friends is a risk-coping strategy which plays an 
important role among low-income urban groups in 
Jordan. 
However, providing or asking for mutual assistance 
is not an effective means of social protection: First, 
it does not provide protection against the long-term 
impact of social risks. Mutual support is based on 
reciprocity. Hence the recipient is expected to repay 
the assistance on a later occasion, especially when 
the donor is not a relative but a friend or neighbour. 
Such reciprocation of assistance is possible for a 
dismissed person hoping to find a new employment. 
But it is not possible in cases of work disability or 
old age. Even relatives may stop their support in the 
long-run. Second, mutual assistance is not reliable, 
because there is no legal entitlement to such assis-
tance. Hence investing in social capital (‘informal 
                                                     
126  Cf. Lund / Srinivas (1999), pp. 54 and 68 - 72; Morduch 
(1999); Wright (1999). 
Table 8: Support of Jordanian Households by Relatives and Friends, Colleagues and Neighbours 
support by relatives support by friends, colleagues and 
neighbours 
 (%) 
support given support received support given support received 
Financial support 14.6 12.5 3.2 0.8 
Other than financial support 23.8 11.1 N/A N/A 
Assistance in household 13.6 7.2 9.1 5.0 
Assistance in productive activities 2.6 0.9 2.2 0.5 
Possible in-kind support 4.5 1.2 3.1 0.5 
Other support 5.6 2.5 5.5 2.5 
Total 23.9 20.3 19.3 8.6 
Source: Hanssen-Bauer / Pedersen / Tiltnes (1998), Table 8.8 
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insurance’) is a rather unsafe risk mitigation strat-
egy. Third, mutual assistance is limited in scope, 
especially for the poor, because most of their rela-
tives, friends and neighbours are poor themselves: 
“Social protection cannot be left merely in the 
hands of the informal traditional risk-management 
structures. There are hidden costs... and, it is neces-
sary to be wary of the traditional optimism about 
informal networks and institutions.” 127 
Philanthropic assistance to the needy, though much 
less important than mutual support, plays an impor-
tant role in Jordanian society, and this fact has, of 
course, much to do with the influence of Islam. The 
zakat, a tax-like alms, is only one expression of 
Islamic humanitarian solidarity. Wealthy persons 
are expected to pay a fixed share of their assets to 
the poor, disabled, orphaned or other needy persons. 
This payment may be given indirectly (to official 
zakat committees) or directly. 
                                                     
127  Del Conte (2000), p. 5. Cf. also Morduch (1999), pp. 189 
and 194. 
5 The Current Gap in Social Protection 
in Jordan and Strategies for Coping 
Despite the great number and variety of social pro-
tection systems, a considerable part of the Jordanian 
population remains unprotected. A substantial num-
ber of Jordanian households are vulnerable to the 
occurrence of risks. They are not covered by any 
risk mitigation scheme and find no way to diversify 
their risks. These are the ‘near-poor,’128 caught in 
the gap in social protection between social insurance 
and social assistance (see Figure 5). 
These ‘near-poor’ do not necessarily have low in-
comes close to the poverty line (see p. 5). They may 
have an income above the poverty line and yet be 
vulnerable to social shocks. However, the GDI 
household survey suggests empirical evidence that 
in Jordan, as in many other countries, vulnerability 
and low income are closely interrelated. The major-
Figure 5: The Current Gap in Social Protection in Jordan 
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ity of low-income earners are vulnerable to risks, 
and most of the unprotected have an income just 
above the poverty line. No household from the sur-
vey sample classified as ‘non-vulnerable’ was clas-
sified as ‘poor’ for certain, and only six households 
were suspected to be poor (see Annex A). 
The correlation between vulnerability and low in-
come can be traced back to four factors: 
— There is strong evidence that the near-poor 
largely rely on income from the informal sector 
and are thus not covered by public social insur-
ance.  
— Private insurance is far too expensive for low-
income earners (the near-poor as well as the 
poor). 
— Social assistance programmes explicitly focus 
on the target group, but the programmes are 
limited in scope and scale.  
                                                                                  
128  Or ‘vulnerable non-poor’; cf. Sebstad / Cohen (2000), 
pp. 4, 9 and 33. 
— Among low-income households, the ability to 
support members in need is limited  
Moreover, the results of the GDI household survey 
suggest a strong correlation between informal sector 
employment and unemployment on the one hand 
and vulnerability on the other. More than half of the 
households interviewed, with all of their potential 
providers either unemployed, day labourers or in-
formal sector employees, were classified as ‘poor’ 
or ‘probably poor,’ while the same applies for only 
a fifth of the self-employed and a seventh of house-
holds with formal sector employees. As for the self-
employed, two thirds were found to be ‘near-poor’, 
while the same applies for only about a third of the 
unemployed and the informal employees and for a 
fourth of formal sector workers (see Figure 6) . 
When social shocks occur, the near-poor are forced 
to cope with their effects. The GDI household sur-
vey found that the most widespread coping strategy 
among the urban poor and near-poor in Jordan is to 
ask for assistance or loans from relatives or, if there 
are no relatives capable of providing support, from 
public social assistance agencies (see Figure 7). The 
Figure 6: Relation Between Poverty, Vulnerability and Nature of Employment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: GDI household survey (see Table A17 in Annex A) 
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outreach of social assistance, however, is very lim-
ited. According to the results of the GDI household 
survey, far less than half the poor are granted social 
assistance (failure of exclusion), while only a few of 
the beneficiaries are not poor (failure of inclu-
sion).129 
The second most important coping strategy of the 
urban poor and near-poor is to mobilise new or ad-
ditional income from labour: Either the family head 
seeks employment himself or his wife or sons take 
up employment. Often children of minor age are 
forced to leave school to contribute to household 
income by means of small, informal jobs. Some 
families report seeking to migrate to find employ-
ment abroad. 
                                                     
129 No more than 12 % of all of the interviewed households 
reported receiving any kind of social assistance. This share 
was only 4 % for the households classified ‘non-poor’. But 
it was also low for the households classified ‘poor’ and 
‘probably poor’ (36 and 26 % respectively), cf. Table A24 
in Annex A. 
A third coping strategy, finally, is to use savings 
(cash savings, gold or jewellery), while few of the 
respondents would be willing to draw from their 
physical stocks (e.g. sell their shop). Of course all of 
the households would, at some time, have to reduce 
or modify their consumption. 
This chapter is intended to assess the gap in social 
protection for each major social risk and to discuss 
the importance of different coping strategies in more 
detail. 
Figure 7: Coping Strategies of East Amman Households in Cases of Social Crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Classification as per Sebstad / Cohen (2000), p. 11. 
Source: GDI household survey (see Table A20 in Annex A) 
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5.1 Old Age, Work Disability and the 
Death of a Main Provider 
Nearly 50 % of the Jordanian population is vulner-
able to social risks like old-age, work disability and 
the early death of the household’s main provider. 
Although life-cycle risks are among the most impor-
tant risks in Jordan, no more than 57 of 139 house-
holds (41 %) covered by the GDI household survey 
reported being eligible for old-age, survivor or work-
disability pensions, while 78 households (56 %) 
were found to be vulnerable to these life-cycle risks 
(see Figure 8). 
The GDI’s findings are confirmed by the results of 
more representative quantitative surveys: At most, 
60 % of the Jordanian households are insured 
against old age, work disability and the death of the 
main provider. The SSC covers 26.4 % of the labour 
force, 8.8 % enrol with the CPP and the MPP adds 
approximately another 23 % (see Table B17 in An-
nex B). However, some employees may have been 
double-counted. Thus far, no private pension insur-
ance is available in Jordan and the coverage of pri-
vate life insurance is marginal (1.7 %). Only a small 
part of the population can afford to pay the private 
companies’ contribution rates.130 
A survey of the Centre for Strategic Studies131 from 
1996 found that on 53.6 % of the employed have 
any pension insurance, which would amount to 
about 46 % of the labour force. The corresponding 
figure was much lower in rural (28.8 %) than in 
urban areas (49.7 %).  
Social assistance cannot replace pension insurance. 
Of the GDI sample’s 139 households, only 19 re-
ceive any kind of social assistance (see Table A15 
in Annex A). The only information on the degree to 
which these groups benefit from public social assis-
tance schemes is that 33.1 % of the NAF beneficiar-
ies are widows and 25.1 % are old-aged. But with 
the total outreach of these programmes limited to 
3.6 % of the total population and the benefits rang-
ing from JD 30 to JD 82, their impact is in any case 
                                                     
130 Dr. Khaled M. Abu-Goura, National Ahlia Insurance 
Company, 21 February 2001. 
131 Cf. CSS (1996a), p. 117. 
Figure 8: Eligibility of East Amman Household Heads for Pension Benefits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: GDI household survey (see Table A22 in Annex A) 
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negligible.132 Besides, some of the work-disabled 
benefit from one of the NGOs’ specialised income-
generating projects or disability programmes. NAF, 
UNRWA, the zakat committees and the MOSD 
provide support to a small number of the old-aged, 
work-disabled, or widows. 
Asking for family assistance or social assistance is 
the most widespread strategy of Jordanian urban 
households for coping with life-cycle risks like old 
age, work disability or the death of the main pro-
vider. 43 households from the GDI sample have 
suffered from a severe decline in economic well-
being in the past because these risks occurred. A 
fourth of them reported having asked for a loan or 
grant from their relatives and having applied for 
social assistance as their first attempt to cope with 
the risk (see Table A21 in Annex A). 
In fact, the GDI household survey found a consider-
able number of Jordanians relying on the support of 
their children in old age or the support of relatives 
when the main provider had died. The most impor-
tant reasons for this are the low level of social assis-
tance, the time-consuming application procedures 
and the rigid eligibility criteria of the public 
schemes. However, family networks should not be 
seen as a substitute for formal protection provisions, 
because there is no legal entitlement to such assis-
tance and because the relatives of the poorest are 
often poor themselves, and so the volume of their 
support is small. 
5.2 Divorce and Separation 
By law, women are entitled to claim financial sup-
port from their husbands once they are divorced. 
Often, however, divorced or separated women do 
not present such claims, and men are often reluctant 
or unable to live up to their duties. These men have 
no income themselves, disappear or fail to respond 
until arrested by the police. 
No insurance covers the risks of divorce or separa-
tion. The GDI household survey confirmed that 
                                                     
132 Cf. IBRD (1999e), pp. 15f. 
women affected by these risks have no choice but to 
apply for assistance from their relatives, friends or 
neighbours or public social assistance institutions. 
However, the social standing of divorced and sepa-
rated women being low, some families refuse to 
support them. 9.9 % of the beneficiaries of NAF are 
divorced or evicted women (see Table A21 in An-
nex A). 
5.3 Unemployment and 
Underemployment 
There is hardly any social protection system in Jor-
dan that covers the risk of unemployment. Low-
income earners especially are completely vulnerable 
to the loss of their employment. There is no unem-
ployment insurance in Jordan. Only jobs in the pub-
lic sector are reported to be ‘safe’: Government 
employees and the members of the armed forces (a 
fourth to a third of the labour force) face hardly any 
risk of being laid off. But no job security legislation 
is applicable for private sector employees. The like-
lihood of being laid off is much higher for employ-
ees without any kind of work contract. Of the GDI 
sample, 25 % of household heads were public sector 
employees or pensioners who do not incur the risk 
of being laid off. Only 5 % were private sector em-
ployees with a written or oral working contract.  
The vulnerability of households to the risk of unem-
ployment, however, depends on more than the prob-
ability of being laid off and losing their insurance 
coverage. Some households have diversified their 
risks in such a way as to be able to cope easily with 
the effects of these risks occurring. 21 % of the 
households from the GDI survey reported having no 
working contract but multiple sources of income, so 
that the loss of one job would have limited negative 
effects. 50 % of household heads were unemployed 
or employed though completely vulnerable to the 
risk of losing their employment (see Table A5 in 
Annex A). 
Apart from that, the GDI household survey sheds 
light on the fact that a very high share of the work-
ing population is active in the informal sector. 63 % 
of the household heads from the sample had em-
ployment and 59 % out of them were categorised as 
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‘informal sector workers’: 43 % were self-emplo-
yed, 6 % day labourers and 10 % employees without 
a working contract (see Table A14 in Annex A). 
However, even though the sample reflects quite well 
the income profile of Jordanian towns in general, it 
has to be kept in mind that the survey was con-
ducted in East Amman only, where informal eco-
nomic activities are reported to be overrepresented. 
It is even difficult for Jordanians to obtain any sup-
port once they are laid off. Few of the unemployed 
are entitled to social assistance. Most public pro-
grammes, like for example NAF, exclude families 
with male members of working age from eligibility, 
even if these men are unable to find any employ-
ment. The only public programmes directly address-
ing unemployment and underemployment are the 
social credit programmes of the DEF and the NAF. 
Both offer social credits to finance small business 
projects and vocational training. 
The most common strategy used to cope with un-
employment is to mobilise labour. This fact is high-
lighted by the results of the GDI household survey: 
Most household heads simply try to find new em-
ployment, while others would be prepared to mi-
grate to find a job abroad or have their wives or sons 
start working. Alternative strategies are to borrow 
from friends or neighbours, take out a bank loan to 
run a small business, or apply for social assistance 
(see Tables A19 and A21 in Annex A). 
5.4 Health Risks 
Compared with other countries in the Arab world, 
Jordan has a performing health system that is acces-
sible to the entire population, though it is provided 
by different institutions of the public, private and 
non-governmental sectors. 
Nevertheless, illness is one of the most important 
risks. Nearly one fifth of the households interviewed 
during the GDI household survey have suffered a 
decline in economic well-being as a result of a 
household member falling ill and being in need for 
medical treatment (see Annex A). Although some 
other risks have more drastic financial effects, 
medical treatment constitutes a serious financial 
burden for the Jordanian poor and near-poor. This 
fact is due to three reasons: First, the Jordanian poor 
and near-poor are rarely covered by health insurance 
Figure 9: Health Insurance Coverage of East Amman Households 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: GDI household survey (see Table A22 in Annex A) 
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(see Figure 9). Second, health risks occur quite fre-
quently. The GDI household survey revealed that 
almost every household has ever faced social shocks 
caused by health risks. Third, illness affects not only 
a person’s economic situation but his ability to gen-
erate labour income and his general well-being as 
well. 
Health Care Provision 
The Jordanian health care sector is made up of pub-
lic and private health care facilities. Private health 
services are asked for by clients of commercial 
health insurance companies, employees of self-
insured firms and households willing to pay the ex-
pensive user fees. User fees are the major source of 
finance of private clinics and hospitals, while com-
pensation payments from private insurance compa-
nies constitute only 20 % of their receipts (see Table 
B15 in Annex B). 
The public health care sector breaks down into three 
systems: the government health care facilities ad-
ministered by the Ministry of Health (MOH), the 
Royal Medical Services (RMS) and the Jordan Uni-
versity Hospital (JUH).133 All of these are predomi-
nantly financed by government budget subsidies 
(60 – 80 % of total receipts), social health insurance 
contributions and user fees (20 - 40 %) being of 
much less importance. 
Protection against Health Risks 
Some 50% of the population remains vulnerable to 
health risks. The GDI household survey found 59 % 
of the interviewed urban households have no health 
insurance (see Figure 9). The corresponding data of 
more representative surveys, however, are much 
lower. Their estimate of overall health insurance 
coverage in Jordan range between 50 and 80 % of 
the population (see Table B15 in Annex B). Most of 
these figures, however, include Palestinian refugees 
eligible for UNRWA’s health service programme, 
                                                     
133 Cf. Brosk et al. (2000), Table ES-1. 
which can hardly be considered health insurance.134 
This does not provide much more than very basic 
health care. Health insurance coverage estimates are 
much more in line once the beneficiaries of 
UNRWA have been deducted from the total number 
of Jordanians reported to have health protection. In 
this case, all figures, with one single exception, are 
in the range between 50 and 60 %. However, cover-
age is much higher in urban than in rural areas 
(70.2 % and 46.7 % of employees only, respec-
tively).135 
Out-of-pocket spending for health care and drugs 
represents a high burden for the Jordanian poor and 
near-poor, because they are rarely covered by health 
insurance. The only formal health protection sys-
tems catering for the poor are those of UNRWA, the 
MOH and a negligible number of NGOs. Depending 
on health insurance coverage, it is possible to dis-
tinguish seven different groups of the population: 
— Members of the armed forces and their relatives 
(including parents) are treated for free at RMS 
and MOH health care facilities. They constitute 
25 to 35 % of the population and pay no more 
than a monthly contribution of JD 1.5 per 
month and employee. 
— Students and employees of the Universities of 
Jordan and Yarmouk and municipal servants of 
Amman (1 to 2 % of the population) are pro-
vided free treatment at the university hospitals. 
— All civil servants and their dependants (21 % of 
the entire population) have to enrol with the 
CHIP. They contribute about 1 % of their sal-
ary to the CHIP and are entitled to use MOH 
facilities for only symbolic fees. 
— Apart from these, the MOH allows a limited 
number of households to use its facilities for 
free if they hold a green-card. Green-cards are 
issued for three years for the very poor (all 
NAF beneficiary households and all households 
with a monthly income below JD 50), for regis-
tered blood donors and for officially recognised 
handicapped persons. Green-cards also entitle 
                                                     
134  Cf. Hanssen-Bauer / Pedersen / Tiltnes (1998), p. 189. 
135  Cf. CSS (1996a), p. 111. 
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their holders to highly subsidised medicines 
(0.1 JD per subscription) from public pharma-
cies. In 2001 some 160,000 Jordanians had 
green-cards, which amounts to 3 % of the 
population or 15 % of the poor. 
— Registered Palestine refugees (5 to 21% of the 
population136) have free access to the UNRWA 
health system. But the range of services pro-
vided by UNRWA has been substantially re-
duced to a small number of treatments (basic 
health care and mother-and-child services, see 
pp. 37 - 38). UNRWA patients used to be trans-
ferred to MOH or private hospitals for in-pa-
tient care, and these hospitals’ fees were borne 
by UNRWA. However, the number of referrals 
has dropped to almost zero, and it has become 
very difficult for even very poor refugees to ob-
tain approval to be treated at hospital for free. 
— Some 5 to 12 % of the population are insured 
with commercial insurance companies. These 
include, on the one hand, the employees of 
large-scale enterprises and the members of pro-
fessional unions, who benefit from favourable 
group insurance arrangements and, on the other 
hand, the direct clients of insurance companies. 
These groups of the population are usually enti-
tled to refer to private health care providers but 
all of them are from higher or higher medium 
income classes.  
— The rest of the population has to pay for every 
kind of health treatment. It is true that the user 
fees in most of the MOH hospitals are highly 
subsidised by the government and the treatment 
of diabetes and cancer is completely free of 
charge for every resident. Moreover, in cases of 
acute illness households with a monthly income 
of up to JD 250 can apply to the Royal Court 
for temporary exemptions from medical costs. 
In 2000 some 12,000 exemptions of this kind 
were approved.137 Treatments in MOH hospi-
tals, however, are reported to be of very low 
quality, and in many cases no beds are va-
                                                     
136 See Table B15 in Annex B. 
137 Dr. Fakhri Al-Smairat, Civil Health Insurance Programme, 
20 February 2001 and 4 April 2001. 
cant.138 Clients have to wait or look to the pri-
vate sector, where they are charged high fees 
for even entering hospital.  
Coping with Health Risks 
In cases of illness, most of the urban poor and near-
poor ask their relatives, neighbours or friends for 
assistance to cover their health treatment costs. Oth-
ers apply for free treatment at the MOH facilities or 
social assistance from public institutions or non-
governmental organisations. Many households, 
however, have to dissolve their small savings, sell 
assets (jewellery) or borrow money from relatives or 
credit institutions (see Table A21 in Annex A). 
5.5 High Number of Children 
Social protection instruments which aim specifically 
at protecting families with a high number of chil-
dren, are non-existent in Jordan. Only some of the 
households affected benefit from social assistance 
and have free access to the subsidised health and 
education sectors. The GDI household survey found 
that urban households with a high number of chil-
dren seek to cope with their situation by applying 
for social assistance and reducing consumption ex-
penditures. Some children from poor families have 
to drop out of school to start work.  
5.6 Low Education 
Jordanians without or with only little schooling and 
training face far-above-average risks of falling into 
poverty but However, there is no social protection 
strategy could address this risk. Rather, it is within 
the scope of education policies to establish preven-
tive measures aimed at raising the education level of 
the population.  
                                                     
138 Dr. Hana‘ Jaber, Centre d’études et de recherches sociales 
sur les pays du Moyen-Orient, 22 April 2001. 
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Although basic education is free of charge in Jor-
dan, a large share of Jordanians have not passed 
primary school finals. Children often have to quit 
school. Others are not able to spend enough time on 
their homework because their families want them to 
work. Aware of this problem, some NGOs provide 
assistance to children in doing their homework. 
Most of these programmes, however, focus on spe- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cial groups of the population such , e.g., as disabled 
children. Some institutions also provide university 
stipends.139 However, supporting academic school-
ing meets neither the needs of the poor nor the de-
mands of the labour market. Only secondary school-
ing and vocational training can extract the poor 
from the education trap  
                                                     
139  See Table B28 in Annex B. 
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Part III: Reform Options 
6 Micro-Insurance in Jordan 
Against the background of the considerable gap in 
social protection in Jordan and the high number of 
households vulnerable to risks, the question is what 
can be done to reform social protection in Jordan 
and to extend its coverage to those currently unpro-
tected. 
Alternative strategies have been outlined in Chapter 
2, and the objective of this chapter is to discuss their 
respective advantages and the feasibility of micro-
insurance in the concrete case of Jordan. 
We found that it is recommendable to establish mi-
cro-insurance in Jordan. Micro-insurance is a prom-
ising approach to bridging part of the gap in the 
present social protection system, because such in-
surance meets the capacities and needs of those who 
are left out by the operating schemes. However, this 
is not a panacea and will certainly not be able cover 
the entire population of Jordan. For this reason, both 
other strategies, reforming social insurance and 
extending coverage and broadening the outreach of 
public social assistance, are equally important. All 
three strategies ought to be pursued together to re-
spond to the specifics of all social groups: the poor, 
the near-poor and the non-poor. 
This chapter starts out with an analysis of the poten-
tial of the three major options for extending the 
coverage of social protection in Jordan (6.1). It turns 
then to the question of whether micro-insurance can 
be designed in such a way that it meets the needs of 
this study’s target group: the urban poor and near-
poor. It examines the framework conditions of mi-
cro-insurance in Jordan (6.2) and the needs and 
demands of the target group (6.3) and discusses the 
design of a potential micro-insurance product (6.4), 
the role different actors can play in a micro-
insurance model (6.5) and the opportunities and 
limits of such a model (6.6). 
6.1 Options for Extending Social 
Protection Coverage 
6.1.1 Extending the Coverage of Social 
Insurance 
The first-best option to improve the social protec-
tion of those that lack access to adequate risk man-
agement strategies is to extend the mandatory legal 
coverage of the Social Security Corporation (SSC) 
to all groups of the employed. It is the SSC’s origi-
nal task to protect all citizens from the impact of 
future risks, and such a solution would have three 
advantages from the point of view of the insured 
with respect to voluntary contributory insurance 
schemes such as micro-insurance:  
— It is cheaper, because the administration and 
distribution channels do not first have to be 
built up. 
— The SSC has long years of experience in de-
signing and pricing insurance contracts and in 
administering a large client base . 
— Membership with the SSC is mandatory, mak-
ing re-distribution between income groups pos-
sible, while voluntary schemes are at risk of se-
lecting not only bad risks but also only the 
poor. 
But it would take years and years to cover all em-
ployees under the statutes of the SSC because 
modifications in legislation in Jordan tend to be 
very slow. Moreover, it would be extremely difficult 
to check informal sector worker enrolment and 
monitor compliance. 
Apart from that, it is not recommendable to extend 
the mandatory coverage of the SSC unless it has 
first undergone substantial reforms, restoring its 
financial position. Such reforms would have to ad-
dress the SSC’s overly generous early-retirement 
regulations and minimum pension provisions, revise 
the benefit formula and reform the current low-yield 
investment policy. These are indispensable to safe-
guard the pension titles of those who are already 
covered as well as the newly insured. 
The same holds true – though to a lesser degree - for 
opening up the SSC on a voluntary basis. This strat-
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egy underlies the concept of the Social Security Law 
reform package which is, at the time being, on its 
way through the legislative process. Among other 
changes, it will open the SSC up to all groups of the 
employed (see p. 29). Such a step points in the right 
direction of closing the gap in social protection in 
Jordan. However, it does not take the fundamental 
financial problems of the SSC into account, and 
instead entails the risk of further aggravating them: 
80 % of the insured already receive the minimum 
pension. According to the pension formula, they 
would be entitled to much lower benefits, but their 
pensions are subsidised to guarantee a minimum 
level of benefits at old age. Most of those attracted 
by the opening up of the SSC for voluntary mem-
bership will be low-income informal sector workers, 
so that the share of minimum pension beneficiaries 
will further increase. 
Apart from that, informal sector employees will find 
it hard to deduct not only the employee’s but also 
the employers share of contributions – totalling 
16.5 % of their labour income. 
Alternatively, a separate new scheme could be built 
up under the aegis of the SSC, designed to meet the 
specifics of informal sector workers: with lower 
contribution levels but without the generous mini-
mum pension provision However, the public will 
fear an intermingling of the two schemes and a 
cross-subsidisation of their respective funds. More-
over, it would be all too apparent that it is unjust to 
subsidise low-wage formal sector workers and not 
to subsidise informal sector workers from the same 
wage class. 
6.1.2 Broadening the Outreach of Social 
Assistance 
Broadening the outreach of social assistance pro-
vided by the National Aid Fund (NAF), the Zakat 
Fund and other public institutions is no alternative, 
either.  
No doubt the volume of social assistance spending 
has to be increased as soon as possible. Today, no 
more than a fifth of the Jordanian poor are granted 
assistance and the level of average transfers is insuf-
ficient to raise the poor above the poverty line. Im-
provements in targeting and reductions in the dupli-
cation of administrative structures could set free 
financial resources that could be devoted to addi-
tional beneficiaries. Now that the consumer-
subsidies – formerly a substantial item in govern-
ment spending - have been reduced to zero, addi-
tional financial resources have to be channelled to 
social assistance.  
But the country cannot afford to provide support to 
all those who are not covered by insurance. The 
limited financial means should be reserved for the 
desperate poor, who are unable to spend for any-
thing but day-to-day survival. Households living 
above the poverty line and having at least some 
excess income should be asked to provide for their 
own social protection.  
6.1.3 Building Up Micro-Insurance 
Schemes 
As a consequence, special systems have to be cre-
ated that address the special capacities and needs of 
the near-poor in Jordan. Micro-insurance could be 
one of these systems. 
To decide on whether micro-insurance is indeed 
feasible in Jordan and would meet the demand of 
this study’s target group, four questions140 have to 
be answered: 
— Do the framework conditions allow micro-
insurance schemes to operate in an effective 
way? 
— Does micro-insurance in general meet the de-
mands of the poor and near-poor? 
— Is it possible to design a micro-insurance prod-
uct that is financially viable and at the same 
time meets the need of the poor and near-poor? 
— What institutions in Jordan have the resources, 
expertise and relations to fulfil the tasks of in-
surance provision (product design, manage-
ment, sale and servicing) and how should these 
                                                     
140  Cf. Brown (2001). 
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institutions be organised to solve the problems 
inherent in insurance provision (administration 
and transaction costs, information asymmetries, 
investment of reserves, adequate risk pooling, 
adverse incentives, confidence; see Chapter 2). 
These questions will be discussed in the following 
four subchapters. 
6.2 Framework Conditions 
The framework conditions in Jordan do not pose 
major obstacles for micro-insurance The necessary 
framework conditions for micro-insurance in Jordan 
were checked through interviews with policy mak-
ers and academic experts (see Table 9): 
Political and economic stability. Jordan’s political 
system is stable enough to be able to judge political 
risks for micro-insurance schemes as low. Amid a 
turbulent region, Jordan has always been and still is 
considered an anchor of stability in the Middle East. 
However, the situation depends to a large extent on 
relations with neighbouring countries. A violent 
conflict, for example, would undermine the basis of 
any insurance scheme and bring about additional 
risks for households.141 
Inflation. Inflation risks are low, as well: The 
change in the cost of living index decreased from 
6.5 % in 1996 to 0.6 % in 1999.142  
Opportunities to invest reserves. Micro-insurance in 
Jordan would not be hampered by a lack of invest-
ment opportunities: Neither domestic nor foreign 
investments are subject to significant legal restric-
tions. As an exception, the SSC is not free to invest 
abroad, a regulation that negatively affects its prof-
itability and limits its potential role in micro-in-
surance schemes.  
Insurance regulation. At present, regulatory insur-
ance legislation could constitute a serious difficulty 
for micro-insurance in Jordan, but it is expected to 
be amended in the very near future. Today, to be 
accredited, intermediaries, i.e. insurance agents and 
insurance brokers, must have either three or ten 
years of experience respectively in the insurance 
business. This restriction would be a very critical 
                                                     
141  Cf. Morduch (1999), p. 198. 
142  See Table B2 in Annex B. 
Table 9: Framework Conditions for Micro-Insurance in Jordan 
Criteria main results  main areas of concern 
Political and  
economic stability? 
stable despite regional instability factors  involvement in Palestine war 
Inflation? 0.6 % in 1999  
Opportunities to  
invest reserves? 
no restrictions when SSC gets involved 
Insurance regulation? rigid criteria for insurance intermediaries, but legal 
amendments set for 2002 
restrictive NGO law does not  
permit profits of NGOs 
Judicial system? necessity for micro-insurance schemes to agree on 
their own dispute-settling procedures 
judicial procedures are slow and 
complicated 
judicial regulations and institutions 
are not reliable 
Socio-cultural  
conditions? 
concept of insurance widely accepted 
micro-insurance considered to be in accordance with 
Islam by religious experts 
distrust provoked by term  
‘insurance’ opt for alternative name 
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point for any institution wishing to play the role of 
agent (intermediary) in micro-insurance. Moreover, 
it encourages insurance companies to market their 
products directly to the insured. However, only re-
cently an independent Insurance Regulatory Com-
mission was established to reform existing legisla-
tion. It is pursuing a new approach and intends to 
judge the accreditation of intermediaries on the ba-
sis of their skills. As of winter or spring 2002, when 
the new insurance law is to come into effect, any 
institution will be able to sell insurance products 
and, consequently, act as an agent in micro-insu-
rance. The Insurance Regulatory Commission has 
shown itself to be open-minded about the idea of 
micro-insurance and is considering formulating the 
executive regulations of the new law in such a way 
that non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are 
explicitly authorised to become active in insurance 
business.143 
Apart from insurance legislation, legal restrictions 
for NGOs could result from the current NGO law. 
According to the Ministry of Social Development 
(MOSD)144, NGOs are not allowed to take over 
responsibilities in insurance schemes, because 
NGOs are not permitted to work for profit. Accord-
ing to NGOs, however, this is not the case. They are 
ready to participate in micro-insurance. Should the 
MOSD prevent NGOs from selling micro-insurance 
contracts, NGO workers would fund co-operative 
unions run by the same staff to become active in the 
micro-insurance business. Co-operative unions are 
even allowed make profit.145 
Judicial system. Micro-insurance schemes, however, 
would have to create their own dispute-settling 
mechanisms. Judicial procedures in Jordan, at pre-
                                                     
143  Dr. Bassel Hindawi, Insurance Regulatory Commission, 
26 February 2001; Mr. Hisham Baban, Ministry of Trade 
and Industry, 26 February 2001; Mr. Sami Gammoh, Mr. 
Ramzi S. Shami and Mrs. Linda Karus, Jordan Interna-
tional Insurance Company, 15 February 2001; Mr. Rajaj 
K. Sweis, Middle East Insurance Company, 21 February 
2001. 
144  Mr. Orabi Molid Ibrahim and Mrs. Maisoun Bdour, Minis-
try of Social Development, 25 February 2001. 
145  Mr. Ayyoub Khamis, Voluntary Society of the Islamic 
Centre in Jabal An-Nadheef, 10 April 2001. 
sent, are too slow, too complicated and not reliable 
enough. Flexible and fast mediation procedures are 
essential to solve disputes between partner and 
agent or between one of them and the insured. 
Again, the Insurance Regulatory Commission could 
play a positive role when the involved parties can-
not find an agreement. It has efficient sanctioning 
mechanisms (e.g. insurance licence suspension) for 
insurance companies violating legal regulations.146 
Socio-cultural conditions. Even religious beliefs are 
no obstacle to micro-insurance. Micro-insurance 
(even life micro-insurance) is a risk pooling tool and 
in accordance with Islam, if it (i) is managed in a 
socially responsible way, (ii) promotes solidarity 
and (iii) invests in acceptable assets only. This was 
also confirmed by Jordanian Islamic legal advisors 
(Fuqahā‛)147, who would even be ready to promote 
the concept. Even ordinary insurance is refused for 
religious objections by only a small minority of the 
urban population, as the GDI survey revealed. Still, 
micro-insurance might appear more acceptable if it 
was named ‘social micro-fund’ (Şundūq Iğtimācī 
Şaġīr) or ‘solidarity fund’ (Şundūq Takāful – the 
term for Islamic insurance) rather than ‘micro-
insurance fund’ (Şundūq Ta’mīn Şaġīr). Investing 
with Islamic banks could also help to allay doubts. 
6.3 Demand 
The most decisive pre-condition for setting up mi-
cro-insurance is, of course, whether there is a poten-
tial market for it. Five questions148 have to be an-
swered to judge the potential demand of households 
for micro-insurance (see Table 10): 
                                                     
146  Dr. Bassel Hindawi, Insurance Regulatory Commision, 
26 February 2001; Mr. Hisham Baban, Ministry of Trade 
and Industry, 26 February 2001. 
147  Dr. Hamdi Murad, Umar-al-Mukhtar-Schools, former 
Director General of the Zakat Fund, 17 April 2001;  
Mr. Ayyoub Khamis, Voluntary Society of the Islamic 
Centre in Jabal An-Nadheef, 10 April 2001. Cf. also 
Bhatty (2001), pp. 47 - 48. 
148  Cf. Brown (2001), p. 13; Lund / Srinivas (1999), 
pp. 75 - 77; McCord (2001b), p. 37. 
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The GDI household survey149 looked into all of 
these questions. It reveals that the potential demand 
for micro-insurance among near-poor urban house-
holds is substantial and that even a considerable 
number of the urban poor are interested in possible 
micro-insurance schemes. However, it has to be 
kept in mind that potential demand does not neces-
sarily translate out into effective demand. 
Vulnerability. Urban low-income groups in Jordan 
are insufficiently protected against risks, especially 
health and life-cycle risks. Lacking adequate sup-
port, the urban poor and near-poor are unable to 
manage these risks and are highly vulnerable. 59 % 
of the interviewed households reported that their 
main provider is not covered by any pension or life 
insurance and that none of the family members have 
                                                     
149  This chapter is based on the results of the GDI household 
survey. Although the sample is not representative, all pa-
rameters, such as average income, average number of 
household members, coverage of social protection, come 
close to representative data. For further details see An-
nex A. 
health insurance (see Figures 8 and 9). As to the 
poor who are unable to provide for their own protec-
tion, less than a third of the interviewed households 
receive public social assistance from any institution 
and the traditional mechanisms of mutual support 
(‘informal insurance’) are much too limited in scope 
and too unreliable to make up for the gap in formal 
social protection. Most of the support to the needy is 
provided by relatives, friends and neighbours on an 
occasional basis only. 
Awareness. Most of the urban poor and near-poor in 
Jordan are well aware of the risks they might face in 
the future as well as of their potential effects. Two 
thirds of those interviewed worry about the future 
and concretised their worries with reference to spe-
cific risks they face. It became apparent that the 
households tend to be better aware of risks with a 
high probability and frequency of occurrence than 
they are about low-frequency / low-probability risks, 
even though the latter cause much higher losses. 
Almost all of those interviewed worried about be-
coming ill or losing their employment, but only part 
of them stated being aware that the main provider 
Table 10: Potential Demand for Micro-Insurance among Urban Groups in Jordan 
Criteria basic questions results 
Vulnerability Are households exposed to risks? 
Are they covered by other social protec-
tion systems? 
more than 50 % vulnerable to life-cycle risks; 58 % to 
health risks 
two thirds of the poor do not receive social assistance 
mutual support insufficient, not reliable, occasional in 
most cases 
Awareness Are households aware of potential future 
risks?  
two thirds aware of future risks; but better aware of 
high-frequency (health) risks than high-loss (life-cycle) 
risks 
Interest Are households willing to provide? 
Do they want support in managing their 
risks? 
two thirds willing to provide but lacking adequate 
means 
Understanding 
and acceptance 
Do households understand and accept 
the concept of insurance? 
Do they consider insurance the most 
appropriate provision strategy? 
good understanding because of widespread mutual in-
surance groups (e.g. family funds) 
most households interested in participating in micro-
insurance scheme 
Willingness  
& ability to  
participate 
What is the economic situation of inter-
ested households?  
Do they feel able to contribute to micro-
insurance on a regular basis? 
42 % able to contribute on a regular base (most of them 
between 2 and 10 JD per month) 
possible contribution highly correlated with income 
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might die or become work-disabled, leaving the 
household without any labour income. 
Interest. The great majority of households are will-
ing to provide for the future but cannot find suitable 
ways to do so. Less than one third of the households 
in the GDI household sample are actively providing 
for the future (most of these doing so by saving 
money or investing in education). This lack of pro-
vision, however, seems to be mainly due to a lack of 
ideas on how to provide or to the absence of appro-
priate schemes. Only a third of the interviewed 
households had any ideas on what kind of protection 
they would like to have. 
These households are in need of support in their risk 
management efforts, and they stress that they expect 
the state or other actors to help them. They wish to 
have some form of insurance or opportunity of in-
come diversification. Only a few households ex-
pressed a preference for savings products, credit or 
social assistance. It is important to be sure about 
this, because households’ exposure to risks is not 
necessarily the same as demand for support and for 
insurance.150 
Understanding and acceptance. The majority of 
interviewed households had no difficulties in under-
standing the concept of insurance when they were 
explained the idea of micro-insurance. This is 
mainly due to the existence of family funds and 
solidarity funds shared by refugees from the same 
town of origin, mutual insurance groups, which 
resemble micro-insurance in that they are contribu-
tory funds providing assistance in a priori defined 
emergency cases.151  
Some households, however, did not understand that 
an insurance scheme only provides benefits to those 
harmed by a risk but not to those who are not af-
fected. They expect any fund always to pay back 
what a member has paid in, like a savings fund. This 
perception is not peculiar to Jordan: Many micro-
insurance schemes have failed because households 
                                                     
150  Cf. Brown (2001), pp. 13 - 14; Brown / McCord (2000), p. 
3; Mosley (2001). 
151  See Box 4, p. 40, for a description of such a fund. 
who were not affected by the insured risk requested 
their money back or left the scheme, feeling be-
trayed.152 Low-income households’ have limited ex-
perience with risk-pooling arrangements, while 
rotating savings and credit associations are wide-
spread and mutual support networks are based on 
reciprocated assistance (giving and taking). 
Most of the urban near-poor welcomed the idea of 
micro-insurance and accepted it, even though it is 
based on the mechanism of pooling risks. They 
would participate in possible schemes. Some house-
holds, however, favoured funds with more redis-
tributive elements (‘charity elements’), which are 
impossible in voluntary schemes. Others feared that 
solidarity among neighbours would be too weak to 
establish a system which requires mutual trust. They 
expressed their preference for a simple savings fund 
without risk-pooling, where everyone gets back 
what he has paid in. Only a few households ex-
pressed religious objections to insurance. 
Willingness and ability to participate. The great 
majority of interviewed households are willing to 
participate in possible micro-insurance schemes. 
They are willing to pay for their protection  
(Table 11). Micro-insurance indeed seems to fill the 
gap in social protection in Jordan.  
Moreover, they are also able to contribute on a 
regular basis. Households interviewed for the GDI 
survey reported an average monthly contribution of 
8.25 JD for insurance. The bulk of potential contri-
butions was between JD 2 and 10 per month and 
household. 49 % of the urban poor and near-poor 
declared their ability to pay at least 2 JD per month 
(see Table 12).  
As in many other countries153, a high number of 
interviewed households were initially willing to pay 
but turned out to be unable to afford it. Even some 
of the poor households would be willing and able to 
contribute, though on a very limited basis. The re-
ported ability to pay for micro-insurance was found 
                                                     
152  Cf. Del Conte (2000), p. 12; McCord (2001b), p. 34; 
Morduch (1999), p. 190. 
153  Cf. Brown (2001), pp. 15 - 16. 
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to be significantly correlated with reported income 
(correlation coefficient: 0.5). Reported household 
incomes were in the range between JD 40 and 500 
per month and household. 
6.4 Product Design 
The significance of these results, however, is lim-
ited, or at least preliminary, because the questions 
on the willingness and ability to pay for micro-
insurance were abstract; they were not linked to a 
specific insurance product, and willingness to con-
tribute depends to a large extent on the concrete risk 
to be covered.154 For this reason, after it became 
clear that households would probably prefer health, 
work-disability and life insurance, insurance com-
                                                     
154  Cf. Brown / Green / Lindquist (2000), p. 4; Brown / 
McCord (2000), p. 3. 
panies were asked whether they could provide such 
insurance contracts in the price range that house-
holds had mentioned and they were asked to outline 
a possible product. This product was again ex-
plained to the households during the second phase 
of the survey. In an iterative process a product was 
designed which is at once (i) financially viable and 
(ii) affordable and attractive for the target group. 
For each of the risks households face, a list of crite-
ria (compare pp. 10 - 11) was used (see Table 13): 
It turned out that it is possible to offer a term life 
and work-disability insurance that the urban near-
poor would demand, while it would be extremely 
difficult for micro-insurance schemes to cover 
health risks, for the time being. The majority of 
interviewed households expressed a preference for 
health insurance, but the products that insurers 
could offer are too expensive for them. Property, 
liability or old-age insurance cannot be offered ei-
ther. But life and work-disability insurance could be 
Table 11: Willingness of the Urban Poor and Near-Poor to Participate in Micro-Insurance 
 absolute number in % of valid interviews with poor and near-poor households 
Yes 65 81 
No 15 19 
N/A 17 - 
Sum 97 100 
Source: GDI household survey (see annex A) 
Table 12: The Ability of the East Amman Poor and Near-Poor to Pay for Micro-insurance 
(JD per month and household) absolute no. in % of valid interviews with poor and 
near-poor households 
Not able 8 12 
1 - 2 11 17 
2 - 5 21 32 
5 - 10 11 17 
10 - 20 9 14 
20 - 50 5 8 
N/A 32 - 
Source: GDI household survey (see annex A) 
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sold with a micro-savings product good for old-age 
provisioning. 
Life and Work-disability Insurance 
Micro-insurance schemes could offer appropriate, 
viable products insuring the death and work disabil-
ity of a main provider.155 It might even be coupled 
with a micro-savings component, a useful product to 
                                                     
155  In the context of this study, work disability, in accordance 
with the Jordanian Social Security Law, refers to ‘total 
work disability’, i.e. ‘any disability precluding the insured, 
totally and permanently, from practising any profession or 
paid employment”. The share of disabilities resulting from 
diseases and injuries in Jordan is published in Table 2 in 
the annexes of the Jordanian Social Security Law. Cf. SSC 
(n.d.), pp. 2; 36 - 59. 
support households in their efforts to provide for old 
age or to accumulate capital for future productive 
investments. 
Life and work-disability micro-insurance schemes 
are already operating in Jordan, additional projects 
are planned. NEF and the MFIs are negotiating with 
private insurance companies on co-operation in a 
life and work-disability insurance project which 
would be to cover the outstanding loan balances of 
their clients.156 JOHUD already requires its custom-
ers to buy life and work-disability insurance to pro-
tect itself from a loss of outstanding loan balances.  
                                                     
156  The Micro Fund for Women is in negotiations with the 
American Life Insurance Co. (ALICO) insure outstanding 
loan balances. Mrs. Niveen Abbousji Sharaf, Micro Fund 
for Women, 22 February 2001. 
Table 13: The Potential Design of Micro-Insurance in Jordan 
Criteria basic questionsa results 
Demand Are households vulnerable to a specific risk? 
Are they aware of the risk? 
Are they willing to provide for protection 
against the risk? 
Poverty correlated with life-cycle, health and 
economic risks  
Households interested in health (64 %), life 
(49 %) and work-disability  
(26 %) insurance 
Appropriateness Is insurance the best solution to protect against 
this risk? 
Insurance appropriate solution for life-cycle 
risks and low-frequency / high-cost risks  
related to illness 
Feasibility Is insurance a possible solution for the risk? 
- risks can be specified 
- risks are not covariant 
- effective risk-pooling through large num-
bers of insured persons 
- be controlled 
- transaction simplicity 
Viability  
(sustainability) 
Can clients’ potential contributions finance all 
related costs or are there other sources of fi-
nancing 
Term life and work-disability insurance could 
be offered: specific idiosyncratic risks, transac-
tions simple and information problems control-
lable 
Health insurance for public sector services not 
feasible: information problems not controllable
Health insurance for private sector services 
feasible and viable: information problems con-
trollable via elaborated methods of Jordanian 
health administrators 
Affordability Are households willing and able to pay for the 
insurance product? 
Term life and work-disability insurance possi-
ble for 1.25 JD monthly  
Health insurance for private sector services too 
expensive: 19 JD monthly 
a Cf. Brown / Green / Lindquist (2000), pp. 5 - 7; Brown / McCord (2000), p. 3; Del Conte (2000), pp. 12 - 14; 
  Lund / Srinivas (1999), pp. 75 - 79. 
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Demand. Among the urban poor and near-poor in 
Jordan, the potential demand for life and work-
disability micro-insurance is significant (see Ta-
ble 14). 49 % and 26 % of the interviewed house-
holds respectively expressed interest in life and 
work-disability insurance. However, it should be 
kept in mind that such initial interest does not nec-
essarily result in the same level of effective demand. 
Many households are not aware of the serious ef-
fects of the risks because they are not confronted 
with them in everyday life (as they are with illness). 
This is highlighted by the fact that households’ in-
terest in health insurance is markedly higher. Life 
insurance might thus loose priority against other 
needs. Awareness campaigns might become neces-
sary, and thus a business line of this kind has to be 
considered a long-term investment.157 Moreover, 
people are more sceptical about life insurance than 
e.g. health insurance; some believe that Islam does 
not permit the insuring the death of a person. 
To raise the interest in and acceptance of life and 
work-disability insurance, a linkage with a savings 
component should be taken into consideration. Such 
a savings component could provide benefits at the 
end of the insurance term, amounting to contribu-
tions to this component plus interest. The advan-
tages of such a double-component product are three-
fold: (i) it would also be acceptable to households 
expecting their contributions back in any case: 
Benefits are provided in any case - not only when 
the household’s main provider dies or becomes 
work-disabled. Hence the scheme would be more 
similar to traditional savings and solidarity clubs. 
(ii) The scheme would be more attractive: House-
holds are rewarded for participating, under the 
good- as well as the bad-case scenario. (iii) Most 
importantly, households would be supported in sav-
ing for future investments in productive capital and 
in providing for old age. For low-income groups, 
                                                     
157  Dr. Khaled M. Abu-Goura, National Ahlia Insurance 
Company, 21 February 2001; Mrs. Heba Dajani, Swiss A-
gency for Development and Cooperation, 18 February 
2001; Mrs. Maha Khatib, Jordan River Foundation, 
26 February 2001; Mrs. Nadia Shamrukh, Jordanian Wom-
en’s Union, 20 February 2001. Cf. also Brown / Churchill 
(2000), p. 54; Hauch (1999); Freiberg-Strauß (1999), p. 8. 
saving is often a more appropriate strategy than 
insurance.158 
Appropriateness. Still, it is recommendable for pos-
sible micro-insurance projects to start out with life 
and work-disability insurance. Savings may be an 
alternative to provide for the risks related to illness, 
but insurance and income diversification are the 
only appropriate strategies to protect against low-
frequency / high-loss risks like death or work dis-
ability.159 The demand of urban households in Jor-
dan for health insurance may be higher, but they are 
more vulnerable to the death or work disability of 
their main provider because the related permanent 
loss of income is more difficult to bear than lump-
sum health care costs. The results of the GDI 
household show indicate that the correlation of pov-
erty with the occurrence of risks is much stronger 
for life-cycle risks than for health risks.160  
Feasibility. Jordanian commercial insurance com-
panies are prepared to offer cheap life and work-
disability insurance on a voluntary basis and act as a 
partner in micro-insurance business. They could 
easily provide the actuarial calculations necessary to 
design contracts. Agents, on the other hand, could 
easily check for moral hazard and fraud, and they 
could sufficiently limit adverse selection. Moreover, 
transactions (especially the management and settling 
of claims) are much easier than for health insurance, 
because benefits are paid for only one single event. 
Viability. One private Jordanian insurance com-
pany161 is prepared to offer contracts at an annual 
prime of JD 6 for every JD 1,000 insured, which 
                                                     
158  Dr. Hana‘ Jaber, Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le 
Moyen Orient Contemporain, 19 April 2001. Cf. Brown / 
Green / Lindquist (2000), p. 6; Brown / McCord (2000), p. 
3; Morduch (1999), p. 198. 
159  Cf. Brown / Churchill (2000), p. 4. 
160  37 % and 28 % of all the interviewed households have 
been affected by life-cycle risks and health-related risks re-
spectively. But this share was significantly higher among 
the subgroup of those classified as ‘poor’ and ‘probably 
poor’ especially for life-cycle risks (63 %; health risks: 
41 %), see Table A19 in Annex A. 
161  Calculation kindly provided by Mr. Waleed Wael Zurub, 
Jordan French Insurance Company, 2 April 2001.  
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still seems a rather conservative calculation. Ac-
cording to independent insurance experts,162 the 
same product could even be offered at a lower price. 
Benefits would be lump-sum payments (paid as one 
single cash transfer after the insured event) and be 
granted when the policyholder dies or becomes 
work-disabled before the age of 65. Hence policy-
holders would have to be between 18 and 60 years 
of age when entering the scheme. Moreover, the 
insurance company argues that the demand of low-
income households could be temporary and condi-
tions its offer on the premise that the contracts be 
for a fixed term (five to ten years). Such conditions 
are normal for new forms of insurance163 and rec-
ommendable with respect to actuarial and transac-
tion simplicity, transparency and risk reduction (see 
p 10). 
Affordability. The target group considers the cost-
benefit ratio of the offer attractive. The sum insured 
should equal policyholder’s income of two years, so 
that the family members of the deceased have 
                                                     
162  Mr. Sameer Gammoh, NatHealth, 26 April 2001. 
163  Cf. Roth (2001), p. 48. 
enough time to mobilise new sources of income, e.g. 
through vocational training for a family member. 
Thus the sum insured should be JD 2,500 on aver-
age, resulting in a monthly contribution of JD 1.25. 
This cost-benefit ratio is far lower than what house-
holds assumed when asked how much they would 
be ready to pay for JD 2,500 of insurance. House-
holds with higher income levels could, of course, 
insure higher sums.  
Health Insurance 
Health micro-insurance affordable for low-income 
groups is difficult to provide in Jordan. The demand 
for health insurance among the urban poor and near-
poor would be high, but any product responding to 
the needs of potential clients from these groups 
would be much too expensive for them because fees 
are very high for private sector services, and infor-
mation problems such as adverse selection, moral 
hazard and fraud appear insurmountable if only 
public sector services were covered. This result is 
Table 14: Preference of East Amman Households for Risks to be Insured 
 absolute no. in % of poor and near-poor 
households 
Demand for risks to be covered by micro-insurance   
- Illness 62 64 
- Death of main provider 48 49 
- Work disability 25 26 
- Property damage 21 22 
- Others 65 67 
Most important risk to be covered by micro-insurance  
- Illness 42 43 
- Death of the main provider 18 19 
- Work disability 6 6 
- Property damage 2 2 
- Others 7 7 
Source: GDI household survey (see Annex A) 
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not unique and not surprising. Thus far no health 
micro-insurance scheme has proven sustainable.164 
Demand. The potential demand for health micro-
insurance is very high, but the ability of potential 
clients to pay for it is limited. The GDI household 
survey revealed that 64 % of the urban poor and 
near-poor would buy health micro-insurance. 43 % 
prefer to insure health-related risks rather than any 
other kind of risk (see Table 14). This preference is 
due to the low coverage of formal health insurance 
schemes and households’ vulnerability to health 
risks.165  
Appropriateness. Insurance is the appropriate strat-
egy to deal with health-related risks. This goes par-
ticularly for contracts covering low-frequency / 
high-cost health treatments (normally in-patient 
care), while high-frequency / low-cost treatments 
(out-patient care) can also be managed by savings. 
The interviewed households confirmed that they 
would be particularly interested in health insurance 
covering in-patient services. Fluctuations in annual 
spending for the treatment of less serious sicknesses 
outside hospitals are rather limited and households 
are more capable of paying such costs out of pocket. 
Moreover, the public sector provides all out-patient 
services at extremely low prices that most of the 
near-poor and even some of the poor can afford to 
pay. In-patient care is subsidised as well, but often 
no beds are free in public hospitals. 
Viability. Insurance companies regard a scheme that 
refunds only treatment costs of public hospitals as 
viable. They could only imagine such products un-
der three conditions: (i) if they were tied to the 
death and work-disability package described above, 
(ii) if co-payments of patients were at least 25 % of 
costs and (iii) if they were compulsory for specific 
groups of the population. Obviously, these restric-
tions are necessary to control the problems of ad-
verse selection, moral hazard and fraud and to reach 
                                                     
164  Cf. Bennet / Creese / Moasch (1998), pp. 26, 40 and 46; 
Brown / Churchill (2000), pp. 47 - 54; ILO / PAHO 
(1999), pp. 20 - 24; McCord (2001b). 
165 Cf. footnote 160. 
large numbers of policyholders and to pool risks 
sufficiently.166 
Feasibility. Compulsory social health insurance 
covering public sector services is no alternative, 
either. It would require amendments in current leg-
islation – a lengthy process. Moreover, it would 
constitute too much of a challenge for the public 
health provision sector: Utilisation of MOH facili-
ties, already over-crowded at most times, would 
further increase and the quality of services further 
worsen. Additionally, such scheme would constitute 
a serious burden for the government budget, be-
cause the number of patients in public hospitals 
would rise.167 
Affordability. Voluntary health insurance that re-
funds expenses for private sector services, on the 
other hand, is a profitable standard product. How-
ever, even with limitations in benefits and an effi-
cient control of adverse selection, moral hazard and 
fraud, contribution rates would have to be very high. 
This problem is highlighted by the experience of the 
Jordanian Engineers Association (JEA), which runs 
a type of health micro-insurance scheme for its 
members covering in-patient care or out-patient care 
or both (see p. 36).  
The programme has only attracted a very small 
number of clients. Contribution levels168 are high, 
although the programme was able to limit adverse 
selection and transaction and administration costs 
and to control for moral hazard through direct rela-
tions with clients. Third-party administrators in 
 
                                                     
166  Mr. Waleed Wael Zurub, Jordan French Insurance Com-
pany, 21 February 2001 and 2 April 2001. 
167  Dr. Fakhri Al-Smairat, Civil Health Insurance Programme, 
Ministry of Health, 20 February 2001 and 4 April 2001; 
Dr. Dwayne Banks, Partnerships for Health Reform, 
26 February 2001. 
168  Mr. Samer Akroush, Amman Insurance Company, 
14 April 2001. The annual contribution rate of the contract 
covering in-patient services insurance is JD 224 for a fam-
ily with two adults and three children. The JEA is re-
insured with a commercial insurer and acts as a micro-
insurance agent.  
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Jordan have invented ingenious method to control 
moral hazard and fraud, though their offer for low-
income groups is too expensive as well.169 
In both cases, contribution levels are higher than 
what the poor and near-poor can afford to pay. 
Adults would have to pay about 5.5 JD per month, 
while the average Jordanian household (lower and 
middle income) is not prepared to pay more than 
2.8 JD per month and adult: A survey sponsored by 
Partnerships for Health Reform has revealed that 
the amount average lower and middle-income 
households with six members are willing to pay is 
only JD 13.8 per month (JD 165.6 per year).170 For 
an estimated average income of JD 200 per house-
                                                     
169  NatHealth could offer a similar product for JD 221 per 
year for the same family; Mr. Samer Akroush, Amman In-
surance Company, 14 April 2001; Mr. Sameer Gammoh, 
NatHealth 25 March 2001. See also p. 36. 
170  These statements rely, apart from the interviews carried 
out, on a study on consumers’ willingness to pay for 
MOH-sponsored voluntary health insurance. Cf. Banks / 
Muna / Shahrouri (1999). 
hold and month171, contribution rates of this level 
would already amount to 6.9 % of total spending. 
Property Insurance  
Property damage is not insurable by micro-insur-
ance in Jordan. The potential demand of households 
for such an insurance product is much smaller than 
for health or term life and work-disability insurance, 
and insurance companies refuse to re-insure this 
factor. They are not willing to offer property insur-
ance to low-income households, because they regard 
the absolute value of the potential sums to be in-
sured as too low in relation to their own administra-
tion costs and consider moral hazard problems to be 
almost insurmountable. 
                                                     
171  Figure given by Dr. Yasser Adwan, University of Yarmouk, 
former General Director of the Social Security Corpora-
tion, 19 April 2001. The median income of annual house-
holds incomes is approximately JD 2000. However, the 
median is not the average but the midpoint of distribution. 
Half of the cases have higher values, and half are lower. 
Cf. Hanssen-Bauer / Pedersen / Tiltnes (1998), p. 198. 
Box 5: The Health Micro-Insurance of the Al-Amal Cancer Centre 
The Al-Amal Cancer Centre, opened in 1997, offers medical insurance covering the treatment of cancer only. Inter-
ested persons must undergo screening, which costs JD 100, to prove that they are not suffering from cancer when they 
join the insurance. The policy becomes valid three months after joining. Regardless of age of entry, Jordanian mem-
bers can choose between a maximum coverage of JD 10,000 or 20,000 for a yearly contribution of JD 10 or JD 50, re-
spectively. According to the centre, 50,000 persons have subscribed, 1,000 of whom have received cancer treatment 
after subscription. The number of insured is probably so high because of group-based policies with firms or other enti-
ties, but not because of individual contracts. 
The insurance programme struggles with six major problems: (i) it is not re-insured. Therefore an increase in claims 
can burden the centre’s budget. (ii) The insured are not under obligation and have to pay for early detection examina-
tions, which decreases the probability of high-cost claims. Nevertheless, the centre works toward making members 
more health-conscious. (iii) Being insurer and health-care provider at the same time is an incentive for the centre to 
lower the quality of services to reduce costs. (iv) Problems of prestige are reported. (v) The group of potential clients is 
limited. Premiums for the whole family plus the fees for medical check-ups are not affordable for low-income groups. 
(vi) The service competes with free cancer treatments provided by the MOH. Those that are able to contribute are in 
most cases already covered by governmental or private health insurance.  
Source: GUVS (1998); Mr. Hasan M. Ala’eddin, Al-Amal Centre, 24 February 2001; Mr. Dwayne Banks, 
 Partnerships for Health Reform, 26 February 2001; Mr. Waleed Wael Zurub, Jordan French Insurance 
 Company, 21 February 2001. 
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6.5 Organisation and Actors 
The supply side of micro-insurance is the last aspect 
remaining to be examined. The challenge is to or-
ganise schemes in a way that solves the problems of 
insurance provision for low-income groups and to 
identify institutions capable of carrying out the tasks 
of product design, sales, management and servicing. 
Section 6.5.1 discusses possible organisational 
models of micro-insurance, while Sections 6.5.2 and 
6.5.3 will turn to potential partners and agents. 
6.5.1 Organisational Model 
Micro-insurance schemes in Jordan should be or-
ganised in accordance with the partner-agent model 
(see p 13), where the tasks of insurance provision 
are distributed between a partner and an agent in 
accordance with the specific capacities of the insti-
tutions involved. The agent’s task would include 
product sale (marketing and underwriting) and 
product servicing (claims control and settlement). 
This role would be best played by institutions like, 
for example, NGOs, co-operatives, MFIs or unions 
that are already active in the target group’s quarters. 
The role of the partner, on the other hand, can only 
be played by insurance companies with sufficient 
expertise. Their task would include product design 
and product management (risk pooling, investment 
of reserves, monitoring). The full-service insurance 
model and the community-based insurance model 
are inferior as to the criteria172 listed in Table 15:  
Minimise information and transaction costs. The 
partner-agent model is able to minimise the admini-
stration, information and transaction costs related to 
the tasks of selling and servicing insurance con-
tracts. Private insurance companies in Jordan offer 
contracts that correspond to the needs and capacities 
of middle- and high-income groups. However, they 
incur very high costs for administrating and moni-
toring schemes, marketing and selling the product, 
collecting primes and settling claims. These costs 
                                                     
172  See Subchapter 2.5, pp. 11 - 14,  for an explanation of 
these criteria and a more general discussion of the models. 
Cf. also Brown / McCord (2000), pp. 4 and 10 - 11. 
exceed contributions collected when contracts are 
sold directly to clients, and they can only be low-
ered with the assistance of micro-insurance agents 
already active where potential clients reside. 
Overcome information asymmetries. Centralised 
actors like commercial insurance companies and 
public social insurance agencies are as a rule distant 
from potential clients. They find it difficult to effec-
tively screen potential clients to minimise adverse 
selection and they are unable to verify claims in 
such a way as to be able to minimise moral hazard 
and false claims. Moreover, commercial insurance 
companies lack the ability to identify potential cli-
ents and enter new markets. They should leave the 
marketing and servicing to partners with established 
contacts to potential clients and a good knowledge 
of the specifics of the target group. These tasks 
could be best carried out by local organisations, 
which can easily identify new potential clients, un-
derwrite and screen them and verify possible client 
claims. Only simple insurance products can be of-
fered on the basis of the full-service model of mi-
cro-insurance.173 
Build confidence. Potential micro-insurance clients 
distrust commercial insurers. They consider their 
policies unaffordable and thus usually do not con-
tact them. However, confidence could be built by 
well-known local agents who are already operating 
supportive programmes for the poor and near-poor. 
Pool risks sufficiently. Local organisations, on the 
other hand, do not have the capacities to design and 
price insurance contracts and to develop and scale a 
possible scheme. Moreover, their financial viability 
is threatened by their lack of any sufficient possibil-
ity to pool risks among a high number of insured 
parties. These tasks can met only by insurance com-
panies with the necessary actuarial and financial 
know-how, a broad scale of activities and a re-
insurance contract. Any accidental correlation of 
bad risks and coincidence of claims can torpedo 
micro-insurance schemes based on the community-
                                                     
173  Cf. Brown (2001), pp. 17 and 23; Brown / McCord (2000), 
pp. 4 and 10. 
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based insurance model or without re-insurance with 
insurance partners. 
Invest funds adequately. Local organisations also 
lack the necessary initial investment capital and the 
possibility and financial know-how to invest re-
serves adequately. By partnering with established 
insurers with access to financial markets, they can 
offer micro-insurance products at a much better 
benefit-cost ratio to clients and more easily learn the 
techniques of insurance business from their partners. 
Their own commission for distributing the product 
can be a fixed share of total profits, which usually 
guarantees a more stable income than the profits of 
an autonomous business. Moreover, local organisa-
tions acting only as agents are less subject to reserve 
capital requirements and other legal restrictions. 
Adverse incentives. There is one other reason why 
the community-based insurance model cannot be 
unreservedly recommended: Here, the insured party 
is at the same time the insurer; he owns and man-
ages the scheme himself.174 Experience from other 
countries shows that such interests overlaps can be a 
source of tensions between the individual members. 
Similarly, the provider model of micro-insurance 
may tend to fail because of conflicting interests: The 
manager of the scheme is at the same time the pro-
vider of services financed by the scheme (see 
Box 5). 
The challenge is to bring together different kinds of 
institutions like commercial insurance companies 
                                                     
174  Cf. Brown / Churchill (2000), pp. 51 - 52. 
and local grass-roots organisations. These tend to be 
reserved about co-operating with one another. 
Commercial insurers are sceptical about the mana-
gerial capacity of local agents, while the latter hesi-
tate to co-operate with profit-oriented insurance 
companies. Training and confidence-building meas-
ures are the key here. 
6.5.2 Partners 
Potential agents should, in any case, be sure to find 
a reliable partner who is ready to strike a fair deal 
with the agent. To make a first check of potential 
partners in Jordan, these175 were analysed according 
to a number of criteria176 listed in Table 16: 
It turned out that the role of partner could better be 
played by a private sector insurance company than 
by a public agency like the Social Security Corpora-
tion (SSC). 
                                                     
175  Interviews were conducted with the two public insurance 
agencies (the Social Security Corporation, the Civil Insur-
ance Programme), with five private insurance companies 
(Amman Insurance Company; Jordan French Insurance 
Company; Jordan International Insurance Company; Mid-
dle East Insurance Company; The National Ahlia Insur-
ance Company) and with NatHealth, a health insurance 
administrator. 
176  Cf. Brown / Green / Lindquist (2000), Appendix I; 
Freiberg-Strauß (1999), p. 7; ILO / PAHO (1999), pp. 17 
and 39 - 40; Lund / Srinivas (1999), p. 55; Musau (1999), 
pp. 18 - 19 and 25. 
 Table 15: Criteria for Organising Micro-Insurance in Jordan 
Criteria Results for Jordan 
Minimise administration and transaction costs 
Overcome information asymmetries 
Build confidence  
only with local agents, not possible for full insurer 
Pool risks sufficiently 
Invest funds adequately 
only with experienced partner, not possible for commu-
nity-based insurance 
Reduce adverse incentives  impossible in provider model,  
difficult for community-based insurance 
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Commercial Insurance Companies 
Interest. Some commercial insurance companies 
active in Jordan are indeed interested in offering 
micro-insurance products.177 Their incentives are 
fourfold: (i) they would gain access to new markets. 
Moreover, they could increase their share of the 
total – highly competitive though small – insurance 
market in Jordan, where more than two dozen com-
panies are active. (ii) The new product could be 
profitable for them despite low contributions, thus 
adding to their profits. (iii) Providing adequate risk 
management instruments to the poor and near-poor 
is a good way for them to gain publicity. Insurance 
companies in Jordan do little advertising because 
the product is considered a collective good of the 
whole industry. (iv) Today’s micro-insurance clients 
                                                     
177  Mr. Waleed Wael Zurub, Jordan French Insurance Co., 
21 February 2001; Mr. Sami Gammoh, Mr. Ramzi S. 
Shami, Mrs. Linda Karus, Jordan International Insurance 
Co., 15 February 2001; Mr. Rajai K. Sweis, Middle East 
Insurance Co., 21 February 2001; Dr. Khaled M. Abu-
Goura, National Ahlia Insurance Co., 21 February 2001. 
may improve their economic situation and become 
good clients of standard insurance products in the 
future. 
Nevertheless, commercial insurance companies 
have their doubts about the viability of micro-insur-
ance products. For this reason, their flexibility as to 
product design is limited (see p. 60). Term insur-
ance contracts and group-based policies are com-
patible with the idea of micro-insurance, but com-
pulsory schemes are not. 
Flexibility. Thus far insurance companies are scepti-
cal about the co-operation with non-profit agents. 
Some would rather rely on direct marketing but any 
such full-service insurance model implies high 
transaction and information costs, which have to be 
passed on to the client, and this could render the 
micro-insurance product unaffordable for the near-
poor. 
Reputation. Many potential clients distrust commer-
cial insurers. The reputation of insurance companies 
is very mixed because many households have had 
bad experience with them. Others have just not stud-
Table 16: Potential Partners of Micro-Insurance in Jordan 
Criteria parameters results for Jordan 
Interest in serving low-
income market 
readiness to adjust products to needs 
and capacities of target group and 
minimise number of exclusions 
medium interest of SSC high for some  
commercial companies 
Flexibility: Readiness for 
long-term co-operation 
with local agents  
opinion of company director willing-
ness to pay commission to agent 
low for SSC 
medium for commercial insurers 
Reputation among target 
group 
opinion of interviewed households good for SSC 
highly mixed for commercial companies 
Capacity to pool risks scale of products number of clients re-
insurance 
very high for SSC (implicit government 
guarantee) 
high for most commercial insurers (many 
clients, re-insurance) 
Actuarial know-how existence of own actuarial division very low for SSC 
Administrative and finan-
cial performance 
Experience with insurance 
asset portfolio 
operating return 
benefit / cost ratio of existing products 
low for SSC 
difficult to estimate for commercial compa-
nies 
Capacity to invest reserves 
& to provide initial financ- 
ing 
access to capital markets 
structure of liabilities 
low for SSC 
sufficient for commercial companies 
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ied contracts well enough to understand exclusions 
or have even misunderstood the concept of insur-
ance and expected their contributions back when no 
insured risk has been involved. Agents, however, 
should be able to cushion such mistrust and explain 
the basic concept and the conditions of micro-
insurance contracts offered. 
Risk-pooling. Private insurers have to be re-insured 
to protect against any co-incidence of claims and 
unexpected increases in benefits granted. All Jorda-
nian insurance companies have well-established 
relationships with international re-insurance compa-
nies. These can also be a valuable source of exper-
tise, since there are already re-insurance micro-insu-
rance schemes in other countries.178 
Moreover, Jordanian insurance companies also have 
the actuarial know-how required to design and price 
micro-insurance contracts as well as the capacities 
to design and price contracts based on sound actuar-
ial know-how, to invest reserves and to provide ini-
tial financing. 
The Social Security Corporation 
The Social Security Corporation (SSC) is the sole 
public insurance agency that should be taken into 
consideration as a partner in micro-insurance pro-
jects: It has a good reputation among target-group 
households179 and long-term experience with a high 
number of insured persons. Moreover, the SSC 
could pool risks sufficiently: It has no re-insurance 
but a high number of insured persons, considerable 
financial reserves and the state as a guarantor. 
However, the SSC has some disadvantages com-
pared with private sector companies: 
                                                     
178  According to Mr. Sameer Gammoh, NatHealth, 21 Febru-
ary 2001, the SwissRe is the company re-insuring the In-
dian Life Insurance Corporation, which is the partner of a 
micro-insurance scheme with the Self Employed Women’s 
Union (SEWA) in India.  
179  Result of the GDI household survey. 
Interest. The SSC shows little interest in offering 
micro-insurance products. It has good reason to be 
anxious to serve the low-income market: Its middle- 
and higher-income members might think that the 
new policy holders are to be subsidised out of their 
funds. Recent experience confirms, in fact, that 
programmes operated by government agencies are 
more likely to tolerate deficiencies in sustainability. 
The government is a sort of re-insurer, and it is, for 
political considerations, reluctant to restore financial 
balances.180 
Flexibility. The SSC would not be prepared to co-
operate with local partners, but would market any 
micro-insurance product directly through its fifteen 
branches and liaison offices. 
Actuarial know-how. The SSC has no actuarial ex-
perts and hence lacks the know-how to price an 
possible product adequately. 
Capacity to invest reserves. The SSC is unable to 
invest funds from life and disability insurance in a 
profitable way. It is prevented by law from investing 
reserves abroad, although the local financial market 
cannot absorb its huge annual surpluses. Moreover, 
the SSC has no investment experts and pursues an 
investment policy with very low returns on invest-
ments. 
Administrative and financial performance. The 
SSC’s operating scheme does not perform well as 
regards returns on contributions. The average bene-
fit-contribution ratio is low and overhead costs are 
high compared to other social security schemes. 
6.5.3 Agents 
The role of the agent in micro-insurance will cer-
tainly turn out to be the bottleneck in any possible 
micro-insurance schemes in Jordan. The tasks of 
product marketing and servicing call for capacities 
and capabilities at many different levels. 
                                                     
180  Cf. Morduch (1999), p. 201. 
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To identify appropriate agents in the Jordanian con-
text, different organisations were analysed along 
eight criteria – all of them are listed in Table 17: In 
the household survey an attempt was made to sound 
out the target group’s preference for the different 
organisations on marketing an possible micro-
insurance product. However, the answers were very 
mixed, and so it is impossible to make any safe 
statements on the target group’s confidence in the 
organisations. As to the other criteria, all analyses 
are based on information given by representatives of 
the organisations as well as in printed information 
brochures (for a list of questions asked see guideline 
of interviews with possible micro-insurance agents 
at the end of Annex A). 
This assessment covered nine groups of organisa-
tions: 
— the four ‘sustainable micro-finance institutions’ 
(MFIs),  
— the Zakat Fund and its affiliated zakat commit-
tees,  
— the foundations, 
— the member NGOs of the General Union of 
Voluntary Societies (GUVS), 
— other NGOs, like, for example, the Jordanian 
Women’s Union (JWU), 
— the Ministry of Social Development (MOSD) 
and its NGO co-operation partners, 
— public institutions with a high number of 
branch offices: Development and Employment 
Fund (DEF) and the Housing and Urban De-
velopment Corporation (HUDC),  
— co-operatives and 
— mutual insurance organisations (the family and 
solidarity funds shared by Palestinians originat-
ing from the same town or village). 
Three groups of organisations were found to be 
appropriate potential agents: (i) two MFIs, (ii) the 
Zakat Fund and zakat committees and (iii) two 
foundations, the Jordan Hashemite Fund for Human 
Development (JOHUD), and the Noor al-Hussein 
Foundation (NHF). With the exception of the MFIs, 
however, these institutions would need training in 
financial affairs. GUVS and its member NGOs 
might also consider becoming active as agents in 
micro-insurance, but in addition to training they 
would also be in need of substantial capacity-
building.  
Insurance companies that are willing to design and 
manage micro-insurance in their role as partners 
should consider co-operating with different types of 
agents at the same time to maximise the outreach of 
a possible micro-insurance scheme and to minimise 
risks. The recommended groups of organisations – 
NGOs, MFIs and zakat committees – each have 
their specific strengths and weaknesses and address 
different social groups and geographic areas. NGOs 
and zakat committees, on the one hand, are active in 
favour of very-low-income groups, but they have no 
experience in financial affairs. The MFIs, on the 
other hand, have considerable experience, but most 
of their clients are middle-income groups. 
Micro-finance Institutions 
The four MFIs built up by The AMIR Programme 
(see p. 37) would be appropriate agents in micro-
insurance schemes. Their experience with financial 
products and their well-trained staff are important 
strengths of this group of organisations. 
Outreach. In comparison to some of the other 
groups of organisations, the potential outreach of 
the MFIs is rather limited. They should not conquer 
new markets but serve their active borrowers to 
keep transaction and information costs low. The 
number of active clients amounts to some 10,000 for 
all four MFIs.  
Commitment and proximity to target group. The 
MFIs’ commitment to the needs of low-income 
groups is limited, their relations with clients are 
limited to the credit business. They have some un-
derstanding of the needs of low-income groups but 
lack the long-term personal relations required to 
overcome the information asymmetries inherent in 
insurance business. Three of the four MFIs are 
based in higher-income quarters. Moreover, the 
MFIs target not the most vulnerable but rather the 
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Table 17: Strengths and Weaknesses of Potential Agents 
results for different groups of organisations Criteria 
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Confidence of target group in institution N/a ++ + + n/a + n/a n/a 0 n/a 
Outreach  0 +++ + ++ + + 0 + 0 0 
Proximity to target group  
Commitment to target group 
0 ++ + ++ ++ 0 0 ++ 0/ ++ ++ 
Proficiency of staff ++ + + 0 + + + + 0 0 
Experience with financial products +++ 0 ++ ++ 0 0 + 0 0 ++ 
Administrative capacity and performance ++ + 0 0 + 0 0 0 0 0 
Organisational and financial stability + + ++ 0 0 ++ ++ + 0 0 
Willingness to participate in micro-
insurance (and co-operate with  
commercial insurance companies) 
++ + ++ + 0 + n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Criterion 1 was tested in household interviews (see Annex A)  
Criteria 2 - 9 were assessed by interviews with representatives of the listed organisations and by an analysis of 
printed information materials. A detailed guideline for the interviews conducted with possible micro-insurance agent 
institutions is attached to Annex A. 
Operationalisation of criteria: 
Confidence of target group: (++) almost all interviewed households... ; (+) majority of interviewed households...; (0) 
minority of interviewed households would trust institution  
Outreach: (+++) close to nation-wide outreach; (++) minimum of 100 active branches or members are active in ma-
jority of urban low-income quarters; (+) minimum of 20 active branches or members are active in majority of towns; 
(0) other. 
Proximity to target group: (++) staff from target-group AND basis of organisations in low-income quarters; (+) main 
area of activities in low-income quarters; (0) other. 
Proficiency of staff: (++) staff is selected according to pre-defined criteria AND trained in professional courses; (+) 
staff is selected according to pre-defined criteria OR goes through institutionalised on-the-job training; (0) other 
Experience with financial products: (+++) is running sustainable micro-credit programme AND is responsible for 
product design itself; (++) is organising mutual insurance OR running credit programme AND making efforts for 
sustainability, (+) is running credit programme; (0) other. 
Administrative capacity and performance: (++) low overhead costs AND non-bureaucratic procedures AND effec-
tive programme management AND monitoring of programme effects; (+) no monitoring; (0) other. 
Organisational and financial stability: (++) sustainability AND continuity in operation guaranteed; (+) sustainability 
OR continuity in operation guaranteed; (0) neither is guaranteed. 
Willingness to participate in micro-insurance: (++) have already considered building micro-insurance scheme; (+) 
willingness expressed in interview; (0) not willing. 
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upper margin of near-poor low-income groups, like 
e.g. small and medium entrepreneurs. Clients must 
have their own business and the size of loans and 
the high interest rates are more appropriate for small 
than for micro enterprises.181  
Proficiency of staff. The MFIs have very committed 
and professional staff. All loan officers go through 
intensive micro-finance training courses and only 
part of their salary is fixed, so they have strong in-
centives to perform well.  
Experience with financial products. There is no 
need to say that the MFIs’ staff members have much 
experience with financial products. They would 
therefore need less training in insurance techniques 
than, e.g., NGO workers. 
Administrative capacity and performance. The 
MFIs’ ability to record clients and to administer and 
monitor financial transfers is excellent. Within one 
year, the institutions were able to substantially re-
duce their operational and administrative costs in 
the credit business. 
Organisational and financial stability. It is still too 
early to make any statements on the MFIs’ organisa-
tional and financial stability because they started 
operations only two years ago. However, within this 
short period they have reached sustainability and 
built up an efficient and expanding organisational 
structure. 
Willingness to participate in micro-insurance. Three 
of the four MFIs have already thought about devel-
oping micro-insurance schemes. They see micro-
insurance as a way to serve their clients in an addi-
tional way and to secure outstanding balances of 
deceased borrowers.  
The Microfund for Women and the Jordan Micro 
Credit Company are already on the verge of intro-
ducing an outstanding balance life insurance sche-
                                                     
181  MFI loans in Jordan are in the range from JD 150 to 
14,000. However, the break-even point for the profitability 
of loans is JD 700, so that the MFIs have strong incentives 
to address higher-income groups only. 
me.182 Additionally, The AMIR Programme plans to 
hire a consultant to assess the market for credit in-
surance.183 Such an insurance line, however, would 
be more of a protection for the creditor than for the 
client.184 
MFIs would be able to act as full-service insurers in 
offering simple products such as term life and work-
disability insurance. They have sufficient experi-
ence in financial affairs and considerable adminis-
trative capacities. However, the first-best option for 
them would be to co-operate with a commercial 
insurance companies as a partner: Micro-insurance 
involves many risks that could endanger the finan-
cial sustainability of the MFIs’ operating credit pro-
grammes. The MFIs ought to re-insure to avoid 
liquidity risks. 
The Zakat Fund and its Affiliated Zakat 
Committees 
Zakat committees would be ideal agents in micro-
insurance schemes if they had at least some experi-
ence in financial affairs. Their programmes are very 
effective and have close to nation-wide outreach. 
Their staff is highly committed to serving the poor 
and enjoys full confidence. 
Outreach. Some 170 zakat committees in Jordan are 
affiliated with the government Zakat Fund (see 
p. 31). They reach almost every urban quarter and 
the majority of villages in Jordan. 
Commitment and proximity to target group. The 
zakat committees are active in lower-income 
neighbourhoods. Their staff originates from these 
same quarters, knows target group households on a 
personal basis and is personally well-known among 
them. Moreover, because of their religious motiva-
tion, they are highly committed to serving the poor. 
                                                     
182 Mrs. Niveen Sharaf, Microfund for Women, 22 February 
2001; Mr. Qais M. Al-Qatamin, Jordan Micro Credit 
Company, 10 April 2001. 
183  Mr. James Whitaker, Mr. Stephen Wade and Mrs. Tanna 
Price, The AMIR Programme, 21 February 2001. 
184  Cf. Del Conte (2000), p. 6. 
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The programmes of the zakat committees address 
only the poor, but the committees enjoy a very good 
reputation as well as confidence among all social 
strata in Jordan. 
Proficiency of staff. Most of the zakat committees 
have only volunteer staff. This staff’s technical pro-
ficiency is rather limited. It lacks the necessary ad-
ministrative and managerial know-how to run a 
micro-insurance scheme. Intensive training would 
be necessary. However, the zakat committees are 
reported to operate in a very effective and efficient 
way. Moreover, the zakat committees would have 
very low costs for marketing micro-insurance, col-
lecting primes and managing claims, because of 
their workers’ personal relations with the beneficiar-
ies and these workers’ voluntary engagement. 
Experience with financial products. At present, 
Jordanian zakat committees have no experience 
with financial products. Most of their operations are 
welfare-oriented. If zakat committees become active 
in future micro-insurance schemes, their staff must 
accept the difference between social assistance and 
insurance. 
Administrative capacity and performance. Because 
their staff consists of volunteers, the zakat commit-
tees in Jordan have low overhead costs and operate 
in a rather pragmatic and effective way. The Zakat 
Fund, on the other hand, is a very bureaucratic and 
inefficient governmental institution. Hence it is 
recommendable to link the zakat committees di-
rectly to an insurance partner to avoid high over-
head costs. An alternative would be to co-ordinate 
the work of the zakat committees as agents through 
an autonomous institution other than the Zakat 
Fund.185  
Because of their religious character, the partner of 
the zakat committees should be an Islamic insurance 
company.  
                                                     
185  The idea is based on three special funds (Poor Student 
Fund, Poor Orphan Fund, Poor Sick Fund) within the Za-
kat Fund, which should become autonomous in 2000. This 
step, however, has not been taken yet. Dr. Hamdi Murad, 
Umar-al-Mukhtar-Schools, former Director General of the 
Zakat Fund, 17 April 2001. 
Organisational and financial stability. The Zakat 
Fund is a well-established and stable public institu-
tion under the direct auspices of the Ministry of 
Awqâf. As to the zakat committees, however, most 
of them have discontinued operations, but they are 
run by volunteers and lack the institutional guaran-
tee of stability.186  
Willingness to participate in micro-insurance. The 
Zakat Fund has already taken into consideration that 
micro-insurance would be an effective strategy to 
reduce the vulnerability of Jordanian households, 
but it has no concrete plans to build up a micro-
insurance scheme itself. 
The Foundations 
The foundations, particularly the Jordan Hashemite 
Fund for Human Development (JOHUD) and the 
Noor al-Hussein Foundation (NHF) can be recom-
mended to play the role of agents in possible micro-
insurance schemes as well. They have a large out-
reach and are very committed to dealing with low-
income groups. However, their overhead costs are 
very high. 
Outreach. The foundations reach a large number of 
beneficiaries. JOHUD is active in more than 50 
communities, NHF in 23 villages. In contrast, the 
Jordan River Foundation has a small outreach, 
which is due to the fact that it is a much younger 
organisation. 
Commitment and proximity to target group. The 
foundations have much experience in dealing with 
low-income groups and they enjoy much confidence 
among the population. However, many of their ac-
tivities rather target middle- and higher-income 
groups. Moreover, their activities focus on rural 
rather than urban areas. 
                                                     
186  Mr. Abdel-Fattah Salah, Ministry of Awqaf, 25 Febru-
ary 2001. 
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Proficiency of staff. The foundations have highly 
qualified personnel in their head offices, but their 
local staff consists of much less well trained volun-
teers. 
Experience with financial products. Both JOHUD 
and NHF are running rural credit programmes. Fur-
thermore, JOHUD already links its loans to credit 
life insurance (see Box 6). Nevertheless, it is quite 
likely that the foundations’ staff would need sub-
stantial training before running larger-scale micro-
insurance schemes.  
Administrative capacity and performance. The 
overhead costs of the foundations are very high. 
Their work in communities is very cost-effective 
because of the large share of voluntary work. But 
the administration of some of the programmes con-
sumes as much as 60 % of total funds. 
Organisational and financial stability. The founda-
tions are well-established and stable organisations. 
The foundations have proven their capabilities in 
various donor-financed projects and the continuity 
of their operations is guaranteed by their affiliation 
to the Royal Family.  
Willingness to participate in micro-insurance. 
JOHUD and the NHF are very interested in taking 
an active role in any possible future micro-insurance 
schemes. 
The General Union of Voluntary Societies 
and its Member NGOs 
The General Union of Voluntary Societies (GUVS) 
and its member NGOs might also consider acting in 
the capacity of micro-insurance agents. The 800 
member NGOs of GUVS have a very large outreach 
and most of them are active at the grass-roots level. 
GUVS could imagine participating in possible mi-
cro-insurance schemes. Both GUVS and its mem-
bers are highly committed to the target group and 
have the confidence of the poor and near-poor. The 
proficiency of their staff is difficult to assess but 
will most likely differ between the NGOs. Because 
their activities are predominantly based on volun-
tary work, they mobilise local resources. GUVS has 
proven its capacity to implement a micro-finance 
programme aiming at financial sustainability in the 
nearer future. The staff involved has been carefully 
chosen and trained for this task. 
However, their staff would need substantial training 
and the member NGOs’ capacities to run micro-
insurance first have to be built. GUVS and the asso-
ciated NGOs face organisational weaknesses. The 
relation between GUVS and its members is loose 
and gives rise to considerable co-ordination prob-
lems. 
The Jordanian Women’s Union 
The non-governmental Jordanian Women’s Union 
(JWU) fulfils all of the criteria established, but it is 
not willing to co-operate with an insurance com-
pany. 
The organisation has 10,000 contributing members 
and reaches many more women through two dozen 
branches and centres all over Jordan. The JWU is 
strongly committed to helping women, particularly 
in refugee camps, and thus has close contact to the 
poor and near-poor. All committees of the JWU are 
Box 6: JOHUD’s Outstanding Balance Life Insurance 
The Jordan Hashemite Fund for Human Development (JOHUD) combines its micro-credit programme with an obliga-
tory outstanding- balance life insurance including additional benefits. The insurance covers 850 active clients. The 
sum insured equals the disbursed loan, and the premium is 1 % of the loan size. In cases of death, the outstanding bal-
ance is reimbursed to JOHUD, whereas the instalments already made by the borrower are paid out to the survivors, 
thus providing the family with some benefit. The life insurance was introduced in the mid-1990s. It is re-insured 
through a private insurance company. The main focus of the insurance is to secure the loan portfolio of JOHUD and to 
lower its collection costs. 
Source: Mrs. Shadia Nusseir, JOHUD, 19 April 2001 
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elected. However, the personnel lacks knowledge 
about financial products. Since micro-insurance 
could be offered through community centres, the 
overhead costs for such a scheme would be com-
paratively low. However, organisational and finan-
cial stability is weak. The JWU depends on donor 
funding. 
The most important problem for the engagement of 
the JWU is that it considers the life and disability 
insurance contract as described in Subchapter 6.4 to 
be too expensive for its clients. The JWU refuses to 
co-operate with insurance companies making profit 
on low-income households and advocates the idea 
of re-distribution from the rich to the poor. 
The Ministry of Social Development 
The Ministry of Social Development (MOSD) is a 
potential agent in the medium and long run. It has a 
decentralised structure of directorates, offices and 
centres and co-operates with local grass-roots 
NGOs. The main objective of the ministry is to help 
the poor and other vulnerable groups. It has inten-
sive contacts with low-income households because 
it is responsible for transferring the NAF’s social 
assistance to eligible households. Hence the MOSD 
can play an important role in promoting micro-
insurance and running awareness campaigns.  
The main bottlenecks for the MOSD in running 
micro-insurance schemes itself are the shortage and 
limited training of the MOSD’s staff. Moreover, an 
amendment of the law defining the role of the 
MOSD would have to be introduced - a lengthy 
process. 
The Development and Employment Fund 
The DEF, despite acknowledgeable strengths, 
should not be thought of as a potential agent in 
micro-insurance. Just as in the case of the MFIs, 
building up micro-insurance would not be too 
expensive for the DEF, as it is administering a 
credit scheme and would thus benefit from syn-
ergy effects and its long-years of experience 
with another financial product. 
However, the outreach of the DEF and its adminis-
trative and managerial capacities are very limited. 
The number of active borrowers was less than 500 
per year in the last decade,187 and many of them are 
neither poor nor vulnerable but fairly well-off mid-
dle-income earners. The DEF is a stable and reliable 
government institution, but the performance of its 
management and staff is reported to be very weak: 
Overhead costs are high, repayment rates are low 
and its targeting is subject to severe criticism among 
experts.  
The Housing and Urban Development Cor-
poration 
The HUDC is also administering a micro-credit 
programme, but the number of loans granted is low 
and the number of posts responsible for this pro-
gramme’s administration has been reduced from 
four to one half over the last three years. In all its 
activities, the HUDC co-operates with its own 
community centres, but also with autonomous grass-
roots NGOs, all of them active in informal urban 
settlements. Thus the HUDC and its co-operation 
partners have considerable outreach, intense con-
tacts to target group households and an excellent 
reputation among the local population. Its main 
responsibilities are to build up local infrastructure, 
upgrade squatter areas, provide social housing, fos-
ter income-generating activities and register land 
ownership. However, the institution is reported to be 
very inefficient and bureaucratic and to be com-
pletely understaffed. 
Co-operatives and Mutual Family Insur-
ance Funds 
The potential of Jordanian co-operatives, family 
funds and solidarity funds shared by Palestinians 
originating from the same town or village differs 
substantially from one organisation to the other. 
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Some have clearly defined objectives, a large num-
ber of members and run a wide range of well-
performing programmes, others are badly perform-
ing one-person shows, exist on paper only or do not 
serve low-income groups. Most importantly, how-
ever, all of these organisations have too limited 
outreach and lack the institutional net-working for 
joint action. 
6.6 Opportunities and Limits 
Micro-insurance is a promising strategy to improve 
the social protection of the urban near-poor in Jor-
dan. It may have beneficial effects for clients, for 
the agent and partner organisations involved as well 
as for the development of the country and even the 
Arab region as a whole. But the potential of micro-
insurance is not without limits: It is not the one-and-
all solution to protect the entire population from all 
risks faced in their lives, and it is not without chal-
lenges.  
Clients benefit. Micro-insurance offers the opportu-
nity for urban near-poor households in Jordan to 
protect themselves at affordable premium levels 
from the negative impact of their main provider’s 
death or work disability. Micro-insurance might also 
foster non-insured people’s awareness of the risks 
they face in their lives and thus have a demonstra-
tion effect inducing households to manage risks by 
means of anticipatory provision. Moreover, success-
ful micro-insurance projects might encourage com-
mercial insurers to turn to potential low-income 
households and to develop other suitable products 
for a wider range of social groups. 
The insurance partner benefits. Insurance compa-
nies that partner with agents in supplying micro-
insurance gain access to new markets and clients 
and improve their national reputation. Moreover, the 
population, in general, in this way grows more ac-
customed to the concept of insurance, gaining con-
fidence in commercial insurers. 
The insurance agents benefit. Potential agents, such 
as NGOs, the foundations or zakat committees, need 
intensive training before they take an active role in 
providing micro-insurance. This training and their 
new experience with marketing financial market 
products contribute to building these organisations’ 
capacities and strengthening civil society. 
The Jordanian economy benefits. Micro-insurance 
in Jordan could boost the public discussion over the 
role of the state in social protection. The govern-
ment might see itself confronted by a rise in pres-
sure to tackle the problem of widespread vulnerabil-
ity by reforming the operating social insurance 
schemes and extending their coverage. However, 
the government might also welcome the efforts of 
non-governmental actors in this field and see itself 
at least partly relieved from its duty to protect the 
unprotected.  
The overall Arab world region could benefit. Micro-
insurance schemes in Jordan would be a pilot ex-
perience in the Arab world. It could provide then 
lessons available for replicating the model in other 
countries, where as yet no attempts have been made.  
Still, there are limits to the potential beneficial ef-
fects of micro-insurance. Benefits for the insured 
are limited in coverage. The micro-insurance prod-
uct outlined above (see pp. 60 - 61) covers only the 
early death and work disability of the policyholder 
but no other risks such as e.g. illness, property dam-
age, old age or unemployment. 
Moreover, by definition benefits are limited in size: 
They are lump-sum payments, not recurrent pen-
sions. Hence they can only enable households to 
manage a loss of income caused by the death or 
permanent work disability of their main provider for 
a limited period. Benefits prevent households from 
sudden drops in well-being and give them time to 
seek alternative sources of income; but they do not 
compensate in the long-term for the negative effects 
of these risks. 
Finally, micro-insurance is always limited in scale, 
as well. The reasons are fourfold:  
— Only part of the target group will subscribe 
when enrolment in micro-insurance is volun-
tary. Experience shows that no more than a 
74 Markus Loewe et al.  
quarter of the population can be reached 
through voluntary contributory schemes.188  
— The near-poor with fluctuating income are un-
able to contribute on a regular basis and hence 
are unable to subscribe. 
— The recommended insurance product does not 
address the poor. The GDI household survey 
revealed that some of the poor could afford to 
pay for micro-insurance on a regular basis, but 
the great majority of the poor would be unable 
to participate in a contributory scheme. 
— The potential geographic outreach of micro-
insurance is also limited because of the lack of 
organisations able to act as nation-wide agents. 
Most organisations that were noted as potential 
agents in micro-insurance have a limited area 
of action. It is difficult to reach target-group 
households in remote villages and urban quar-
ters where none of the NGOs or MFIs is active. 
A close to nation-wide outreach can only be at-
tained by schemes that involve all of the zakat 
committees affiliated with the governmental 
Zakat Fund.  
The impossibility of any re-distribution within the 
scheme is another limit to the potential of voluntary 
micro-insurance schemes. Elements of solidarity 
between the poor and the rich are disincentives for 
the rich to enrol and result in the adverse selection 
of only the poorest. Re-distribution from the rich to 
the poor is only possible in mandatory schemes. 
7 Recommendations for Reform in 
Jordan 
To improve the social protection of the urban poor 
and near-poor in Jordan, we recommend a threefold 
strategy. The most promising way to improve the 
social protection of the near-poor is to establish 
micro-insurance. The poor, however, can only be 
supported by broadening the outreach of social as-
sistance. At the same time, however, the coverage of 
                                                     
188 Cf. Beattie (2000), p.133. 
the operating social pension and health insurance 
schemes should be reformed to enhance their effi-
ciency and sustainability and make them fit for suc-
cessive extensions in coverage to additional popula-
tion groups. The long-term goal of these reforms 
should be for all population groups to be covered by 
a compulsory and comprehensive social insurance 
system. 
This recommendation needs to be concretised. This 
chapter’s task is to point to measures that might be 
taken by different actors in Jordan and that have the 
maximum positive effect on the social protection of 
the urban poor and near-poor in Jordan. A plan of 
action is outlined for each of the three fields: micro-
insurance (7.1), social insurance (7.2) and social 
assistance (7.3). 
7.1 A Schedule for Establishing Micro-
Insurance 
One of the major results of the foregoing chapters is 
that the partner-agent-model of micro-insurance was 
confirmed to be a realistic approach to improving 
the social protection of the near-poor in Jordan. 
Many questions, however, are still left to be an-
swered, e.g. the implementation of micro-insurance. 
This Subchapter is intended to discuss 
— what actors should take the initiative to estab-
lish micro-insurance in Jordan, 
— what steps have to be taken to prepare, imple-
ment and monitor primary micro-insurance pro-
jects and 
— how the up-scaling of these first projects can be 
facilitated. 
Table 18 summarises the results: 
Improving the Social Protection of the Urban Poor and Near-Poor in Jordan  75 
Initiative to Establish Micro-Insurance 
It is important to stress that the initiative to establish 
micro-insurance in Jordan has to come from within 
Jordan. Any of the agents and partners involved 
could play this role. The organisations most suitable 
to raise and promote the idea in Jordan are the So-
cial Productivity Programme Unit (SPP Unit) on the 
one hand and the Near-East Foundation on the 
other. 
The SPP Unit (see Box 7) has four comparative 
advantages in taking an active role in initiating and 
co-ordinating the building up of micro-insurance:  
— It has very good contacts to many potential 
agent institutions: the four sustainable micro-
finance institutions (MFIs), the Jordan 
Hashemite Fund for Human Development 
(JOHUD), the Noor al-Hussein Foundation 
(NHF), the General Union for Voluntary Socie-
ties (GUVS) and the Ministry of Social Devel-
Table 18: Possible Schedule for Establishing Micro-Insurance in Jordan 
Step tasks actors involved donor support (see Chapter 8) 
additional market research provide or finance short-term expertise 
information on and promotion of 
the micro-insurance concept 
identification and co-ordination of 
interested agents and partners 
initiator: 
SPP Unit or 
NEF or 
any agent or 
any partner 
none: initiative must come from within 
the country 
Initiative 
verification of legal framework 
conditions 
initiator AND gov-
ernment 
only consultancy 
decision on target area 
and on actors initially involved  
provide or finance possible  
training of agent staff 
product design only consultancy 
implementation 
all parties involved 
only consultancy 
Pilot project 
monitoring and evaluation;  
amendments in product design;  
possible termination of project 
independent evalua-
tion team 
provide or finance short-term expertise 
information campaigns/ market-
ing  
grass-roots NGOs,  
community centres 
media 
government 
provide expertise 
training of additional agents provide training of trainers 
finance training in country 
capacity-building: technical up- 
grading of agents involved 
Institute for Banking 
Studies finance initial technical equipment 
exchange of ideas only consultancy 
arbitration provide possible training of arbitration 
unit 
lobbying for favourable legisla-
tion 
discussion forum to 
be founded by all 
actors with special 
support from SPP 
Unit only consultancy 
Up-scaling / 
replication 
implementation all parties involved possibly finance re-insurance fund 
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opment (MOSD). Several actors are involved in 
micro-insurance and the SPP Unit would be the 
ideal mediator between them.  
— The SPP Unit is part of the Ministry of Plan-
ning and thus has the necessary administrative 
influence to foster necessary legislative and 
policy changes at the macro level.  
— Micro-insurance fits very well into the aims of 
the SPP - reducing poverty and enhancing so-
cial productivity. Micro-insurance could thus 
be introduced as another component of the pro-
gramme when the next programme phase is 
launched in summer 2002.  
— The SPP Unit co-ordinates donor activities in 
the social policy field and channels financial 
development assistance to different social sec-
tor projects. Hence the SPP Unit could easily 
raise the necessary funding for the start-up of 
micro-insurance. Experience in other countries 
has shown that micro-insurance needs initial 
donor funding.  
The Near East Foundation (NEF) is able to promote 
micro-insurance by bringing in its experience in 
participatory research, capacity-building and moni-
toring. It is currently planning to carry out market 
research on the potential demand and the desired 
design of insurance for outstanding loan balances.189  
The initiator’s role is fourfold. It should (i) study in 
more detail the potential demand for micro-
insurance, (ii) verify the legal conditions of micro-
insurance, (iii) promote the micro-insurance concept 
in Jordan and (iv) identify interested institutions and 
co-ordinate them. 
Market research. Additional market research is 
necessary to inform all involved actors about the 
potential demand for micro-insurance.190 Partners 
and agents of micro-insurance schemes face infor-
mation deficits, albeit for different aspects. More-
over, information on market structure should be a 
public good. Transparency lowers market entrance 
costs for all parties, prevents the formation of mo-
nopolistic structures and thus secures low premium 
levels for clients. 
The insurance companies need market data to calcu-
late appropriate premium and benefit levels, because 
they have no contacts with potential micro-in-
surance clients. Though interested in taking an ac-
tive role in the new business and having sufficient 
                                                     
189 Mr. Majdi Al Qorom, Near East Foundation, 
18 April 2001. 
190  Cf. Brown / McCord (2000), p. 7. 
Box 7: The Social Productivity Programme 
The Social Productivity Programme (SPP) was launched in 1998 for a period of ten years. It is co-ordinated by a spe-
cial department of the Ministry of Planning (MOP), the Social Productivity Programme Unit (SPP Unit). Phase 1 is set 
to end, after three years of operation, in 2002. It is well endowed with a budget of JD 178 million, mainly financed by 
foreign donors. The SPP aims at reducing poverty and enhancing productivity by projects that are part of four pro-
gramme components:  
- the Community Infrastructure Development Component (65 % of funds),  
- the National Aid Fund Reform Component (17 %) aiming at restructuring and expanding the NAF 
- the Small and Micro Enterprise Development Component (15 %) and  
- the Training and Employment Support Component (3 %).  
All projects of these components are implemented by existing or newly created public, private or third-sector institu-
tions. The SPP Unit’s function is limited to co-ordinating all activities of the SPP and in the social sector in general as 
well as to channelling donor funds into one of the four programme components. 
Source: MOP (n.d.) 
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financial reserves to take limited risks, they are not 
ready to get engaged without more detailed market 
research. 
For other, non-financial institutions the information 
gap is even larger. Although some of them, like the 
Zakat Fund, the foundations, and GUVS know the 
target group very well, they need information on the 
target group’s financial specifics. 
Verification of Framework Conditions. Most of the 
necessary conditions for micro-insurance are given 
in Jordan. However, the margins of micro-insurance 
as set by national insurance regulation and the NGO 
law need to be (re-)viewed carefully.  
The prevailing insurance regulatory legislation 
would not allow institutions with less than three 
years of experience in the insurance business to 
market insurance contracts. This restriction will be 
amended with the new law as of the year 2002. Still, 
the new law should be studied in detail with a view 
to the legal conditions for micro-insurance agents. 
An ideal legal regulation of micro-insurance would 
be simple and transparent as a means of encourag-
ing small actors to participate and balance consumer 
protection with promotion of the new business. 
Similarly, the NGO law has to be reviewed with any 
eye to the question whether NGOs should be enti-
tled to market insurance policies and manage 
claims. Possibly, legal amendments would be use-
ful. 
Promotion of micro-insurance. Although a small 
number of organisations in Jordan are considering 
building up micro-insurance schemes, the concept is 
still very not very well known among the country’s 
public, private and third sector institutions. For this 
reason, some institution must take the initiative to 
make the micro-insurance concept better known 
among relevant actors and propose appropriate insti-
tutions to play an active role in micro-insurance. 
Co-ordination of interested institutions. Finally, 
institutions interested in acting as agents or partners 
in possible micro-insurance projects have to be 
identified and co-operation between them estab-
lished. Any private insurance company could take 
on the role of partner, provided it is prepared to co-
operate with an agent active on the grass-roots level. 
It is much more difficult to identify appropriate 
agents. We recommend giving consideration to the 
MFIs and JOHUD (who already have experience 
with financial products) and, after some capacity 
building, the NHF, GUVS and the zakat committees 
to take this role. All of them have close ties to low-
income households and (with the exception of the 
zakat committees) are involved in the SPP.  
In case of an involvement of the zakat committees, a 
partnership based on Islamic principles might be 
given some careful thought: Co-operation between 
these committees, a co-ordinating body (independ-
ent, though founded by the Zakat Fund), an Islamic 
insurance company (to re-insure the scheme) and an 
Islamic bank (to invest the reserves).191 
Preparation, Implementation and Monitor-
ing of Pilot Projects 
Micro-insurance should start out with small pilot 
projects to reduce the negative effects of any possi-
ble failure of the project and to facilitate the evalua-
tion of first experiences with micro-insurance in 
Jordan. The target area of the pilot project has to 
chosen carefully and the product must be well de-
signed, because the success of the pilot project 
would be decisive for any possible up-scaling. 
Three to five years after implementation, the pilot 
project should be evaluated and be continued only if 
it has proven successful. Its design should be 
changed in the light of the results of the pilot phase 
evaluation. 
Pilot-project area. The choice of an appropriate 
target area for pilot projects of micro-insurance 
must take the specifics of different urban quarters 
into account: 
As a first step in selecting a target area, appropriate 
agent organisations have to be identified. Interested 
partners can be involved wherever the pilot project 
                                                     
191  Dr. Hamdi Murad, Umar-al-Mukhtar-Schools, 17 April 
2001. 
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is located, but the decision for the pilot-project area 
and the agent involved in the project are interde-
pendent: The agent should be strong and active in 
the area and have intense contacts with and a good 
standing among the target group households. Local 
community centres and grass-roots NGOs running 
training courses, working facilities and social activi-
ties might be best suited for the purpose. 
As a second step, the results of the market research 
phase have to be considered. Target-group house-
holds (i.e. the near-poor) should constitute a high 
share of the local population. 
As a third step, the density of social relations within 
the quarter should be studied: This is essential if the 
scheme is to benefit from the demonstration effect 
of participating households becoming better able to 
manage their risks than others.192 Moreover, neigh-
bourhood relationships should be trustful, because 
solidarity among neighbours is an important prereq-
uisite for households to participate and pool their 
risks with other households from the quarter. 
Product design. During the pilot project only one 
simple product should be offered: term life and 
work-disability insurance. More complex products 
could be added at a later stage. 
The initial product, however, should not be coupled 
with credit products. Several Jordanian MFIs are 
about to offer their clients insurance for outstanding 
loan balances. It is the easiest insurance product to 
design. Nevertheless, for three reasons we recom-
mend starting with a separate sale of micro-insur-
ance contracts: 
— Credit insurance is only one possible micro-
insurance product. It addresses a limited num-
ber of micro-credit-clients only, most of them 
being small-scale entrepreneurs. Micro-
insurance, however, should improve the social 
protection of many households and, first and 
foremost, address the most vulnerable. 
— Credit insurance, in many cases, is more of a 
protection for the creditor than for the client. 
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— The protection of credit insurance ends when 
the credit is paid back.  
— Micro-credit programmes have clients in many 
different areas. The pilot project, however, 
should focus on one single quarter to facilitate 
the monitoring of the scheme and the evalua-
tion of its effects for individual households and 
the community as a whole. Moreover, micro-
insurance is a community-based approach built 
on the self-organisation and self-determination 
of households; its success depends to a high 
degree on close contacts between the 
policyholders and their geographic proximity to 
the distribution agent.  
Outstanding loan balance insurance projects can be 
built up separately and later be linked with the pilot 
project. In any case, the final goal should be close 
co-operation of different micro-insurance providers, 
which might even end up in an integration of all 
schemes. 
Implementation. Before the products are offered, the 
agent involved must show proof of sufficient know-
how in financial affairs and the product offered in 
order to be able to take on responsibility for product 
marketing and servicing within the pilot-project 
target area. Otherwise, his staff should be given 
qualified training in appropriate programmes. 
At the beginning of the pilot-phase, only short-term 
insurance policies should be sold. This phase should 
not exceed three to five years to ensure an early 
evaluation of the project, and all contract terms 
should end with this phase. All actors involved 
should have the possibility to end their engagement 
at the end of the pilot-phase, and no titles should be 
left open. 
On the other hand, the liabilities of the contracts 
sold must be secured in every case. Even if it turns 
out that the number of sold contracts remains too 
small to make the project profitable or that premi-
ums and benefits are disproportionate for the in-
surer, none of the actors involved should be able to 
retreat before all contract terms have ended and all 
claims are settled. Furthermore, any illiquidity re-
sulting from a coincidence of claims must be pre-
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vented. A reliable re-insurance of the scheme is 
therefore essential. 
During the pilot-phase, at least, photo booklets 
should be used to document client membership and 
premium payments: with clients receiving a stamp 
for each contribution to the scheme in their personal 
insurance books. Such booklets induce client trust in 
the scheme. For the insurer, they are cheap and easy 
to handle and allow for a clear identification of the 
person insured.193 
Evaluation. At the end of the pilot phase, the project 
has to be evaluated in detail. Here, the focus should 
be on product design, the organisational shape of the 
scheme, its financial performance, the framework 
conditions and, of course, customer satisfaction. The 
evaluation ought to be carried out by an independent 
team and consist of either Jordanian or foreign con-
sultants with experience in commercial insurance or 
even micro-insurance business. If the evaluation 
report confirms the pilot project as successful, it can 
be scaled up by the participating actors to other 
areas and /or be replicated by other organisations. 
Possibly the policy conditions, the organisational 
structure or the marketing strategy to be modified in 
the light of the pilot project’s experience. 
Up-scaling of the Project 
Before expanding the outreach of micro-insurance, 
information campaigns, additional training for the 
participating organisations and structural capacity-
building measures have to be carried out. A discus-
sion forum could be established to (i) exchange 
innovative know-how between all organisations in-
volved in the micro-insurance business, (ii) alleviate 
the distrust between NGOs and commercial compa-
nies, (iii) provide arbitration in case of disagree-
ments between different actors involved and (iv) se-
cure favourable legal framework conditions. 
Information Campaigns. If micro-insurance is going 
to be established on a broader basis, information 
campaigns ought to be carried out to raise the target 
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group’s awareness about social risks, to inform 
them about different social protection strategies and 
to provide information about the concept of micro-
insurance: Even though during the GDI household 
survey near-poor households had a very good opin-
ion of the concept of micro-insurance, many poten-
tial clients will probably have their concerns and 
questions. Experience from other countries194 shows 
that it is essential for the success of micro-insurance 
that clients are well informed about the offered 
product: 
— Households often mistrust insurers because of 
negative experience made by others or them-
selves. 
— Other households have never dealt with insur-
ance and hesitate to spend part of their income 
for uncertain future benefits. 
— A third group of households might be interested 
in participating, but they are poorly informed 
about micro-insurance and believe it to be too 
expensive for their situation and not appropri-
ate to meet their needs. 
Awareness campaigns can pursue different strate-
gies: (i) Information brochures and leaflets should 
be distributed. (ii) Information workshops could be 
held in community centres, mosques, cultural and 
training centres and schools. (iii) TV advertisements 
could be launched. Here, the spot of the Micro Fund 
for Women’s advertising for the MFI’s micro-credit 
programme is a good example of what such cam-
paigns might look like. It has attracted many new 
clients because it was designed in a simple and un-
derstandable way.195 (iv) Finally, grass-roots NGOs 
and other local multipliers will play a highly crucial 
role in raising the target group’s confidence by 
word-of-mouth propaganda. Their participation is 
very important because they have a higher degree of 
acceptance and credibility among the target group 
than representatives of public institutions, private 
companies or donor agencies. 
                                                     
194  Cf. Brown / McCord (2000), p. 5; McCord (2001b), p. 35. 
195  Mrs. Niveen Abbousji Sharaf, Micro Fund for Women, 
22 February 2001. 
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Training. At the same time, the staff of newly in-
volved agents and partners has to be trained. Micro-
insurance agents need special skills in marketing 
and selling contracts, informing about insurance 
conditions, underwriting, collecting primes, check-
ing and settling claims, book-keeping, basic and 
ongoing monitoring, financial auditing and main-
taining long-term relations with clients. The MFIs 
have well-trained loan officers, but they lack the 
specific know-how for insurance business. Other 
potential agents like the zakat committees, the foun-
dations and the GUVS-member NGOs need even 
more comprehensive training. They have only re-
cently gained their first experiences in marketing 
financial products in some newly established micro-
credit programmes. But these programmes are not 
yet financially sustainable and the number of quali-
fied staff has to be increased.  
Training courses could be held by the Institute for 
Banking Studies196, where the staffs of almost all 
Jordanian micro-credit programmes have been 
trained. For micro-insurance, particular courses 
could be set up and taught by nationals, who would 
need special training themselves. 
Partners in a micro-insurance scheme also have to 
be up to new and unusual tasks and hence need 
training. Micro-insurance is different from the ordi-
nary insurance business. As a consequence, even 
experienced partners have to adopt new manage-
ment techniques. The start-up costs of micro-insur-
ance can be considerably reduced if standardised, 
but flexible, management information systems are 
provided. Again, the Institute for Banking Studies 
would be an appropriate institution to offer these 
courses.  
Structural capacity-building. Similarly, the admini-
stration and technical equipment of the micro-insur-
ance agents is in need of capacity-building. The 
administrative structure of the agent organisations 
needs to be viewed as to its effectiveness in manag-
                                                     
196 The Institute for Banking Studies was set up by the Central 
Bank of Jordan and major Jordanian commercial banks. 
The AMIR Programme supports the micro-finance training 
component. 
ing micro-insurance and their IT equipment may 
need upgrading. 
Discussion forum. A very useful way to promote the 
exchange of information is to establish a specialised 
micro-insurance discussion forum. It could be foun-
ded with the support of the SPP but should remain 
institutionally independent. It would have to fulfil 
four major tasks:  
First, the forum would promote the exchange of 
experience and ideas between all institutions active 
in the micro-insurance business and should remain 
open to all kinds of organisations interested in 
building up additional micro-insurance schemes in 
Jordan and or elsewhere in the Arab world. The 
forum would thus function as a knowledge-manage-
ment and innovation centre. Experts could collect 
and prepare data on micro-insurance in Jordan, or-
ganise workshops and conferences on new research 
issues to provide policy-makers and donor agencies 
with up-to-date findings and facilitate micro-insur-
ance in other Arab countries.  
Second, the forum could facilitate co-operation be-
tween partners and agents of micro-insurance as a 
means of overcoming the prevailing mistrust be-
tween NGOs and commercial insurance companies. 
NGOs are often believed to be unable to work on a 
sustainable basis, and commercial insurers are per-
ceived as being out only for profit. Such stereotypes 
are potential bottlenecks for micro-insurance 
schemes coming to being. 
Third, the forum could act as an arbitration board 
active in cases of disputes between the different 
parties in micro-insurance business relations, i.e. in 
mediating between partners and agents, agents and 
agents and agents and clients. 
Fourth, the forum could aim at lobbying for a fa-
vourable legal and political environment. It should 
establish intense contacts with policy-makers and 
thus try to influence the framework conditions of 
micro-insurance. 
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7.2 An Agenda for Reforming Social 
Insurance 
Micro-insurance is a promising strategy to support 
the near-poor in their social protection efforts, as 
long as they are not covered by any kind of public 
social protection system. Micro-insurance might 
even become a permanent institution protecting in-
formal sector workers from social risks, this group 
of the employed being difficult to cover by manda-
tory social insurance schemes in any country.  
However, micro-insurance is no substitute for the 
extension of social insurance. The provision of mi-
cro-insurance contracts by non-governmental and 
private sector institutions does not in any way re-
lieve the government from its original responsibility 
and duty to provide adequate social protection for 
all its citizens. On the one hand, it is called on to 
support and promote the spread of micro-insurance 
schemes and to create favourable framework condi-
tions. On the other hand, it must make all possible 
efforts to integrate as many of the employed as pos-
sible into the mandatory public social insurance 
system, which is the sole vehicle for redistributive 
elements in the field of social protection. 
In Jordan, as a long-term goal, all employees and 
their families should be entitled to public pension 
benefits and be covered by a comprehensive health 
insurance system. Beforehand, however, fundamen-
tal reforms are due in both fields to avoid any fur-
ther deterioration of their financial situation and the 
quality of the services available. Unemployment 
insurance, however, is not recommendable in the 
short to medium run. 
7.2.1 Pension Insurance 
All public pension schemes in Jordan – the scheme 
of the Social Security Corporation (SSC), the Civil 
Pension Programme (CPP) and the Military Pen-
sion Programme (MPP) – need to be reformed. 
They are responsible for securing pensions for the 
present and all future generations, though they face 
serious deficits involving their efficiency, sustain-
ability and social fairness: 
— large parts of the population are not covered by 
any of the schemes, 
— benefits differ from one scheme to another as to 
their generosity, 
— overhead costs are high 
— their returns to invested reserves are far too low 
and 
— benefits provided exceed by far the contribu-
tions collected in two of the three schemes; the 
third (the SSC scheme) will have to disinvest 
reserves as of 2022 and will be short of cash re-
serves in 2041. 
Reforms have to address efficiency and sustainabil-
ity problems first of all. Only then can efforts be 
made to extend the schemes’ coverage to additional 
population groups. As to the SSC scheme, reforms 
have to get underway in five fields: (i) governance, 
(ii) investment policy, (iii) qualifying conditions, 
(iv) pension formula and (v) control of compliance. 
Governance. As a first step, the SSC should be 
granted more independence from government inter-
ference. All directors should have a free hand in 
their decision-making activities. This implies that 
directors and board members should not be govern-
ment officials and ought to be appointed for a fixed 
term (without any threat of dismissal before the end 
of a term or possibility of appointment for another 
term). 
Apart from that, administration procedures have to 
be simplified and over-staffing reduced. The SSC 
has high overhead costs. Though administration is 
well staffed, it lacks qualified staff in important 
areas, for example actuaries and investment experts. 
Investment policy. Investment regulations have to be 
amended to allow for more profitable investments. 
The low rate of return to invested reserves is the 
single most important reason for the fact that the 
SSC’s income is so small that its reserves will be 
exhausted by 2041. We recommend that 
— parliament grant the board of investors com-
plete independence in its investment decisions 
and allow for investments abroad, 
82 Markus Loewe et al.  
— a well-trained investment unit be built up 
within the SSC, 
— the board of investors take its decisions on the 
base of economic rather than political consid-
erations: that it diversify its investment portfo-
lio, stop investments in non-interest-bearing as-
sets (e.g. government credits) and consider in-
creasing the share of high-yield/ high-risk in-
vestments. The average return to investment 
should at lest equal the interest rates of long-
term savings deposits. 
Qualifying conditions. Some of the SSC laws on 
benefit conditions are far too generous197 and entail 
immense costs, which are another factor of the 
SSC’s increasing expenditures: 
— The normal age of retirement should be gradu-
ally raised from 60 to 65 for men and from 55 
to 60 for women.198 
— The generous early retirement regulations have 
to be amended to encourage workers to remain 
longer in the labour force, thus paying contri-
butions over a longer period of time. Reduc-
tions for pensions granted to those retiring at 
the age of 45 have to be much higher than the 
present 10 %. 
— All spending for minimum pension provisions 
should be financed by the government budget 
as a means of making fiscal subsidies more 
transparent. 90 % of all pensioners are entitled 
to a minimum pension substantially higher than 
the equivalent of contribution payments. The 
difference in costs reduces accrued reserves and 
is thus financed by future generations of pen-
sioners or, if the SSC goes bankrupt, by the 
government, i.e. by future taxpayers. Redis-
tributive elements in social protection favour-
ing low-income earners should be financed by 
progressive taxes, not by contributions col-
lected from a minority of taxpayers. 
Pension formula. An actuarial division should be 
built up to publish regular reports on the SSC’s fi-
                                                     
197  Cf. Cichon (2000), p. 6. 
198  Ibid. 
nancial position and to make projections for the 
financial impact of planned changes in benefit levels 
and conditions.  
To balance out the SSC’s spending and earning, the 
pension formula must be adjusted in accordance 
with the projections of this actuarial division. The 
accrual rate (today: 2 %) has to be markedly re-
duced and pensions should be based on average 
lifetime earnings - not on average earnings over the 
last two years. Moreover, they should be automati-
cally adjusted for inflation. At present, adjustments 
are decided upon on the basis of ad hoc parliamen-
tary decrees. Normally they are too low to compen-
sate for losses in the real value of pensions.199 
Control of compliance. Photo membership cards 
should be issued to all SSC-insured to reduce the 
risk of fraud. Every insured person would accord-
ingly receive a card on the first day of employment 
so that governmental controllers can easily verify 
every single worker’s compliance with the SSC 
when they visit an enterprise. 
To raise the overall efficiency of social insurance in 
Jordan, efforts have to made to merge all of the 
three systems. A first step has already been under-
taken; a decision was taken in 1994 that newly hired 
government employees will be covered no longer by 
the CPP but by the SSC. It would be straightforward 
to shift the remaining CPP insured and the armed 
forces, presently insured under the provisions of the 
MPP, to the SSC scheme as well.200 This streamlin-
ing is recommendable to avoid double standards in 
social protection for different groups of the em-
ployed, to simplify administration structures, to 
produce synergy effects and to reduce administra-
tion costs. 
                                                     
199  Cf. Cichon (2000), p. 7. 
200  Today, 99 % of all new government employees are cov-
ered by the SSC. However, under the present legislation it 
will take more than 70 years until no employee or depend-
ant is entitled to benefits from the CPP. Mr. Umar Ibrahim 
Umari and Mr. Mohammad Hamdan, Civil and Military 
Pension Commission, Ministry of Finance, 26 February 
2001. 
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But the army is a sensitive issue and it is not very 
likely that the MPP will be integrated into the SSC. 
The armed forces enjoy a special status in the Jor-
danian social and political system which makes it 
difficult to treat them like other government em-
ployees.  
Nevertheless, the government might consider har-
monising the benefit conditions. Today, provisions 
under the MPP are even more generous than under 
the SSC scheme and the CPP and constitute a wor-
rying burden to the government budget. No less than 
23 % of the population is covered by the MPP.201 
Initial steps to reform the MPP and harmonise it 
with the other two schemes might include  
— increasing the minimum period of contribution 
from 16 years to 20 or 25 years and 
— increasing the transparency of the system by 
raising contribution rates to realistic levels after 
raising real wage levels, the net effect for wage 
earners being zero.  
7.2.2 Health Insurance 
Compulsory social health insurance is the only pos-
sible strategy to improve the social protection of all 
Jordanian households from health risks. Subchapter 
6.4 shows that micro health insurance is not feasible 
in Jordan (see pp. 60 - 62 ). However, solutions 
have to be found to finance such health insurance 
and to overcome the substantial gaps in the coun-
try’s health care provisioning sector. 
As a final goal, social health insurance should cover 
the entire population of Jordan and reimburse all 
medical treatment costs. For this purpose, an inde-
pendent agency needs to be set up to insure all 
groups of the employed on a mandatory basis and 
under equal conditions for all: the CHIP-insured, the 
members of the armed forces and all other groups of 
the population. The nucleus of such an entity could 
either be the Civil Health Insurance Programme 
(CHIP) or a new agency to be established as a 
daughter agency of the SSC. The CHIP currently 
                                                     
201 See Table B17 in Annex B. 
covers public sector employees only. It would need 
to be transformed into an autonomous public agency 
entirely independent of the government. The SSC is 
allowed by law to offer health insurance.  
However, strategies have to be identified that ensure 
that contribution levels will either remain or become 
affordable for low-income earners:  
First, the contribution rates of the armed forces and 
higher-income CHIP-insured persons ought to be 
substantially increased. At present, their health care 
is highly subsidised by the government. If the cov-
erage of the schemes is extended to additional 
groups of the employed, these subsidies should in-
stead be granted as a transfer to the general health 
insurance budget to subsidise the contribution rates 
of low-income earners. 
Second, the high incidence of unjustified claims in 
the public and private health care sectors has to be 
reduced by improving the verification of claims. 
This task should be outsourced to private Jordanian 
Third Party Administrators (TPAs), who have de-
veloped a highly efficient system of controlling 
claims.202 
Third, small co-payments for services should be 
charged to create incentives to use hospitals only 
when necessary. The poor and chronically ill, how-
ever, must remain exempted from these fees. All of 
them should be automatically granted green-cards 
by the MOSD to prove their need and their eligibil-
ity for free health care.203 
Fourth, it might be useful to opt for a step-by-step 
approach when health insurance coverage is ex-
tended: At the beginning, the newly insured might 
be insured for in-patient treatment only and be 
                                                     
202 One of these TPAs uses a fully automated system of 
checking claims within seconds. Applying the system re-
quires, however, that all health service providers be com-
puterised, have on-line access to data services and use pa-
tient smart cards. The public health providers should intro-
duce the same technical system as to avoid different norms 
being used within the Jordanian health sector. 
203  Based on a proposal of Dr. Yasser Adwan, University of 
Yarmouk, 19 April 2001. 
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charged lower contributions than those already cov-
ered by the CHIP. At current price levels, full cov-
erage for in- and out-patient services in public and 
private hospitals would not be affordable for the 
majority of the population. Even if the insured were 
entitled to use public health care facilities only, 
contributions would stand at about 17 % of average 
salaries.204 The GDI household survey found the 
urban poor and near-poor to have a preference for 
cheap health insurance covering hospital treatment 
only rather than any more expensive comprehensive 
social health insurance.205  
At the same time, reforms are due on the health care 
provision side as well to address the health sector’s 
capacity problems and the poor quality of public 
hospital services: The capacities of public health 
care facilities are overburdened, because reforms 
have long been neglected. Every governorate has 
only one public hospital financed by the Ministry of 
Health (MOH). These hospitals have very low stan-
dards and are often full. Sometimes they are forced 
to refuse even urgent cases. Large additional parts 
of the Jordanian population covered by public health 
insurance would confront the health care facilities 
with a sudden increase in the number of patients and 
thus aggravate the existing capacity problems. 
To increase the quantity and quality of health care 
services, we recommend that the public sector 
— buy overcapacities from the private sector206,  
— improve co-ordination between the public 
health providers (the MOH, the Royal Medical 
Services and the University Hospitals of Jordan 
and Yarmouk) to reduce the duplication in ser-
vices offered, decrease administration costs and 
increase the number of services offered to the 
insured, 
— build additional public hospitals and  
                                                     
204  Dr. Yasser Adwan, University of Yarmouk, 19 April 2001, 
referring to a study carried out by the University of Jordan 
in the mid 1990s. 
205 See Annex A for more details. 
206  Dr. Fakhri Al-Smairat, Civil Health Insurance Programme, 
Ministry of Health, 20 February 2001 and 4 April 2001. 
— decentralise the administration of public hospi-
tals to foster competition between them  
At the same time, the demand for in-patient health 
care has to be reduced. Many Jordanians tend to 
consult hospitals for minor basic health problems. 
Part of this problem could be solved by encouraging 
people to take preventative measures to avoid sick-
ness as well as by fostering the use of out-patient 
health care facilities through a new mandatory gen-
eral referral system – the consultation of out-patient 
health care facilities would constitute a condition for 
admission to hospital.207 One element of such a re-
ferral system is already in place in the system of 
white cards issued by the MOH. These cards indi-
cate each person’s nearest health centre. If a persons 
looks up another facility, he or she is required to pay 
the double normal fee.208 
7.2.3 Unemployment Insurance 
Establishing contributory – voluntary or mandatory 
- unemployment insurance is not recommendable. 
Unemployment is a serious social risk, but, for three 
reasons, viable solutions to the problem do not fall 
within the scope of risk mitigation. First, most of the 
unemployed in Jordan are labour-market entrants 
who have never worked and earned labour income. 
Second, unemployment insurance would include 
formal sector employees only and leave the much 
more vulnerable informal sector workers uncovered. 
Third, unemployment insurance would have to be 
mandatory because of the moral hazard as well as 
adverse selection problems. Contributions would 
have to be levied on all groups of the employed. 
Because of the high unemployment rate, they would 
constitute an unbearable burden for the employees 
and increase the cost of labour, distort the labour 
market and result in even higher unemployment.  
                                                     
207  Mr. Dwayne Banks, Partnership for Health Reform, 
26 February 2001. 
208  Dr. Fakhri Al-Smairat, Civil Health Insurance Programme, 
Ministry of Health, 4 April 2001. 
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The lack of productive employment is a structural 
problem which can only be reduced by risk preven-
tion strategies at the macro and individual level: 
— a policy of macroeconomic stabilisation and 
labour-intensive growth,  
— an active employment policy with special focus 
on business credits, 
— a better education policy focusing on voca-
tional training rather than academic education. 
7.3 Recommendations for Broadening 
the Outreach of Social Assistance 
Social assistance spending in Jordan should be ex-
tended in scope and scale. This recommendation 
addresses all public social assistance providers, but 
especially the National Aid Fund (NAF). Public 
social assistance should remain a last resort of pro-
tection for the poorest segments of society. Yet the 
existing systems are far from covering all needy 
households. 
Administrative and organisational reforms can do a 
lot to reduce overhead costs and release financial 
resources to be used for an extension of outreach to 
additional beneficiaries. Moreover, the government 
is called on to channel additional funds into social 
assistance now that consumer-subsidies – formerly a 
high item in government spending - have been re-
duced. 
NAF is already on the right track with its SPP-
financed reform package. This aims, on the one 
hand, at enhancing NAF’s administrative capacities 
through 
— decentralisation of NAF’s institutional structure 
and better training of its staff; 
— better co-ordination with other assistance 
schemes like the Zakat Fund and the founda-
tions, as well as with institutions like the SSC 
and the CPP to check alternative income 
sources and 
— computerisation of NAF’s database and build-
ing of a joint computer net-work with these or-
ganisations to exchange information on-line.  
On the other hand, the NAF’s outreach to the poor 
should be broadened by means of an increase in the 
number of recipients;  
— improved and more transparent targeting rules 
and practices;  
— the implementation of additional programmes 
like vocational training and scholarships for 
grown-up children or partly work-disabled per-
sons with an eye to integrating them in the la-
bour force.209 
However, thus far the success of the reform-package 
has remained limited. Some deficits of NAF have 
not even been addressed: Application procedures 
should be streamlined and facilitated and waiting 
periods of applicants should be shortened. Commu-
nity centres could assist households in filling out 
formulas and applying for documents.  
Households whose children turn 18 and are hence 
no longer eligible for assistance, should receive 
assistance on a lower level for a transition period. 
The existing integration programmes that subsidise 
50 % of salaries during the first six months of em-
ployment should be enlarged. 
The Zakat Fund, the second largest provider of so-
cial assistance, with its decentralised committees, is 
reported to work efficiently in the field. This is due 
to its activities being based on highly motivated 
volunteer workers. However, the fund itself is re-
ported to suffer from bureaucratic inefficiencies and 
overhead costs.210 Administrative restructuring and 
institutional development are the challenges to be 
faced.  
Other measures geared to improving the efficiency 
of the Zakat Fund would be to externalise special-
ised funds for certain groups of the poor like the 
chronically ill, orphans or students as a means of 
                                                     
209  Dr. Fayiz Suyyagh, The National Aid Fund, 20 February 
2001. For a more detailed description of NAF see  
pp. 30 - 31. 
210  Dr. Hamdi Murad, Umar-al-Mukhtar-Schools, 17 April 
2001; Dr. Yasser Abu Hilala, Al Jazeera Channel, 11 April 
2001. 
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further decentralising the fund’s administrative 
structure. Each of these semi-independent funds 
should have its own consultancy and advisory board 
and be able to act autonomously. 
8 Recommendations for German 
Development Co-operation with 
Jordan 
This chapter aims at identifying possible effective 
approaches for a German contribution to reforms 
and development in the field of social protection in 
Jordan. In accordance with the main topic of this 
study, the focal point is micro-insurance. Neverthe-
less, it takes into account the overall objective of 
creating a comprehensive and pluralistic social pro-
tection system that responds to the needs and ca-
pacities of different social groups and makes pro-
posals for development co-operation in other fields 
of social protection as well. 
The main recommendation for Jordanian-German 
development co-operation is to get engaged in re-
forming social protection in Jordan. Poverty and the 
vulnerability of households to risks are among the 
country’s most serious problems. The government is 
willing to enhance its social policy strategy but most 
institutions active in this field face serious problems 
with their technical and financial capacities in put-
ting the reforms suggested in Chapter 7 into prac-
tice. Thus far social protection has been widely dis-
regarded by the international donor community. 
A special focus should be on promoting micro-
insurance. Here, German development co-operation 
has comparative advantages because of its experi-
ence in supporting micro-insurance projects in other 
countries. Donor assistance is essential to alleviate 
specific bottle-necks in the micro-insurance ap-
proach by consulting all involved actors, training 
their staff, funding market-research studies, infor-
mation campaigns and initial technical infrastructure 
investments and providing short-term expertise for 
specific issues. 
The line of argumentation starts out with an analysis 
of the framework conditions for Jordanian-German 
development co-operation in the field of social pro-
tection (Subchapter 8.1) and an overview on the 
activities of other donors in this field (Subchap-
ter 8.2). Finally, Subchapter 8.3 looks into the po-
tential of a German commitment aimed at support-
ing social protection in Jordan and outlines possible 
instruments to promote micro-insurance, to support 
the reform of social insurance and to build capaci-
ties in the Zakat Fund. 
8.1 The Framework Conditions 
Donor support in the field of social protection is 
necessary when a country 
— faces severe social problems such as wide-
spread poverty or vulnerability to risks but 
— lacks the know-how, the technical instruments 
or the financial means to solve these problems. 
Donor support in the field of social protection, how-
ever, is only possible  
— when it is possible to solve the identified prob-
lems by means of concrete reforms, 
— when the relevant governmental and non-
governmental organisations in social protection 
themselves take the initiative in implementing 
these reforms and 
— when there is general consensus in society in 
favour of the reforms. 
Donor support in the field of social protection, fi-
nally, can be expected to be effective only if the 
government is committed to the targeted reforms, 
i.e. 
— if it is prepared to support or at least tolerate 
the reforms, 
— if the reforms are embedded in a poverty-
reducing economic, financial, tax, budget and 
legal-policy framework and 
— if the legal control and regulation mechanisms 
are effective in protecting the social systems 
and their beneficiaries. 
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These are the main messages of a position paper of 
the German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-
operation and Development / Bundesministerium für 
Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung 
(BMZ) on “Supporting Social Security Systems in 
Developing Countries” of March 1999.211 That pa-
per stresses that the poor and near-poor must be the 
main target-groups of German development co-
operation in the field of social protection. 
The paper furthermore mentions the guiding princi-
ple of subsidiarity, which is relevant at two levels: 
First, reforms in the field of social protection should 
not replace the risk management efforts of house-
holds at the individual level but only bridge gaps 
left by these efforts, i.e. support households when 
they are unable to manage their risks on their own. 
Second, development co-operation should address 
only the bottlenecks of national reform capabilities. 
It should not or crowd out domestic actors’ activi-
ties and commitments in the reform process but 
instead act as a catalyst to mobilise as many national 
actors and resources as possible. 
As to these criteria, Jordanian-German development 
co-operation in the field of social protection is nec-
essary, possible and holds promise of being effec-
tive: 
Social protection reforms are necessary. Chapter 3 
has argued that poverty is a widespread problem, 
which can be traced back to the vulnerability of 
households to risks. Chapters 4 and 5 have illus-
trated the serious gap in today’s social protection 
systems.  
Social protection reforms are possible. Chapters 6 
and 7 have listed a number of potential approaches 
to extending the coverage of social protection to the 
urban poor and near-poor, the main target groups of 
German development co-operation. Moreover, they 
have shown that micro-insurance is the most prom-
ising approach to reducing the vulnerability of near-
poor households in the short run; that large parts of 
the population would welcome this innovative con-
cept; and that a considerable number of organisa-
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tions are able to play and interested in playing an 
active role in possible micro-insurance projects. 
Social protection reforms are expected to be effec-
tive. The Jordanian government has recognised the 
importance of social development, and it is highly 
committed to improving the outcome and frame-
work conditions of social policy. The country has 
undergone a deep transformation process over the 
past few years, and a considerable number of refor-
matory laws have passed parliament. To give an 
example: insurance and financial market regulations 
have been amended. Many community and wom-
en’s empowerment programmes have been 
launched.212 
However, some very important reform projects have 
not been implemented. In most cases, decision-
makers have flinched from the initial plans because 
they faced insurmountable resistance from vested-
interest groups. Before a consensus and commit-
ment to reforms is reached, development co-
operation should hold back with support in these 
particular fields.  
The main obstacle to social protection reforms is in 
fact a lack of essential technical capacities and ca-
pabilities. Many of the reform proposals listed are 
new approaches for Jordan. For example, the coun-
try generally lacks experience with micro-insurance. 
Moreover, many reform projects also lack the nec-
essary funding. The country’s structural adjustment 
programme is putting strong pressure on the budget, 
narrowing the scope social development projects.  
8.2 Present Donor Activities 
Despite the country’s need for support in reforming 
social protection, little development co-operation is 
underway in this important policy field. Numerous 
donors are active in Jordan. All of them see poverty 
reduction as one of the most important policy goals 
                                                     
212  Dr. Abla Amawi, UNDP Jordan, 25 February 2001. Cf. 
also UNDP (1998), p. 6; UNDP Jordan (2000). See also 
Chapter 4. 
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and social protection as a crucial instrument in this 
respect.  
Some of the most important issues in the field of 
social protection have not been addressed by devel-
opment co-operation. Some bilateral and multilat-
eral donors are supporting the reform of the health 
care sector and the National Aid Fund (NAF), others 
run social development projects (micro-finance, 
community development and vocational training). 
In the past, some donors also supported income-
generating projects and the reform of social assis-
tance. However, as far as risk mitigation systems 
like social, commercial or micro-insurance are con-
cerned, no donor activities are underway, apart from 
other short-term consultancy on reforming the So-
cial Security Corporation (SSC), the Civil Pension 
Programme (CPP) and the public health insurance 
schemes (see Table 19). No micro-insurance pro-
jects are planned as yet. 
The Jordanian Social Productivity Programme 
(SPP) is financed by a number of bilateral and mul-
tilateral donors (see Box 7, p. 76). Loans are pro-
vided by the World Bank, the German Kreditanstalt 
für Wiederaufbau (KfW), Italy, the Arab Social and 
Economic Fund and the Islamic Fund. Grants are 
provided by UNDP, Germany and USAID. Each 
donor is engaged in specific components of the SPP 
in accordance with its development strategy.213 
The United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) has concentrated its activities on public 
sector capacity-building, conservation of natural 
resources and poverty eradication.214 As far as pov-
erty alleviation is concerned, UNDP has budgeted 
US-$ 2.8 million to enhance the governments’ abili-
ties to reduce poverty at the national level. The 
lion’s share of these funds are dedicated to the SPP 
to finance the NAF reform project, vocational train-
ing for the unemployed and micro-credit projects of 
very low income-earners. Furthermore, UNDP is 
                                                     
213 Dr. Mustafa Al-Saleh, Mr. Adel Basbous, Mr. Omar Al-
Rafie, Ministry of Planning, 15 February 2001; Dr. Gaith 
Fariz, Social Productivity Programme Unit, Ministry of 
Planning, 21 February 2001. 
214 Cf. UNDP Jordan (2000), p. 5. 
financing Jordan’s first National Human Develop-
ment Report.  
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) has 
been providing hardship assistance, primary health 
care and education services to registered Palestine 
refugees for almost five decades (see pp. 37 - 38). 
However, from year to year UNRWA’s activities 
have had to be cut down because of repeated reduc-
tions in funding by UNRWA’s donors. Its total 
budget for programmes in Jordan was US-$ 75 mil-
lion in 1999.215 
The main focus of the United Nations Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF) is on promoting children’s and 
women’s rights within development and enhancing 
maternal and child health. Moreover, UNICEF is 
funding education and community empowerment 
projects.216 
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has 
conducted an actuarial assessment of the projected 
effects of the draft social security law amendment 
on the financial position of the Social Security Cor-
poration (SSC) in November 2000.217 
The World Bank supports a programme of the Min-
istry of Health aimed at decentralising the public 
hospital system. As a donor of the SPP, the Bank is 
co-financing the reform of the NAF, the Community 
Infrastructure Programme and the Training and 
Employment Support Programme. Apart from that, 
it runs an NGO capacity-building programme218 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is consult-
ing the Ministry of Finance with regard to reform of 
                                                     
215  Cf. UN (1999). UNRWA’s main donors are the United 
States, the European Union, Japan, Sweden, the UK, Nor-
way, Germany, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands and 
Spain. 
216  Dr. Maha Shadid and Mrs. Muna M. Idris, UNICEF Am-
man, 20 February 2001. Cf. UNICEF Jordan (1998). 
217 Cf. Cichon (2000). 
218 Dr. Fakhri Al-Smairat, Civil Health Insurance Programme, 
Ministry of Health 20 February 2001; Mr. Zaid Al-Kayed, 
20 February 2001.  
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the Civil Pension Programme (CPP). It has recom-
mended integrating the CPP-insured into the pen-
sion programme of the SSC.219 
The United States Agency for International Devel-
opment (USAID) is Jordan’s most important bilat-
eral development partner. In the year 2000 alone, it 
spent approximately US$ 200 million in Jordan. 
                                                     
219 Mr. Umar Ibrahim Umari, Civil and Military Pension 
Commission, Ministry of Finance and Mr. Mohammad 
Hamdan, Ministry of Finance, 26 February 2001.  
USAID220 is active in three fields: (i) water man-
agement, (ii) economic development and (iii) health 
and population growth. Only the latter two are rele-
vant for social protection: With regard to economic 
development, The AMIR Programme (Access to 
Micro-finance & Improved Implementation of Pol-
                                                     
220  Mr. Roy Grohs, USAID Jordan and Mrs. Toni 
Christiansen-Wagner, USAID Jordan, 20 April 2001. Cf. 
also USAID, Jordan Mission (2000). 
Table 19: Donor Engagement 
 social  
assistance 
health 
care 
health  
insurance 
pension 
insurance 
micro-
insurance 
micro  
credits 
other 
SPPa reform of 
the NAF 
    sustainable  
micro-
finance 
vocational training; 
community  
development 
UNDP       public sector  
capacity-building 
UNRWA refugee 
hardship  
assistance 
refugee  
primary 
health care  
    refugee  
primary education  
UNICEF  maternal 
and child 
health 
    community em-
powerment  
ILO    assessment 
of SSC 
   
IMF    reform of 
CPP 
   
World 
Bank 
 decentrali-
sation of 
hospitals 
    NGO  
capacity-building 
USAID  health sec-
tor reform 
reform of 
health in-
surance 
  sustainable  
micro-
finance 
 
KfW      loan to  
the DEF 
squatter-upgrading 
Interna-
tional 
NGOs 
     micro-
credit 
schemes 
income generation 
for women 
In italics: only consultancy projects. 
aThe Social Productivity Programme (SPP) is predominantly financed by donors. 
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icy Reform) is of special interest.221 It aims at creat-
ing a favourable environment for small-scale entre-
preneurs and to encourage households to invest in 
business projects as a means of diversifying their 
income sources. It does so by providing funding for 
the four market-based micro-finance institutions 
(see p. 37). To support reforms in the health sector, 
USAID is funding a project on Partnerships for 
Health Reform which is carrying out research in the 
health sector and providing policy advice to the 
MOH. It has built up a system of national health 
accounts and supported a pilot decentralisation pro-
ject in two MOH hospitals. The next project phase 
will focus on primary health care and the implemen-
tation of an efficient referral system.222 
Germany is running three development co-operation 
projects in the field of social development, all of 
them financed by the German Bank for Reconstruc-
tion/ Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW). The 
first is a squatter-upgrading programme carried out 
by the Human and Urban Development Corporation 
(HUDC). The second is the SPP’s community infra-
structure development programme. The third is a 
micro-finance loan to the Development and Em-
ployment Fund. 
8.3 Potential Approaches 
Thus far the most important task of social protection 
reforms has not been addressed by either Jordanian 
decision-makers or foreign donors. This task is to 
end the exclusivity of public social insurance for 
formal sector employees, i.e. to improve the social 
protection of the poor and near-poor. Donors should 
give priority to supporting this target group through 
the provision of risk-pooling products rather than 
social assistance. In buying insurance products, 
people opt to provide and pay for their own protec-
tion against social risks. 
                                                     
221 Mr. James Whitaker, The AMIR Programme, 21 Febru-
ary 2001. 
222  Dr. Fakhri Al-Smairat, Civil Health Insurance Programme, 
Mr. Zaid Al-Kayed, Ministry of Health, 20 February 2001 
and Mr. Dwayne Banks, Partnership for Health Reform, 
26 February 2001.  
In view of the global upsurge in micro-credit, it 
would make sense for donors to promote micro-
insurance. Micro-insurance is a strategy for the ur-
ban near-poor to pool their risks. It prevents house-
holds from falling under the poverty line and thus 
reduces the number of people living in poverty as 
well as the requirements for social assistance spend-
ing. Hence it is complementary to income diversifi-
cation instruments like micro-credits. Micro-insur-
ance, however, affects poverty levels in a much 
more preventive mode than does micro-credit, 
which aims at improving people’s well-being when 
they are already poor. 
Nevertheless, the potential of micro-insurance in 
Jordan is limited in outreach and coverage. As a 
consequence, while focusing on micro-insurance, 
donors might at the same time consider supporting 
complimentary social protection reform strategies 
such as social insurance reform. In the field of so-
cial assistance, capacity-building of the Zakat Fund 
might be considered. 
This recommendation also applies for German de-
velopment co-operation. The German BMZ has 
recently decided to concentrate its co-operation with 
Jordan on drinking water and waste water manage-
ment.223 The rationale for this decision was twofold: 
First, German development co-operation has pro-
found technical know-how in water management 
issues. Second, both German implementation agen-
cies, the German Bank for Reconstruction/ Kredit-
anstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) and the German 
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit 
(GTZ), have been active in the water sector for sev-
eral years and have thus gained valuable experience 
under the Jordanian framework conditions. How-
ever, despite the recent decision to focus on water 
management, direct poverty eradication is still re-
garded a top priority field for German development 
co-operation in the Arab world in general and in 
Jordan in particular, and micro-insurance is one of 
the most effective approaches in this field. 
                                                     
223  Mr. Richard Avedikian, Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, 
20 February 2001, Mr. Burghard Kehr, Deutsche Gesell-
schaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 13 February 2001 
and Mr. Martin Kaiser, consultant, 23 March 2001. Cf. al-
so BMZ (1998), p. 6. 
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Supporting initiatives to establish micro-insurance 
in Jordan is very much in accord with the overall 
BMZ objectives and guidelines as formulated in the 
above-mentioned BMZ position paper:  
According to this paper, the objective of develop-
ment co-operation “is not so much to create totally 
new systems but to reach the poor target group, to 
adjust, expand and complement the existing systems 
and design them in such a way that they can be fi-
nanced.”224  
On the other hand, the paper favours “to create a 
suitable complement to central government systems 
in the form of decentralised social security sys-
tems.”225 It proposes supporting co-operative sys-
tems and private sector alternatives to public social 
insurance. The optimum result is a pluralistic, de-
centralised network involving individual, commu-
nity- and co-operative-based activities as well as 
private and social insurance. In particular, the link-
ing of and interaction between private, public and 
co-operative / community-based systems are seen as 
a promising approach. In this context, the BMZ226 
explicitly mentions the co-operation between private 
insurance companies and non-governmental organi-
sations such as the case of the micro-insurance pro-
ject of the Self Employed Women’s Association 
(SEWA) in India. 
Nevertheless, the paper227 sets limits to official Ger-
man development co-operation in the field of social 
protection: 
— It should be designed in such a way that the 
systems supported become sustainable in them-
selves or maintainable by national resources. 
German commitments must be limited in scale 
and time. Their task is to overcome the initial 
bottlenecks in the reform of existing systems or 
development of new systems, but not to pro-
vide long-term assistance.  
                                                     
224 BMZ (1999), p. 12. 
225 BMZ (1999), p. 10. 
226 Cf. BMZ (1999), p. 13. 
227 Cf. BMZ (1999), p. 11. 
— The systems supported must be looked into 
with an eye to their efficiency and social fair-
ness. A compromise has to be defined between 
these two conflicting goals that takes the spe-
cific national context into consideration. This 
means that it must be guided by historical ex-
perience, religious and cultural values and the 
prevailing social norms of the country con-
cerned so as to ensure a general social consen-
sus concerning the reform supported. 
— Participation of the target group – the poor and 
near-poor – must be ensured. Society at large 
must be involved in defining the reform objec-
tives and civil society organisations are ex-
pected to play a role. It must be certain that no 
individuals or entire population groups are ex-
cluded from the beneficial effects of the re-
forms. 
— Ownership and commitment of the actors in-
volved is imperative. 
— The reforms supported must primarily target 
the poor and near-poor. 
To respond to these guidelines, technical co-opera-
tion is recommendable. Germany can provide limit-
ed financial contributions to a temporary reform 
process or the start-up of new projects (e.g. for local 
experts, technical equipment, capacity-building, 
emergency funds, market research, initial marketing 
campaigns), though long-term commitments or the 
direct funding of benefits are incompatible. Poten-
tial instruments of technical co-operation include 
— workshops and conferences to raise public 
awareness, foster and disseminate information, 
intensify the policy dialogue, document and ex-
change international experience; 
— short-term expert missions to provide consul-
tancy with regard to management structures, 
administrative procedures, monitoring, regula-
tion, data-processing, legislative issues etc.; 
— long-term expert missions to facilitate reform 
processes and co-operation initiatives; 
— market research and studies identifying target 
groups and openings for activities; and 
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— the training of government employees and 
NGO staff and the training of trainers. 
The following sections discuss the potential role of 
development co-operation in supporting social pro-
tection reforms in the fields of micro-insurance 
(8.3.1), social insurance (8.3.2) and social assistance 
(8.3.3) by means of any of the instruments listed. 
8.3.1 Establishing Micro-Insurance 
Possible initiatives aimed at developing micro-
insurance schemes should be granted support by 
Jordanian-German development co-operation. The 
approach is perfectly within the scope defined by 
the BMZ position paper on supporting social protec-
tion in developing countries, and the German GTZ 
has gained experience with micro-insurance in sev-
eral countries.228 
This support should in the first place be technical 
co-operation. Financial co-operation certainly has a 
role to play in specific cases. Experience with mi-
cro-insurance in other countries shows, however, 
that while subsidisation of micro-insurance – even 
more than the subsidisation of micro-credit – may 
constitute security for providers, it also tends to 
reduce incentives to raise efficiency, improve prod-
ucts and observe and address negative develop-
ments. At most, donors should give subsidised re-
sources as in-kind grants.229 
The role of donors in micro-insurance is fourfold: 
(i) to help overcome the initial costs and technical 
problems involved in establishing and up-scaling 
micro-insurance, (ii) to reduce financial and institu-
tional risks for the actors involved, (iii) to facilitate 
interaction between the state and the actors involved 
and between different groups of actors and (iv) to 
speed up the emergence of micro-insurance projects. 
                                                     
228 The most prominent micro-insurance projects with GTZ 
support are SEWA in India and the Social Health Insur-
ance Networking and Empowerment Project (SHINE) on 
the Philippines. Cf. BMZ (1999), p. 13; Freiberg-Strauss 
(1999); Lund / Srinivas (1999), p. 61 and Annex case 6. 
229  Cf. Brown / McCord (2000), p. 14. 
The first two objectives do not need explanation. To 
understand the third, one must take into considera-
tion that the relevant organisations in most countries 
are not familiar with the concept of micro-in-
surance. In many cases, donors must be accepted to 
act as ‘genetic engineers.’ They can inspire appro-
priate actors to build micro-insurance projects, col-
lect, condense and pass on lessons on good practice, 
measure processes and give technical assistance. 
This is important because “evolution by trial-and 
error would take too long”.230 
As to German development co-operation, it is in 
accordance with the guidelines set out by the BMZ 
position paper to say that the setting up of micro-
insurance projects in Jordan (as noted in Subchap-
ter 7.1; see Table 18, p. 75) can be supported in six 
domains: (i) detailed market research and impact 
monitoring, (ii) training, (iii) administrative and 
technical capacity-building, (iv) marketing and in-
formation campaigns, (v) re-insurance and 
(vi) forming a discussion forum. Of course long-
term consultancy may be provided by an expert 
during all phases of the micro-insurance project. 
This expert might be positioned with the initiating 
institution (e.g. the SPP Unit). 
Market Research and Impact Monitoring 
German development co-operation could provide 
expertise or funding for more detailed market re-
search. All actors involved in micro-insurance ur-
gently need information on the scale and structure 
of the demand for micro-insurance products, but 
most NGOs lack the necessary financial resources 
and insurance companies may be reluctant to cover 
the costs of large-scale surveys before they know 
that their commitment will pay off. 
For this purpose, the GTZ could send a short-term 
mission of their own experts. However, it would be 
preferable to provide only the funding to engage 
local experts, e.g. from the Near East Foundation 
(NEF), the Center for Strategic Research or the 
Jordanian Department of Statistics. Support might 
                                                     
230  Schreiner (2000), p. 423. 
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be provided by international micro-insurance ex-
perts to design the questionnaires, or for the inter-
view guidelines of the survey.231 
Also, development co-operation could provide the 
expertise or funding for monitoring and evaluating 
the project. During and after the pilot-project phase, 
a detailed impact assessment should be conducted. 
The clients and all actors involved should be inter-
viewed on their satisfaction with the partnership 
scheme and the product offered. Such an evaluation 
requires special attention, because the success of the 
project’s up-scaling or replication heavily depends 
on the experience gained during the pilot phase. 
Hence it should be carried out by specialised ex-
perts. 
Training 
Training the staff of micro-insurance providers is 
perhaps the most important target of development 
co-operation. The lack of experience with financial 
products among NGOs will certainly turn out to be 
the major bottleneck when micro-insurance projects 
are set up in Jordan. The know-how and proficiency 
of their staff is essential for the success of the agent-
partner model concept.  
Before and during the pilot project phase, the train-
ing of the involved actors’ staff could be provided 
by donor-financed experts. Thus far no suitable 
training capacities are available in Jordan. Again, 
the GTZ could put to use its experience with micro-
insurance in India.  
In the long run, however, such training should be 
done by Jordanians in Jordan to secure the sustain-
ability of the scheme. For this reason, before the 
pilot project is scaled up, development co-operation 
is needed to train nationals to give training courses 
to additional distribution agents. These courses 
might be held at the Institute of Banking Studies 
                                                     
231 MicroSave-Africa has developed a toolkit for market re-
search for all classes of micro-finance. For more infor-
mation, cf. http://www.microsave-africa.com/market_  
research.asp. 
which already trains the staff of Jordan’s four sus-
tainable micro-finance institutions.  
German development co-operation should not only 
provide the training of trainers but also finance part 
of the costs of the training courses offered at the 
Institute of Banking Studies to replicate the pilot 
project. Such support is useful to subsidise the start-
up costs of micro-insurance and thus create incen-
tives for commercial insurance companies and 
NGOs to participate. Nevertheless, the commercial 
insurance companies involved should be able to 
cover the rest of the costs. It is in their own interest 
to co-operate with well-trained agents. Moreover, 
the Jordanian state might also contribute to demon-
strating its commitment to the project. 
Administrative and Technical Capacity 
Building  
Development co-operation should facilitate the de-
velopment of appropriate institutional structures, 
systems and policies: It might consider assisting in 
institutionalising co-operation, designing manuals 
and procedures and building, establishing standard-
ised internal audits and dispute-settling mechanisms 
for the scheme. Moreover, it might also consider 
financing some of the necessary initial technical 
equipment of the agents involved, who lack, for 
example, the start-up capital to buy computers and 
software needed for book-keeping. The speed of the 
pilot project’s up-scaling depends heavily on the 
capacities of the agents, and economies of scale are 
essential for the scheme to sustain itself.232 
Marketing and Information Campaigns  
Donor support might be needed to launch the initial 
marketing and information campaigns once the pro-
ject has been scaled up. Technical assistance my be 
helpful to impart know-how on marketing tech-
niques, the design awareness campaigns and the 
presentation of information in advertisements, in-
formation brochures and workshops. No financial 
                                                     
232  Cf. Brown / McCord (2000), pp. 14 - 15. 
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assistance should be granted, however. The costs of 
the marketing and awareness-building activities can 
be covered by the commercial insurance partner; the 
campaigns have positive spin-off effects on the sale 
of the insurer’s other, conventional, products as well 
as on its general reputation. 
Re-insurance Fund 
If at all, standard financial co-operation should only 
take place in the field of re-insuring the scheme. 
The commercial insurance partner might feel unable 
to cover the whole risk entailed by micro-insurance 
– especially during the pilot phase, when it might 
turn out that the pricing of the product is not appro-
priate, while claims have to be settled to avoid any 
erosion of client confidence. Moreover, even after 
years of operation, catastrophic events may result in 
an unexpected coincidence of claims that the insur-
ance partner is unable to compensate for by other 
business lines. 
In the form of private-public-partnership (PPP), 
official development co-operation might facilitate 
the provision of re-insurance by international com-
panies. To reduce the risk of the actors involved, 
insurance companies re-insure their conventional 
products with large companies who have the capac-
ity to pool risks world-wide. Re-insurance compa-
nies should be prepared to bear these risks and pos-
sibly pay for claims. They have great interest233 in 
partnering in micro-insurance in the Arab world, 
because such an engagement would improve their 
reputation and standing in the region and increase 
their market share. 
However, a donor-financed re-insurance fund is 
imperative in the case that re-insurance companies 
are not prepared to deal with micro-insurance. Such 
a fund could be established with the initiator of the 
project or with any neutral institution which is pre-
pared to co-ordinate the various actors involved. 
Payoffs should be granted in the above-mentioned 
emergency cases only. No hidden subsidisation of 
the micro-insurance scheme should take place, as in 
                                                     
233 Mr. Volker Dietrich, Munich Re, 23 September 1999. 
the case of SEWA. The Indian organisation was 
granted a GTZ-sponsored re-insurance fund carry-
ing a principal-plus-inflation maintenance require-
ment. It is now financing a fifth of its administration 
and benefit spending through the annual real interest 
of the fund of US$ 450,000.234 This exceptionally 
high capital income clearly constitutes a disincen-
tive for SEWA to improve the efficiency of its 
scheme and the design of the product offered. On 
the other hand, the fund was essential for the sur-
vival of the scheme when an earthquake hit the 
SEWA project area in 2000. 
Discussion Forum 
The forming and development of a discussion forum 
might also call for technical donor support. To fulfil 
its four tasks (exchange know-how, facilitate co-
operation and arbitrate between involved actors and 
lobby for favourable framework conditions), the 
discussion forum will probably depend on qualified 
expertise – at least in its initial phase. A long-term 
mission of a GTZ consultant would constitute useful 
backing. 
Finally, the ‘neutral’ position of development agen-
cies may be useful to defuse potential political con-
flicts between the government and the actors in-
volved and mediate between partners and agents of 
micro-insurance and thus play an essential role in 
facilitating lasting co-operation partnership. 
8.3.2 Reforming Social Insurance  
Technical assistance might be needed to support one 
or another reform in both Jordan’s public pension 
schemes and health care provision sector. The aim 
of such reforms is to restore the financial sustain-
ability of the systems, a prerequisite for any attempt 
to broaden their coverage. As to German commit-
ments in these fields, however, it would be impor-
tant to look into whether Germany has comparative 
advantages in these fields and to ensure that no 
other donors are already engaged here. In addition, 
                                                     
234  Cf. McCord / Isern / Hashemi (2001), p. 21. 
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the government must prove that it is committed to 
the reforms supported. 
Pension Insurance 
A commitment of German development co-ope-
ration in the field of public pension insurance is not 
recommendable at the time being. The political 
decision-makers are obviously not prepared to re-
form the operating schemes in such a way as to 
secure their long-term financial sustainability. They 
admit the need to merge the three schemes and rec-
ognise the bleak financial future of the Social Secu-
rity Corporation (SSC).235 Nevertheless, all imple-
mented, ongoing and planned reform projects fail to 
tackle the sustainability issue and are further aggra-
vating the SSC’s financial position. 
Even though the commitment of the Jordanian gov-
ernment is growing, Jordanian-German bilateral 
development co-operation is probably not the most 
suitable vehicle of support. All single measures 
should be embedded in a comprehensive reform 
agenda to be designed and accompanied by an insti-
tution like the International Labour Office (ILO), 
with its extensive experience in social insurance 
reform. Germany could at the utmost provide sup-
port for individual components within the reform 
programme. Moreover, the SSC still has sufficient 
reserves to finance the outstanding reforms. Hence 
only technical support should be granted: 
— An investment expert might be sent to Jordan 
to assess the SSC’s current investment policy 
and work out a guideline for a new portfolio 
investment strategy. Moreover, the staff of a 
new investment unit could be trained by Ger-
man experts. 
— An actuarian could view the SSC’s benefit 
formula and benefit conditions and make pro-
posals for legal amendments to restore a finan-
cial balance. As a contribution to long-term 
                                                     
235 Mr. Ahmad Abdel-Fattah, Social Security Corporation, 17 
February 2001; Mr. Mohammad Hamdan, Ministry of Fi-
nance, 26 February 2001 and Mr. Umar Umari, Civil and 
Military Pension Commission, Ministry of Finance; cf. 
ILO (2000). 
autonomy, technical support might be provided 
to build up an actuarial unit with the SSC. 
— This same actuarian could also assess the CPP 
and MPP and make proposals to harmonise 
these programmes’ benefit conditions with 
those of the SSC. Here, it could also help to 
mediate between the interests of different pres-
sure groups. 
Health Insurance 
Despite the engagement of the World Bank and 
USAID, German technical co-operation could play a 
role in reforming the Jordanian health sector. The 
Jordanian government seems to be committed 
somewhat more to carrying out reforms in the health 
sector than in public pension schemes. It has agreed 
on a USAID-financed project to (i) strengthen ca-
pacity for health sector planning and implementing 
health reforms, (ii) improve public hospital auton-
omy, (iii) build health provider capacities (in ac-
counting, pricing and processing data) and (iv) est-
ablish universal health insurance.236 
German development co-operation, might, for ex-
ample, provide support toward  
— introducing an efficient automated claim man-
agement system administered by a powerful 
third-party agency,  
— building capacities within the nucleus of a fu-
ture social health insurance corporation (either 
the CHIP or a daughter agency of the SSC), 
— co-ordinating the three operating public health 
care providers. 
8.3.3 Reforming Social Assistance 
Schemes 
The potential scope of German development co-
operation in the field of social assistance is rather 
limited. The National Aid Fund (NAF) is already in 
                                                     
236 Mr. Dwayne Banks, Partnership for Health Reform, 
26 February 2001. 
96 Markus Loewe et al.  
the midst of a reform process. This reform is one of 
the four components of the donor-financed SPP. 
Hence no additional support is needed for the time 
being. 
If asked for, German development co-operation 
could, however, support the second provider of so- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cial assistance in Jordan: to build capacities in the 
Zakat Fund. While the zakat committees are said to 
operate in a highly efficient way, the Zakat Fund is 
a bureaucratic institution which suffers from ineffi-
cient procedures and high overhead costs. An orga-
nisational assessment could provide valuable sup-
port.
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Kristalsky, Terri, Deputy Component Leader, Sustainable 
Micro-Finance Initiative, The AMIR Programme, United 
States Agency for International Development; Amman,  
31 October 2000 
Lattouf, Hala, Senior Programme Officer, Human Develop-
ment, Poverty and Gender, Jordan Country Office, United 
Nations Development Programme; Amman, 30 May 2000 
Maas, Kirsten, Regional Director, Arab Middle East Office, 
Heinrich-Böll-Foundation, Exchange of Letters, 23 May 
2000 
Mahmud, Nadia, Macroeconomic and Trade Expert, Meda 
Team Jordan, Technical Assistance to the European 
Commission in Jordan, Delegation of the European Union 
in Jordan; Amman, 26 April 2001 
McCord, Michael J., Senior Technical Advisor, MicroSave 
Africa; Amman, 28 March 2001 
Metzger, Ulrike, Ministerialdirigentin, Division 220 (Near 
East), German Ministry for Economic Co-operation and 
Development; Bonn, 30 May 2001 
Morell, Reiner, Counsellor, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy 
of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan; Amman, 28 March 2001 
Münch, Liesl, Socio-Economist, Consultant; Amman, 19 May 
2000 and 30 October 2000 
Murad, Dr. Hamdi, Professor, Islamic Law, Umar-al-Mukhtar-
Schools, former Director General of the Zakat-Fund; 
Amman, 17 April 2001  
Murad, Badi’a, Director, International Relations and Informa-
tion, Al-Amal-Centre; Amman, 25 February 2001 
Nabulsi, Dr. M. Said, Chairman and CEO, Jordan Investment 
Trust P.L.C.; Amman, 1 June 2000 
Nasser, Dr. Sari, Professor, Faculty of Sociology, University of 
Jordan, Hayy Nazal Community Centre; Amman, 28 May 
2000 and 25 February 2001 
Nawawi, Mahmoud Salem, Project Director, Community 
Based Social Rehabilitation Programme; Amman, 23 May 
2000 and 25 October 2000 
Nufil, Mohammed, Pension Insurance Programme, The Jordan 
Engineer’s Association; Amman, 19 March 2001 
Nusseir, Shadia, Executive Director, The Jordanian Hashemite 
Fund for Human Development; Amman, 19 April 2001 
Pickartz, Dr. Josi Salem, Clinical Psychologist, Al-Kutba 
Institute for Human Development ; Amman, 23 May 2000 
Price, Tanna S., Marketing Specialist, Sustainable Micro-
Finance Initiative, The AMIR Programme, United States 
Agency for International Development; Amman, 21 Feb-
ruary 2001 
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Quandour, Awni, Coordinator, The Micro-Credit Programmes, 
The Noor Al-Hussein-Foundation, The Quality of Life 
Project; Amman, 26 February 2001 and 8 April 2001 
Qurcan, Khaldun, Director, Housing and Urban Development 
Corporation; Amman, 14 March 2001 
Ramon, Johan, Country Representative, Jordan Office, CARE 
International; Amman, 19 February 2001 
Sabbagh, Amal, President, Jordanian National Committee for 
Women; Amman, 25 February 2001  
Saifi, Rana, Development Officer, British Embassy Amman; 
Amman, 29 May 2000 
Sakijha, Basem, Arab Archives Institute; Amman, 30 May 
2000 
Salah, Abdel-Fattah, Secretary General, Ministry of Awqāf; 
Director General, The Zakat Fund; Amman, 25 February 
2001 
Salah, Jamal, Ph. D., Secretary General, Ministry of Planning; 
Amman, 16 May 2000 
Salem, Silvia, Assistant Director, Ministry of Social Develop-
ment; Amman, 25 February 2001 
Schlumberger, Oliver, Assistant Professor, Institute of Politi-
cal Science, University of Tübingen; Amman, 27 October 
2000 
Schneider, Stefan, First Counsellor, Division 310 (Near East), 
German Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Berlin, 6 July 2000 
Schneller, Dr. Martin, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of 
Germany to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan; Amman, 
13 and 28 March 2001 
Shadid, Dr. Maha, Assistant Project Officer, Jordan Country 
Office, UNICEF; Amman, 20 February 2001 
Shahin, Mitri, Noor Al-Hussein Foundation; Amman, 19 Feb-
ruary 2001 
Shakhatreh, Dr. Hussein, Director General, Jordan Department 
of Statistics; Amman, 29 May 2000 and 15 February 2001 
Shami, Ramzi S., Jordan International Insurance Company, 
Deputy Director General; Amman, 15 February 2001 
Shamrukh, Nadia, Jordanian Women’s Union; Amman, 29 
October 2000, 20 February 2001 and 9 April 2001 
Sharaf, Niveen Abbousji, General Manager, Micro Fund for 
Women; Amman, 22 February 2001 
Shawa, Fouad, Chief of Field, Relieff and Social Services, 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East; Amman, 22 February 2001 
Shteiwi, Dr. Musa, Director, Jordan Centre for Social Re-
search; Amman, 24 May 2000 and 25 October 2000 
Solbakken, Hilde, Second Secretary, Norwegian Embassy 
Amman; Amman, 18 May 2000 
Subeihi, Dawoud, The Jordan Engineer’s Association, Health 
Insurance Programme; Amman, 15 March 2001 
Suyyagh, Fayiz, Ph. D., Management Consultant Director, 
Project for Restructuring National Aid, Social Productiv-
ity Programme Unit; Amman, 20 February 2001 
Sweis, Rajai K., General Manager, Middle East Insurance Co.; 
Amman, 21 February 2001 
Tiltnes, Åge A., Researcher, Regional Office, FAFO Institute 
for Applied Social Science; Amman, 21 February 2001 
Ule, Dr. Wolfgang, Director, Goethe-Institute Amman; Am-
man, 31 May 2000 
Umari, Umar Ibrahim, President of the Civil and Military 
Pension Commission, Ministry of Finance; Amman,  
26 February 2001 
Vogt, Dr. Ulrich, Representative in Jordan and Lebanon, Frie-
drich-Naumann-Foundation; Amman, 24 May 2000 and 
18 February 2001 
von Schröder, Hans, Second Secretary, Embassy of the Federal 
Republic of Germany to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jor-
dan; Amman, 16 May 2000 
Wade, Stephen P., Programme Director, The AMIR Pro-
gramme, United States Agency for International Devel-
opment; Amman, 21 February 2001 
Whitaker, James, Component Leader, Sustainable Micro-
Finance Initiative, The AMIR Programme, United States 
Agency for International Development; Amman, 31 Octo-
ber 2000, 21 February 2001 and 18 April 2001 
Wils, Oliver, Researcher, Institute of Political Science, Free 
University of Berlin; Amman, 11 April 2001 
Yousef, Ahmed, Secretary General, Islamic Action Front; 
Amman, 10 April 2001 
Zurub, Waleed Wael, General Manager, Jordan French Insur-
ance Co. Ltd.; Amman, 21 February 2001 and 25 and  
28 March 2001 
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List of Interlocutors by Institution  
 
NOTE: All interlocutors are listed with the position held on 
 the day of the last official meeting with the GDI 
 team as given below. 
 
Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
Ministry of Finance: 
– Dr. Mohammad S. Abu-Hammour, Secretary General; 
Amman, 22 April 2001 
– Lutfi Abu-Hazeem, Under-Secretary for Gouvernorate 
Affairs; Amman, 22 April 2001 
Civil and Military Pension Commission: 
– Umar Ibrahim Umari, President of the Commission; Am-
man, 26 February 2001 
– Mohammad S. Hamdan, Senior Financial Researcher; 
Amman, 26 February 2001 
Ministry of Planning: 
– Salah, Jamal, Ph. D., Secretary General; Amman, 16 May 
2000 
– Dr. Mustafa Al-Saleh, Director, Bilateral Co-operation 
Department; Amman, 15 February 2001 
– Dr. Dieter Katterman, Team Leader, Jordanian-German 
Project ‘Promotion of a National Information System’; 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit; 
Amman, 24 February 2001 
Social Productivity Programme Unit: 
– Dr. Ghaith H. Fariz, Director; Amman, 21 February 2001 
and 4 April 2001 
– Fayiz Suyyagh, Ph. D., Management Consultant Director, 
Project for Restructuring National Aid; Amman, 20 Febru-
ary 2001 
– Adel Al-Rafie, Pilot Projects Co-ordinator; Amman,  
15 February 2001 
– Adel Basbous, Co-ordinator, Community Infrastructure 
Programme; Amman, 15 February 2001 
Ministry of Industry and Trade: 
– Dr. Bassel Hindawi, Director General; Amman, 26 Febru-
ary 2001 
– Hisham Baban, Ph. D., Senior Legal and Technical Advi-
sor; Amman, 26 February 2001 
Ministry of Health: 
– Zaid Al-Kayed, Secretary General; Amman,  
20 February 2001 
Civil Health Insurance Programme: 
– Al-Smairat, Dr. T. Fakhri, Vice-President; Amman,  
20 February 2001 and 4 April 2001 
Ministry of Social Development: 
– Faida Barkawy, Director, Directorate of Families and 
Children; Amman, 25 February 2001 
– Maisoun Bdour, Director, Directorate of Organisations and 
International Relations; Amman, 25 February 2001 and  
9 April 2001 
– Omar Hamzeh, Director, Directorate for Monitoring and 
Social Protection; Amman, 25 February 2001 
– Orabi Mohid Ibrahim, Assistant Director, Directorate for 
Social Development and NGOs; Amman, 25 February 
2001 
– Silvia Salem, Assistant Director; Amman, 25 February 
2001 
Ministry of Awqāf/ The Zakat Fund: 
– Abdel-Fattah Salah, Secretary General; Director General 
of the Zakat Fund; Amman, 25 February 2001 
– Dr. Hamdi Murad, former Secretary General; former 
Director General of the Zakat Fund; Professor for Islamic 
Law, Umar-al-Mukhtar-Schools; Amman, 17 April 2001  
 
Jordanian Public Institutions 
The AMIR Programme: 
– Stephen P. Wade, Programme Director; United States 
Agency for International Development; Amman, 21 Feb-
ruary 2001 
– James Whitaker, Component Leader, Sustainable Micro-
Finance Initiative; United States Agency for International 
Development; Amman, 31 October 2000, 21 February 
2001 and 18 April 2001 
– Terri Kristalsky, Deputy Component Leader, Sustainable 
Micro-Finance Initiative; United States Agency for Inter-
national Development; Amman, 31 October 2000 
– Tanna S. Price, Marketing Specialist, Sustainable Micro-
Finance Initiative; United States Agency for International 
Development; Amman, 21 February 2001 
– Jamil El Wheidi, Micro-Finance Expert, Sustainable Mi-
cro-Finance Initiative; Amman, 21 February 2001 
Department of Statistics: 
– Dr. Hussein Shakhatreh, Director General; Amman,  
29 May 2000 and 15 February 2001 
The Development and Employment Fund: 
– Marzouq Hadid, Director General; Amman, 18 February 
2001 
Housing and Urban Development Corporation: 
– Khaldun Qurcan, Director; Amman, 14 March 2001 
– Dr. Hidaya Khairi, Public Society for Urban Housing and 
Works; Amman, 22 February 2001, 21 March 2001 and  
18 April 2001 
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– Ghassan Abu Nasir, Micro-Credit Programme; Amman, 
27 February 2001 and 29 March 2001 
– Isam Hamarsheh, Director General’s Office, Public Rela-
tion; Amman, 1 April 2001  
Human Resources Development Centre: 
– Dr. Nader Al-Murayyan; Amman, 18 February 2001 
The Jordan Engineer’s Association: 
– Mohammed Nufil, Pension Insurance Programme; Am-
man, 19 March 2001 
– Dawoud Subeihi, Health Insurance Programme; Amman, 
15 March 2001 
The National Aid Fund: 
– Khalid Ulian Ghneim, Director General; Amman,  
20 February 2001  
– Qasim Yaqub Al-Maumani, Deputy Director General; 
Amman, 20 February 2001  
– Fayiz Suyyagh, Ph. D., Management Consultant Director; 
Project for Restructuring National Aid, Social Productivity 
Programme Unit; Amman, 20 February 2001 
Social Security Corporation: 
– Ahmad Abdel-Fattah, General Director (since 2000); 
Amman, 17 February 2001 
– Dr. Yaser M. Adwan, General Director (until 2000); Am-
man, 21 May 2000 
– Nawaf Kalaldeh, Director, Planning and Research  
Department; Amman, 25 October 2000; 14, 17 and  
28 February 2001 and 8 April 2001 and Bonn,  
15 December 2000 
 
Jordanian Non-Governmental Organisations and 
Foundations  
Community Based Social Rehabilitation Programme: 
– Hashim Al-Majali, Engineer, Office of His Royal 
Hashemite Excellency Prince Raad; Amman, 23 May 2000 
– Mahmoud Salem Nawawi, Project Director; Amman,  
23 May 2000 and 25 October 2000 
Community Centre Hayy Nazal: 
– Rana Frial; Amman, 28 May 2000 
– Dr. Sari Nasser; Professor, Faculty of Sociology, Univer-
sity of Jordan; Amman, 28 May 2000 and 25 February 
2001 
Family Guidance and Awareness Centre Zarqa  
– Nadia Bushenaq; Zarqa, 31 October 2000 
The General Union of Voluntary Societies: 
– Dr. Arafat Al Tamemi, Deputy Secretary General; Am-
man, 24 and 28 February 2001 and 9 April 2001 
 
Al-Amal-Centre: 
– Badi’a Murad, Director, International Relations and 
Information; Amman, 25 February 2001 
– Hasan M. Ala’eddin, Director, Health Care Programme; 
Amman, 25 February 2001 
Global Development Forum: 
– Nevaf Aghabi; Amman, 21 May 2000 
Islamic Action Front: 
– Dr. Abd-el-Latif Arabiyat, Director General; Amman,  
10 April 2001 
– Ahmed Yousef, Secretary General; Amman, 10 April 2001 
The Jordan Hashemite Fund for Human Development: 
– Shadia Nusseir, Executive Director; Amman, 19 April 
2001 
– Munif M. Abu Rish, Director, Social Development De-
partment; Amman, 18 February 2001 
Jordan River Foundation: 
– Maha Khatib, Director General; Amman, 26 February 
2001 
– Malak El-Nasser, Director General (until 2000); Amman, 
30 May 2000 
The Jordanian National Committee for Women: 
– Amal Sabbagh, President; Amman, 25 February 2001  
Jordanian Women’s Union: 
– Nadia Shamrukh; Amman, 29 October 2000, 20 February 
2001 and 9 April 2001 
The Noor Al-Hussein Foundation: 
– Sima S. Bahous, Ph. D., Executive Director; Amman,  
19 February 2001 
– Mahmoud Al-Hadid, Project Manager; Amman, 28 May 
2000 
– Mitri Shahin; Amman, 19 February 2001 
Voluntary Society of the Islamic Centre Jabal An-
Nadheef: 
– Ayyoub Khamis, Director General; Amman, 10 April 2001 
 
International Non-Governmental Organisations 
CARE International: 
– Johan Ramon, Country Representative, Jordan Office; 
Amman, 19 February 2001 
Credit Housing Foundation: 
– Rafael Jabba, Country Director, Jordan Office; Amman, 
21 February 2001 
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Médecins du Monde: 
– Dr. Catherine Giboin, Resident Country Representative, 
Amman Office,; Amman, 22 February 2001 
Near East Foundation: 
– Hajem Halaseh, Country Director, Amman Office, Near 
East Foundation; Amman, 29 May 2000, 30 October 2000 
and 26 February 2001 
– Qasem M. Deiri, Programme Officer, Amman Office; 
Amman, 31 May 2000 
– Majdi Q. Al Qorom, Programme Manager, Amman Of-
fice; Amman, 30 October 2000, 19 February 2001 and  
26 February 2001 
Transparency International:  
– Arwa Hassan, Press and Public Relations Officer; Amman, 
25 May 2000 
 
International and Non-German Bi-lateral Develop-
ment Co-operation 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF): 
– Muna M. Idris, Assistant Project Officer, Monitoring and 
Evaluation, Jordan Country Office; Amman, 24 May 2000 
and 20 February 2001 
– Dr. Maha Shadid, Assistant Project Officer, Jordan Coun-
try Office; Amman, 20 February 2001 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP): 
– Dr. Abla Amawi, Senior Programme Officer, Human 
Development, Poverty and Gender Division, Jordan Coun-
try Office; Amman, 25 February 2001 
– Lattouf, Hala, Senior Programme Officer, Human Devel-
opment, Poverty and Gender Division, Jordan Country Of-
fice; Amman, 30 May 2000 
– Tania E. Jordan, Programme Assistant, Poverty, Human 
Development, Poverty and Gender Division, Jordan Coun-
try Office; Amman, 30 May 2000 
– Mohammed Hussain A. Bakir, Ph. D., Consultant; Am-
man, 22 May 2000 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA): 
– Thomas W. Kramer, Field Administration Officer, Jordan 
Field Office; Amman, 29 May 2000 
– Fouad Shawa, Chief of Field, Relieff and Social Services 
Programme; Amman, 22 February 2001 
– Maha Rantisi Abdulhamid, Deputy Chief of Field, Relieff 
and Social Services Programme; Amman, 22 February 
2001 
– Mousa Bassir, Deputy Chief of Field, Health Services 
Programme; Amman, 26 February 2001 
The World Bank: 
– Daniel Gerber, Consultant; Amman, 21 February 2001 
European Commission (EC): 
– Cristiana Famea, Third Secretary, Delegation of the Euro-
pean Union in Jordan; Amman, 28 February 2001 
– Nadia Mahmud, Macroeconomic and Trade Expert, Meda 
Team Jordan, Technical Assistance to the European 
Commission in Jordan, Delegation of the European Union 
in Jordan; Amman, 26 April 2001 
Regional Economic Development Working Group 
(REDWG), Monitoring Committee Secretariat: 
– Dr. Andrä Gärber, Head of the Secretariate; Amman,  
20 May 2000 
Norwegian Embassy Amman: 
– Hilde Solbakken, Second Secretary; Amman, 18 May 
2000 
Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation (SDC): 
– Hiba Dajani, National Programme Officer, Technical 
Support Office; Amman, 18 February 2001 
UK Department for International Development (DFID): 
– Rana Saifi, Development Officer, British Embassy Am-
man; Amman, 29 May 2000 
United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID): 
– Toni Christiansen-Wagner, Mission Director; Amman,  
24 April 2001 
– Roy J. Grohs, Programme Officer and Economic Advisor, 
Amman Office; Amman, 24 April 2001 
– Stephen P. Wade, Programme Director; Amman,  
21 February 2001 
– James Whitaker, Component Leader; Amman, 31 October 
2000, 21 February 2001 and 18 April 2001 
– Terri Kristalsky, Deputy Component Leader; Amman,  
31 October 2000 
– Tanna S. Price, Marketing Specialist; Amman,  
21 February 2001 
 
German Development Co-operation 
German Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
– Stefan Schneider, First Counsellor, Division 310 (Near 
East); Berlin, 6 July 2000 
German Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment: 
– Ulrike Metzger, Regierungsdirektorin, Division 220 (Near 
East); Bonn, 30 May 2001 
Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany to the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: 
– Dr. Martin Schneller, Ambassador; Amman, 13 and 28 
March 2001 
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– Reiner Morell, Counsellor, Deputy Head of Mission; 
Amman, 28 March 2001 
– Martina Kramer; Amman, 16 May 2000 and 28 March 
2001 
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau: 
– Richard Avédikian, Director, Amman Office; Amman,  
20 February 2001 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit: 
– Burghard Kehr, Director, GTZ Office Amman; Amman, 
16 May 2000, 13 February 2001 and 15 March 2001 
– Dr. Dieter Katterman, Team Leader, Jordanian-German 
Project ‘Promotion of a National Information System; 
Amman, 24 February 2001 
– Rima Khalifeh, Secretary, GTZ Office Amman; Amman, 
28 May 2000 
Goethe-Institute Amman: 
– Dr. Wolfgang Ule, Director; Amman, 31 May 2000 
German Academic Exchange Service (Deutscher Aka-
demischer Austauschdienst): 
– Randolph Galla, Country Representative Jordan, Lecturer 
for German Language and Literature, Jordan University 
Amman; Amman, 20 May 2000 
Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation: 
– Evelyn Abu Ayyash, Assistant Director, Amman Office; 
Amman, 18 May 2000 
Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation: 
– Dr. Ulrich Vogt, Representative in Jordan and Lebanon; 
Amman, 24 May 2000 and 18 February 2001 
Heinrich-Böll-Foundation: 
– Kirsten Maas, Regional Director, Arab Middle East Of-
fice; Exchange of Letters, 23 May 2000 
Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation: 
– Olaf Köndgen, Resident Representative, Amman Office; 
Amman, 17 May 2000 
Independent Consultants: 
– Siegfried Holtkemper; Berlin, 8 August 2000 
– Martin Kaiser, Head of Mission, German Mission for the 
Evaluation of the German-Jordanian Development Co-
operation; Amman, 29 March 2001 
– Volker Bünning, Economist; Amman, 24 February 2001 
– Michael Dürr, Agricultural Economist, GFA-Gesellschaft 
für Agrarprojekte mbH; Amman, 21 May 2000 
– Liesl Münch, Socio-Economist; Amman, 19 May 2000 
and 30 October 2000 
 
 
 
Private Sector Companies and Institutions 
Ahli Microfinancing Co.: 
– Ghassan E. Abuyaghi, General Manager; Amman,  
20 February 2001 
– Yousef M. Kandah, Assistant General Manager; Amman, 
20 February 2001 
Amman Insurance Co.:  
– Samer Gh. Akroush, Life and Medical Manager; Amman, 
14 April 2001 
Islamic International Arab Bank: 
– Mahdi M. Z. Kilani, Senior Finance and Investment Offi-
cer; Amman, 19 May 2000 
Jordan French Insurance Co. (JOFICO): 
– Waleed Wael Zurub, General Manager: Amman, 21 Feb-
ruary 2001 and 25 and 28 March 2001 
Jordan International Insurance Co. (JII): 
– Sami Gammoh, Chairman; Amman, 15 February 2001 
– Ramzi S. Shami, Deputy Director General; Amman,  
15 February 2001 
– Linda Karus, Life Insurance Department; Amman, 15 and 
19 February 2001 
Jordan Investment Trust P.L.C.: 
– Dr. M. Said Nabulsi, Chairman and CEO; Amman, 1 June 
2000 
Jordan Micro Credit Co. (JMCC): 
– Qais M. Al-Qatamin, Executive Director; Amman,  
14 February 2001 and 10 April 2001 
– Hussam H. Habibah, Assistant Operations Manager; Am-
man, 14 February 2001 
Micro Fund for Women: 
– Niveen Abbousji Sharaf, General Manager; Amman,  
22 February 2001 
Middle East Insurance Co.:  
– Rajai K. Sweis, General Manager; Amman, 21 February 
2001 
Munich Re-Insurance Co.:  
– Dietrich, Volker, Country Representative for Egypt, Su-
dan, Yemen and Jordan, Gizah, 23 September 1999 
The National Ahlia Insurance Co.: 
– Dr. Khaled M. Abu-Goura, Ph. D., Deputy General Man-
ager; Amman, 21 February 2001 and 25 March 2001 
National Health Insurance Administrator (NatHealth): 
– Sameer Gammoh, General Manager; Amman, 21 February 
2001, 25 March 2001, 6 April 2001 and 26 April 2001 
– Saed Kawar, Marketing Manager; Amman, 25 March 2001 
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Academics and Journalists 
Al-Jazeera Channel  
– Yasser Abu Hilala, Correspondent; Amman, 11 April 2001 
Al Urdun al-Jadid Research Centre  
– Dr. Hany Hourani, Director; Amman, 24 May 2000 
Al Kutba Institute for Human Development 
– Dr. Josi Salem Pickartz, Clinical Psychologist; Amman,  
23 May 2000 
Arab Archives Institute: 
– Basem Sakijha; Amman, 30 May 2000 
– Sa‘eda Kilani; Amman, 30 May 2000 
Cairo University 
– Dr. Hanaa Kheir el-Din, Professor; Amman, 28 October 
2000 
Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le Moyen Orient 
Contemporain, Amman Branch  
– Dr. Hana’ Jaber, Scientific Secretary; Amman, 19 April 
2001 
– Jean-Pierre Cassarino, Scientific Secretary (until 2000),; 
Amman, 23 May 2000 
Centre for Modern Oriental Studies Berlin  
– Katja Hermann; Amman, 11 April 2001 
FAFO Institute for Applied Social Science  
– Åge A. Tiltnes; Amman, 21 February 2001 
Free University of Berlin 
– Oliver Wils, Institute of Political Science; Amman,  
11 April 2001 
The Jordan Times  
– Dr. Francesca Ciriaci, Staff Reporter; Amman, 22 May 
2000 
Partnerships for Health Reform, Abt Associates  
– Dwayne Banks, Ph. D., Senior Health Economist; Amman, 
26 February 2001 
Umar-al-Mukhtar-Schools  
– Dr. Hamdi Murad, Professor, Islamic Law; former Direc-
tor General of the Zakat-Fund; Amman, 17 April 2001  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Jordan  
– Dr. Moustafa Al-Hamarneh, Professor, Director, Jordan 
Centre for Strategic Research; Amman, 25 October 2000 
and 19 February 2001 
– Dr. Atheel Jomred, Professor, Faculty of Economy; Jordan 
Centre for Strategic Research; Amman, 25 October 2000 
and 19 February 2001 
– Dr. Nasim Barham, Professor, Economic Geography, 
Faculty of Human & Social Research; Amman, 1 June 
2000 and 11 March 2001 
– Dr. Sari Nasser, Professor, Faculty of Sociology; Hayy 
Nazal Community Centre; Amman, 28 May 2000  
and 25 February 2001 
– Dr. Musa Shteiwi, Professor, Faculty of Sociology: Direc-
tor, Jordan Centre for Social Research; Amman, 24 May 
2000 and 25 October 2000 
University of Bonn  
– Dr. Renate Dieterich, Senior Researcher, Institute for 
Oriental Studies,; Amman, 7 April 2001 
University of Mainz  
– Dr. Alaa Al-Hamarneh, Assistant Professor, Faculty  
of Geography; Mainz, 23 October 2000 and Bonn,  
12 - 14 December 2001 
University of Minnesota  
– Dr. Ragui Assaad, Professor, Faculty of Economy; Am-
man, 28 October 2000 
University of Tübingen  
– Oliver Schlumberger, Assistant Professor, Institute of 
Political Science; Amman, 27 October 2000 
University of Yarmouk 
– Dr. Yaser M. Adwan, Professor, Faculty of Economy; 
until 2000 Director General of the Social Security Corpo-
ration; Amman, 21 May 2000 
Non-affiliated: 
– Dr. T. Fakhri Al-Smairat, Vice-President, Civil Health 
Insurance Programme, Ministry of Health; Amman,  
20 February 2001 and 04 April 2001 
– Dr. Hidaya Khairi, Public Society for Urban Housing and 
Works; Amman, 22 February 2001, 21 March 2001 and  
18 April 2001  
– Michael J. McCord, MicroSave Africa; Amman, 28 March 
2001 
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Annex A 
The GDI Household Survey: Methodology 
and Statistical Analysis  
The results of the present study are largely based on 
the findings of a field survey conducted by a team 
from the German Development Institute (GDI) in 
five weeks in the months of March and April 2001 
in selected quarters of East Amman. The survey 
covered 139 households and aimed at (i) assessing 
the needs of the urban poor and near-poor for addi-
tional social protection and (ii) measuring their po-
tential demand for micro-insurance. 
Annex A is intended to present  
— the immediate results of the GDI household sur-
vey in more detail than in the main text of the 
study, 
— the methodology used for the empirical research 
and  
— the manner in which raw data were processed 
and households were categorised. 
Sample Choice 
The initial decision to focus the empirical research 
on East Amman was taken for two reasons: First, 
the majority of the Jordanian urban poor live in 
Amman.237 Second, East Amman’s quarters differ 
markedly from one another with respect to their 
economic and social characteristics: The population 
of Amman is composed by migrants from all parts 
of Jordan (and Palestine), who often settle in spe-
cific quarters, grouped by their towns of origin. This 
makes it easy to mix households of different origins 
and with different habits within a survey sample 
composed of households from different quarters of 
Amman only.  
                                                     
237  Khayri / Nasir (1995) estimate that 66 % of the Jordanian 
poor are living in Amman, cf. Khairy / Nasir (1995), p. 8. 
After several experts238 were consulted, the quarters 
were selected according to four criteria: 
— The research was to cover a wide range of quar-
ters with respect to the economic and social situ-
ation of their inhabitants. 
— The research was to encompass a variety of 
quarters extending between city centre and out-
skirts. 
— The research was to include at least one Palestin-
ian refugee camp. 
— The research was to have a certain geographical 
spread (North, South, East and the centre of 
Amman). 
Based on these criteria, nine quarters were selected 
(see Figure A1). Within each quarter, the GDI team 
carried out interviews with members of different 
households. The main criteria for selecting house-
holds to be interviewed in the quarters were the 
greatest possible variety of households interviewed 
with respect to economic well-being, employment 
status of the main provider, location of the house-
hold within the quarter (centre, edge), reputation 
among other households and geographic origin of 
the family.  
To select households matching these criteria, the 
GDI team co-operated with local NGOs well rooted 
in the social structure of the quarters. All NGOs had 
                                                     
238 Dr. Alaa Al-Hamarneh, University of Mainz, 13 December 
2001; Dr. Moustafa Al-Hamarneh, Center for Strategic 
Research, University of Jordan, 19 February 2001;  
Dr. Hidaya Khairi, Public Society for Urban Housing and 
Works, 22 February 2001; Mr. Hajem Halaseh and  
Mr. Majdi Al-Qorom, Near East Foundation, 19 February 
2001; Dr. Arafat Al Tamemi, The General Union of Vol-
untary Societies, 24 February 2001; Mr. Awni Quandour, 
Noor al-Hussein Foundation, 25 February 2001; Dr. Nasim 
Barham, University of Jordan, 1 June 2000; Dr. Ghaith 
Fariz, Social Productivity Programme Unit, 21 February 
2001; Mr. Randolph Galla, German Academic Exchange 
Service, 20 May 2000;. Mr Nawaf Kalaldeh, Social Security 
Corporation, 28 February 2001; Mrs. Terri Kristalsky, The 
AMIR Programme, 31 October 2000; Dr. Sari Nasser, Uni-
versity of Jordan, 25 February 2001; Mr. Mahmoud Salem 
Nawawi, Community Based Social Rehabilitation Pro-
gramme, 25 October 2000; Dr. Josi Salem Pickartz, Al-
Kutba Institute for Human Development, 23 May 2000; Dr. 
Hussein Shakhatreh, Jordan Department of Statistics, 15 
February 2001; Dr. Musa Shteiwi, Jordan Centre for Social 
Research, 25 October 2000. 
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Figure A1: Location of Quarters Covered in Amman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A1: Location of Interviews 
location of interview Quarters number of  
interviews house shop centre 
Al-Amir al-Hassan 21 21 0 0 
Al-Joffe 24 24 0 0 
Al-Marka 4 3 1 0 
An-Nuzha 20 14 6 0 
Hayy Nazzal 24 5 0 19 
Jabal al-Hussein 5 0 4 1 
Jabal an-Nadhif 13 10 3 0 
Mukhayyam al-Hussein 15 15 0 0 
Wihdat 13 4 9 0 
Sum 139 96 23 20 
In % 100 69 17 14 
Wihdat 
Al-Amir
al-Hassan 
Al-Marka  
ash-Shimaliyya 
Jabal an-Nadhif
Hayy Nazzal 
Al-Joffe 
Jabal al-Hussein
Mukhayyam al-Hussein
An-Nuzha
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previous experience with qualitative and quantita-
tive research and enjoy a good reputation among 
international and Jordanian NGOs as well as among 
academic social research experts. Most of the con-
tacts to the local grass-roots NGOs were established 
with the assistance of the Near East Foundation, 
which has by far the longest experience in qualita-
tive household research in Jordan. 
The local NGOs supported the GDI team’s research 
in composing a sample of households to be inter-
viewed in accordance with the above-mentioned 
criteria, informing these households on the GDI 
team’s proposed visit and introducing the GDI team 
to the households. Moreover, these NGOs substan-
tially contributed to the GDI team’s research by 
providing the necessary framework information on 
the quarters and the interviewed households and 
their background as well as by commenting on and 
analysing the information given by the households. 
Depending on the local organisation, the interviews 
were carried out inside the house or in a shop or 
community centre. Table A1 lists the number of 
households interviewed within each quarter with 
reference to the locations at which the interviews 
were conducted. 
From each household, one member was interviewed 
by one or two members of the GDI research team, 
an interpreter and a social worker from the local 
NGO. Table A2 shows that the interviews were 
carried out with household members with different 
positions within their household: males and females, 
household heads, their wives and their adult chil-
dren; old and young; Jordanians and Palestinians. 
Methodology 
The household interviews were based on a semi-
structured questionnaire, though they were also 
open to additional questions. The questions were 
not always posed in the same order, and much time 
was left for households to give additional and unex-
pected information, explanations and examples from 
their lives. The questionnaire (see end of Annex A) 
focused on six major issues: 
— current household economic and social situation 
as determined by means test (questions 1 and 
12), self-categorisation / subjective poverty 
(question 3), monthly household spending (ques-
tions 9 - 11) and monthly household income and 
fluctuations in income (question 8); 
— risks that have occurred in the past and the cop-
ing strategies chosen by the household to man-
age these risks (questions 3 - 4); 
— current household state of social protection, vul-
nerability to risks and satisfaction with existing 
social protection instruments available to them 
(questions 5 - 7, 18 - 23 and 25 - 26);  
— the ability and willingness of the urban poor and 
near-poor to participate in micro-insurance 
(questions 8 - 12 and 24a) and  
— their wishes for improvements in their own so-
cial protection and preferences with respect to 
the design of possible micro-insurance schemes 
(questions 13 - 17, 24 and 24b - 24d).  
During the interviews, notes were taken to record 
the answers given by the interviewed. The research 
team sought to note down the replies in the most 
comprehensive possible form as well as to ensure 
that they were reporting in the form of ‘life stories’. 
This was done to avoid any loss of information. 
Only in a second step was the information gathered 
clustered in relevant dimensions and categorised. 
These data were processed in two different ways: 
The first followed a purely quantitative methodol-
ogy, the second was a more qualitative approach.  
In the following, some statistical findings are pre-
sented. They are the result of the quantitative proc-
essing of the data gathered. First, it will be ex-
plained how ‘poor’ and ‘near-poor households’ 
were defined and identified. Second, some results 
for each of the five issues listed above are dis-
cussed.  
It should be stressed that due to the small number of 
interviews and the way households were selected 
from within the quarters, the results cannot be con-
sidered representative. 
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Identification of the Urban Poor and Near-
Poor  
The focus group of this study is the urban poor and 
near-poor. For the purpose of this study, ‘the poor’ 
are defined as all individuals living below the abso-
lute poverty line, and all individuals that are not 
poor but face a high risk of becoming poor as a con-
sequence of the occurrence of risks are defined as 
‘near-poor’. 
To make use of the household data gathered for this 
study, first of all, poor and non-poor households 
from the sample had to be identified and isolated 
from the rest of the households. A multidimensional 
approach was chosen for this task, because informa-
tion on economic situation and, especially, on in-
come was not considered as sufficiently reliable. 
The questionnaire therefore not only contained 
questions on the income of the households, it also 
included questions aimed at cross-checking the 
plausibility of the answers on this topic: questions 
about income sources, subjective estimates of a 
household’s economic situation and expenditures. 
Furthermore, a means test was conducted.  
Households were classified as ‘poor’ or ‘non-poor’ 
households in accordance with three criteria: their 
Table A2: Gender, Age, Relationship to Household Head and Nationality of the Persons Interviewed  
 absolute number in % of interviews 
Gender of person interviewed   
Male 44 32 
Female 95 68 
Age of  person interviewed   
< 20 3 2 
20 - 29 14 11 
30 - 39 34 26 
40 - 49 27 21 
50 - 59 25 19 
> 59 28 21 
N/A 8 - 
Relationship of person interviewed to household head   
Husband / wife 59 42 
Identical 55 40 
Son / daughter 16 12 
Father / mother 6 4 
Brother / sister 3 2 
Nationality of person interviewed   
Jordanian 17 14 
Palestinian 101 83 
Other Arab 3 2 
Other 1 1 
N/A 17 - 
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income, their expenditure and a means test. For 
income and expenditures, we used a poverty line of 
JD 313,5 per year and per capita. This poverty line 
is taken from IBRD (1999) and is an updated ver-
sion of the official poverty line developed by Al-
Saquor for the year 1987. The means test focused on 
the furnishings of the households (refrigerator, col-
our TV set and furniture in the living room). This 
was intended to ensure the reliability of the data on 
income and expenditures. 
— Households were classified as ‘poor’ if their 
annual income per capita and annual expendi-
tures per capita were below the poverty line 
and if the household lacked at least one basic 
durable consumer good.  
— Households were classified as ‘probably poor’ 
if they met the above-stated income and expen-
diture criterion but did not lack the durable 
consumer goods. 
— Households with an annual income or annual 
expenditures above the national poverty line 
were classified as ‘non-poor’. 
— All households for which information on in-
come or expenditures was not available were 
not classified. 
Table A3 gives an overview of the number of 
households within the sample that were classified as 
‘poor’ and ‘non-poor’ on the basis of these criteria: 
Once poor and non-poor households had been dis-
tinguished, vulnerable and non-vulnerable non-poor 
households had to be identified. Vulnerability is 
usually referred to as the disability of households to 
deal with risks:  
 
“Vulnerability may be considered in terms 
of the resources and range of coping 
mechanisms available to an individual or 
household to protect against a shock or 
economic stress event ahead of time or to 
deal with it after it occurs.”239 
There is no widely accepted way to operationalise 
vulnerability, and it is beyond the scope of the pres-
ent study to develop a generally acceptable measure 
of vulnerability. Hence a pragmatic approach was 
chosen that is based on the consideration that the 
means used to cope with the negative effects of risks 
are the assets and entitlements that households can 
mobilise or manage in the face of hardship240: 
— The assessment of vulnerability to risks fo-
cused on the most important risks only: health 
risks, life-cycle risks (old-age, death of the 
main provider, work disability) and economic 
risks (employment and income insecurity). 
— Vulnerability was defined by criteria of exclu-
sion: Households were classified as ‘non-
vulnerable’ when they were found to have suf-
ficient protection from the three above-
mentioned groups of risks. All other house-
holds were classified as ‘vulnerable.’ To meas-
ure households’ degree of protection, three fac-
tors were taken into account: (i) their coverage 
by reliable formal social protection schemes 
(e.g. private and social insurance), (ii) the di-
versification of their income and (iii) their en-
dowment with real estate property which can be 
sold to cope with serious risks. Informal me-
                                                     
239 Sebstad / Cohen (2000), p. 33. Cf. also idem, pp. 4, 9 and 11. 
240  Cf. Sebstad / Cohen (2000), p. 11. 
Table A3: Poor and Non-poor Households 
 absolute number in % of valid data in % of interviews 
Poor 14 11 10 
Probably poor 31 25 22 
Non-poor 77 63 55 
Not classified 17 - 12 
Total 139 100 100 
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chanisms were not considered, because the de-
gree to which households are protected through 
these mechanisms proved to be too difficult to 
measure and because informal mechanisms are 
insufficiently reliable.  
— For each group of risks, four degrees of protec-
tion were developed: (i) comprehensive protec-
tion, (ii) good protection, (iii) insufficient pro-
tection and (iv) non-protection. Table A4 gives 
an overview of the criteria used to classify hou-
seholds by these categories. 
— The households were classified in two steps: In 
a first step, each household was categorised for 
each group of risks. In a second step, the over-
all degree of risk was defined. A decision was 
therefore a taken to group households into the 
lowest of all attained categories as regards their 
protection from each of the three groups of 
risks.241  
— For the purpose of this study, all households 
enjoying either overall comprehensive or over-
all good protection were considered ‘non-
vulnerable’.  
The definition of vulnerability categories and their 
aggregation to form an overall vulnerability index is 
not the most exact and comprehensive methodology. 
It does not claim to be the best or even the unique 
solution for this objective. However, within the 
framework of this study the rather simple and prag-
matic approach was considered to be satisfactory. 
                                                     
241  This measure tends to overestimate the vulnerability, since 
a better protection in other risk classes is not considered. 
However, in almost all cases, households were categorised 
in two neighbouring classes; therefore, distortions are limi-
ted.  
Table A4: Criteria for Measuring Vulnerability 
 comprehensive  
protection 
good protection some protection no protection 
Health risks entire household cov-
ered by CHIP, RMS, 
green-card, private 
health insurance or 
insurance provided by 
an employer 
some members cov-
ered by one of the 
insurance schemes  
or 
entire family eligible 
for UNRWA health 
services 
all other households because of the highly subsi-
dised health sector, no 
household was categorised 
as ‘not protected’ 
Life-cycle risks household head (main 
provider) covered by 
SSC, CIP, MPP or 
Professional Ass. 
not covered by any 
pension scheme, but 
own real estate that 
they do not use them-
selves for living 
not covered by any 
pension scheme, but 
own the house and the 
land they use them-
selves 
not covered by any pension 
scheme and do not own real 
estate 
Employment 
and income  
insecurity 
household head (main 
provider) a public 
employee  
or 
household head a 
pensioner 
household head (main 
provider) is formally 
employed (has a writ-
ten work contract) 
and income is diversi-
fied (at least three 
different sources of 
income) 
household head (main 
provider) is formally 
employed, but income 
is not diversified 
or 
household head has 
no formal employ-
ment, but diversified 
income 
household head (main pro-
vider) has no formal em-
ployment and income is not 
diversified 
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Table A5 shows the results of the classification of 
the sample households according to these criteria. 
Only 29 of 124 classifiable households (23 %) can 
be considered to be non-vulnerable. Most of them 
are headed by public employees and CPP or MPP 
pensioners. Private sector employees were only 
included as long as they (i) were covered by the 
SSC, (ii) had health insurance or were eligible for 
UNRWA health services and (iii) had diversified 
income sources. All other groups were classified as 
‘vulnerable.’ 
Poverty and vulnerability were found to be highly 
correlated: Of 29 non-vulnerable households, not 
one single household is poor. Only six households 
had been classified a ‘probably poor’ in a first 
step.242  
However, five of these six households had declared 
an income only slightly above the poverty line and 
had been found to be comparatively well endowed 
with assets in the means test. Thus these households 
                                                     
242  ‘Probably poor households’ were assumed to be poor on 
the basis of their declared income, while the means-test 
could not confirm this assumption. 
Table A6: Poor and Near-Poor Households 
 absolute number in % 
Non-vulnerable 28 22 
Vulnerable non-poor (near-poor) 55 44 
Probably poor 28 22 
Poor 14 11 
N/A 14 - 
Sum 139 100 
Table A5: Vulnerable and Non-vulnerable Households 
 comprehensive 
protection 
good  
protection 
some  
protection 
no  
protection 
N/A 
Health risks      
Absolute number 29 58 50 - 2 
In % of valid interviews 21 42 36 - - 
Old age, work disability,  
death of main provider 
     
Absolute number 55 9 19 47 9 
In % of valid interviews 42 7 15 36 - 
Employment and income  
insecurity 
     
Absolute number 33 6 28 66 6 
In % of valid interviews 25 5 21 50 - 
Vulnerability index      
Absolute number 11 18 26 69 15 
In % of valid interviews 9 15 21 56 - 
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were removed from the group of the ‘probably 
poor.’ Five households were classified as ‘non-
vulnerable’ in this second step and only the remain-
ing ‘special case’ was not able to be classified.  
Table A6 presents an overview of the composition 
of the sample according to the above-mentioned 
categories. Of a total of 125 classified house-
holds243, 28 are non-vulnerable, while 97 are (in one 
way or another) representative of this study’s target 
group: 42 were classified as ‘poor’ or ‘probably 
poor’ and 55 are near-poor households as defined by 
this study: not poor but vulnerable to risks.  
The Socio-economic Profile of the GDI 
Sample 
The interview’s questions concerning the social and 
economic situation of its households not only served 
the purpose of categorising households. They also 
aimed at providing insight into the socio-economic 
situation of the quarters covered by the survey and 
                                                     
243  21 Households could not be categorised due to missing 
data. 
providing the research team with some information 
on the vulnerability of the sample households. 
(Apart from that, these questions, posed at the be-
ginning of each interview, served for a ‘warm-up’ 
between the interviewed and the interviewers.) 
Tables A7 to A18 present the results of this assess-
ment. They show that the GDI household survey 
covered different households with respect to a num-
ber of social and economic characteristics.  
Moreover, to the extent that data were available, the 
tables compare the GDI sample’s profile with the 
profiles of other, more representative surveys. They 
show that, in many respects, the GDI survey mirrors 
comparatively well the national socio-economic 
situation, if one takes the small sample size of only 
139 households into account. 
Table A7 makes evident that the age structure com-
position of the GDI sample is very much in line 
with the structure of the Jordanian population as 
reported by the Jordan Department of Statistics: The 
average size of the interviewed households was 
6.98. The majority of households (56 %) consists of 
five to eight members. However, a significant share 
(19 %) have 10 or more family members. 
Table A7: Number of Household Members 
GDI household survey DOS (1995) Number 
absolute number in % of interviews in % of households 
1 1 1 4 
2 8 6 8 
3 9 7 9 
4 9 7 12 
5 16 12 13 
6 25 18 13 
7 17 12 11 
8 20 14 8 
9 7 5 7 
10 9 7 6 
> 10 17 12 9 
N/A 1 - - 
Average  6,98 -  
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Table A8: Number of Children, Old-aged, Disabled and Working Household Members 
 absolute number in % of classified interviews 
Children under 16 (average: 3.10)   
0 20 16 
1 22 17 
2 15 12 
3 25 19 
4 16 12 
5 13 9 
6 7 5 
7 4 3 
8 3 2 
> 8 4 3 
N/A 10 --- 
Old-aged / aged 60+ (average: 0.51)   
0 95 68 
1 26 19 
2 18 13 
Disabled (average: 0.16)   
0 125 90 
1 11 8 
2 2 1 
> 2 1 1 
Working (average: 1.55)   
0 17 13 
1 63 48 
2 30 23 
3 11 8 
4 9 7 
6 2 2 
N/A 7 --- 
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Large households are also characterised by high 
dependency ratios (here defined as the ratio of non-
working members to all households members). High 
dependency ratios were, in most cases244, traced 
back to a high number of children, while the number 
                                                     
244  This finding is in accordance with representative data. Cf. 
Hanssen-Bauer / Pedersen / Tiltnes (1998), p. 54. 
of disabled and old-aged family members within the 
household are of only minor importance (see Table 
A8). Another factor contributing to the high level of 
dependency ratios is the low share of working 
women. In the sample, only 30 of 201 working 
households members (15 %) were females. 
High dependency ratios were found to be correlated 
with poverty. As Table A9 demonstrates, almost  
 
Table A10: Poverty and Disabled Household Members 
 disabled household 
member 
in % of classified 
households 
no disabled household 
members 
in % of classified  
households 
Poor  2  14  12  11 
Probably poor  7  50  24  22 
Non-poor  5  36  72  67 
Not classified  0  -  17  - 
Sum  14  100  125  100 
Table A9: Poverty and Dependency Ratio 
 dependency  
ratio  
> 0.75 
in % of classified house-
holds with a dependency 
ratio 
> 0.75 
dependency 
ratio 
 < 0.75 
in % of classified 
households with 
a dependency 
ratio 
 < 0.75 
N/A 
Poor  10  12  3  8  1 
Probably poor  25  32  3  8  3 
Non-poor  45  56  31  84  1 
Not classified  9  -  5  -  3 
Sum  89  100  42  100  8 
Table A11: Poverty and Old-aged Household Members 
 Old-aged household 
member (60+) 
In % No old-aged house-
hold member 
In % 
Poor  4  10  10  12 
Probably poor  11  28  20  24 
Non-poor  25  63  52  63 
Not classified  4  -  13  - 
Sum  44  100  95  100 
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Table A12: Gender, Marital Status and Age of Household Heads 
GDI household survey CCA reporta  
absolute number in % of interviews in % of households 
Gender of household head    
Male  116  83  93 
Female  23  17  7 
Marital status of household head    
Never married  4  3  2 
Married  113  81  92 
Widowed  19  14  5 
Divorced  0  0  <1 
Abandoned  3  2  <1 
Age of household head    
< 20  0  0 
20 - 29  3  3 
 8 
30 - 39  24  24  25 
40 - 49  16  16  27 
50 - 59  19  19  23 
> 59  38  38  18 
N/A  39  -  - 
a  Source: CCA report: as quoted by Bakir (2001), annex, p. 3 - 4. 
Table A13: Poverty and Gender of Household Head 
 male-headed 
households 
in % of classified 
male-headed house-
holds 
female-headed house-
holds 
in % of classified 
female-headed 
households 
Poor  8  8  6  27 
Probably poor  25  26  6  27 
Non-poor  67  66  10  45 
Not classified  16  -  1  - 
Sum  116  100  23  100 
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half of the interviewed households with a depend-
ency ratio of 0.75 or more were classified as ‘poor’ 
or ‘probably poor,’ while only 16 % of the house-
holds with a dependency ratio were below 0.75. 
Representative data confirm the finding that a high 
dependency ratio is an important poverty factor.245 
The GDI survey also revealed a correlation between 
poverty and disability: 64 % of the households that 
had at least one disabled family member living in 
the household were classified as ‘poor’ or ‘probably 
poor,’ against 33 % of the households without dis-
abled members (see Table A10). 
No significant correlation was found between old 
age and poverty. As Table A11 shows, households 
with at least one member aged 60 or more were not 
more likely to be poor than other households. 
The interviewed households differed not only with 
respect to their composition but also with respect to 
gender of households heads. Table A12 provides an 
overview of some basic characteristics of the heads 
of the interviewed households. It makes evident that 
the composition of the GDI sample as to household 
                                                     
245  Cf. Hanssen-Bauer / Pedersen / Tiltnes (1998). 
head characteristics is very similar to the composi-
tion of the overall Jordanian population as indicated 
by a UNDP report.246 Of 139 GDI sample house-
holds, 118 (83 %) were headed by males and only 
23 households by females, the latter being widows 
in most cases. 
The GDI survey revealed a clear tendency for fe-
male-headed households to be poorer than male-
headed households: Table A13 shows that 54 % of 
the interviewed female-headed households were 
classified ‘poor’ or ‘probably poor,’ while this ap-
plies for only 34 % of the male-headed households.  
The interviewed households differ with respect not 
only to social but also economic characteristics (Ta-
ble A14). The sample covered households with their 
head employed (32 %), self-employed (27 %), un-
employed (4 %), not actively looking for an em-
ployment (14 %) or even employers The inter-
viewed households differ with (1 %). Interestingly, 
no significant correlation was found between the 
employment status and the probability of being poor 
or probably poor: in the sample, employees were 
                                                     
246  Cf. Bakir (2001). 
Table A14: Employment Status of Household Heads 
GDI household survey CCA reporta World Bankb  
absolute  
number 
in % of  
interviews 
in % of house-
hold heads 
in % of house-
hold heads 
Employed  44  32 
- Work contract  32 80 (of employed)
- No work contract  8 20 (of employed)
- N/A  4  - 
Daily labourer  5  4 
44 59 
Self-employed  37  27  14  7 
Employer  1  1  5  5 
Retired  26  19  25  11 
Unemployed  6  4  < 1  6 
Not actively looking for employment  20  14  12  12 
a: Source: CCA report: as quoted by Bakir (2001), annex, pp. 4 - 5; own calculations. 
b: Source: World Bank report: IBRD (1999), based on data of the DOS from 1997; own calculations. 
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almost as likely to be poor or probably poor as the 
self-employed. 
However, the share of informal employment within 
the GDI sample seems to be somewhat above the 
national average. This divergence can be traced 
back to the survey’s focusing on low-income urban 
quarters: The share of employers and formal sector 
employees is much higher in Amman’s high-income 
western quarters, but also in rural areas. 
Most of the interviewed households rely on only 
one or two different kinds of income (see Table 
A15): Only 33 households (25 %) had three or more 
income sources. Income from labour was by far the 
most important income source: 81 % of the inter-
viewed households received income from labour. 
Furthermore, the households mentioned pensions 
(23 %), family assistance (23 %) and social assis-
tance (17 %) as important income sources. 
As to income levels, the GDI survey covered house-
holds from almost all levels (see Table A16). The 
lowest income per month reported by the house-
holds was JD 50, while the highest was no less than 
JD 1,500. Most households (51 %) had a monthly 
income between JD 100 and 300. The average in-
come of about JD 260 was close to official data. 
Similarly, per-capita income varied from less than 
JD 10 to more than JD 200 per month, the average 
being JD 43.19. The majority of households (55 %) 
reported per-capita income between JD 20 and 50. 
However, in 40 % of the households monthly in-
come was not stable but subject to fluctuations. In 
most cases the fluctuations were due to self-
employment or day labour. Furthermore, some 
households (9 %) reported the amount of family 
assistance as differing from month to month.  
Questions about monthly expenditures were aimed 
at cross-checking the information about the income 
situation of the households. As Table A18 shows, the 
households mentioned higher per capita expenditures 
than per capita income. However, in general differ- 
 
Table A15: Number and Nature of Income-Source 
 GDI household survey FAFO reporta 
 absolute number in % of interviews in % of all Jor- 
danian households 
Income sources (average: 2.01)   
1 47 35 
2 56 41 
3 20 15 
4 12 9 
5 1 1 
N/A 3 - 
Kinds of income sources    
Labour income  
(wage or self-employment income) 
112 81 78 
Pension 23 17 15 
Family assistance 23 17 15 
Social assistance 19 14 5 
Others (e.g. rent) 6 4 9 
a Source: Hanssen-Bauer / Pedersen / Tiltnes (1998) 
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Table A16: Income, Income per Capita and Fluctuation of Income 
GDI household survey DOS (1995) Income per household  
in JD / month  
(average: 260.32) 
number in % of  
valid interviews 
in % of households
< 50  2  2 2 
50 - 100  18   17 5 
100 - 200  27   25 25 
200 - 300  28   26 25 
300 - 400  10   9 
400 - 500  10   9 
25 
> 500  12   11 17 
N/A  32   0 0 
Income per household member  
in JD / month  
(average: 43.19) 
absolute number in % of  
valid interviews 
 
< 25 38 36  
25 - 50 41 38  
50 - 100 16 15  
>100 12 11  
N/A 32 -  
Fluctuation of monthly income and deci-
sive factor for income level 
absolute number in % of  
valid interviews 
 
No fluctuation 78 60  
Fluctuation;  
by most important factor(s): 
53 40  
- self-employment 39 74  
- day labour 9 17  
- support from relatives, friends or 
neighbours 
5 9  
- weather, harvest 3 6  
- employer’s business 2 4  
- working time/intensity 2 4  
- ability to work 1 2  
N/A 8 -  
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Table A17: Expenditure and Living Conditions of Households Covered 
GDI household survey CSS (1996a) Expenditures (in JD / month) 
(Average: 136.7) absolute number in % of interviews with 
data available 
in % of  
households 
< 50 1 1 2 
50 - 100 13 13 10 
100 - 200 34 33 44 
200 - 300 28 27 27 
300 - 400 12 12 
400 - 500 5 5 
> 500 11 11 
26 
N/A 35 - 0 
GDI household survey Expenditures per household member 
in JD / month 
(Average: 45.1) 
absolute number in % of interviews with 
data available 
< 25 32 31  
25 - 50 46 44  
50 - 100 18 17  
> 100 8 8  
- N/A 35 -  
GDI household survey Number of persons per room 
(Average: 45.1) absolute number in % of interviews with 
data available 
DOS (1995) 
in % of  
households 
< 1 6 5 11 
1 - 2 32 29 41 
2 - 3 42 38 28 
3 - 4 17 15 12 
> 4 14 13 8 
N/A 28 --- --- 
GDI household survey Lack of basic household equipment 
absolute number or 
number with data 
available 
in % of interviews with 
data available 
DOS (1997) 
in % of urban 
households 
Television 3  / 121 2 6 
Refrigerator 7  / 110 6 12 
Heating 2  /   48 4 3 
Furniture 2  /   91 2 N/A 
Telephone 19  /   98 19 54 
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ences were not great. Tables A16 and A17 also show 
that the distribution of the GDI sample households as 
regards income and expenditure brackets respectively 
reflects quite well the national income and expendi-
ture profiles reported by the Jordan Department of 
Statistics and the Centre for Strategic Research. 
Risks and Risk-coping Strategies 
During the interviews households were asked about 
the occurrence of risks in their past life, their effects 
on the household’s well-being and the strategies 
households chose to cope with these risks. The aim 
of these questions was threefold: 
— The first aim was to investigate the relation 
between the occurrence of specific risks and 
changes in the social and economic situation of 
households. The coincidence of risk occurrence 
and a drop in well-being is an indicator for 
households being vulnerable to this risk as well 
as for this risk having considerable negative ef-
fects on the households. 
— The second aim was to analyse the degree of 
correlation between present absolute poverty 
and the occurrence of serious risks in the past as 
a means of assessing the importance of risks as 
poverty factors. 
— The third aim was to identify what kind of cop-
ing strategies households prefer in response to 
specific risks. 
Interviewed households reported a high variety of 
risks to have occurred in the past, the most impor-
tant being 
— life-cycle risks (e.g. death, work disability and 
old age of the main provider), 
— health risks, 
— economic risks linked to the country’s worsened 
macroeconomic situation (e.g. unemployment, 
business failure) and 
— a high dependency ratio. 
However, it turned out that only a few risks fre-
quently lead to significant declines in economic 
well-being (see Table A19): Mid- and long-term 
Table A18: Correlation between Poverty, Vulnerability and Nature of Employment 
Nature of employment poor probably 
poor 
near-poor non-
vulner-
able 
not  
classified 
total 
No household member employed 6 
(1.24) 
8 
(3.31) 
1 
(0.41) 
8 
(0.84) 
1 
(0.21) 
24 
(1.00) 
All employed are either without 
work contract or labour on a daily 
basis 
7 
(2.17) 
2 
(1.24) 
1 
(0.62) 
6 
(0.95) 
0 
(0.00) 
16 
(1.00) 
All employed are either self-
employed or without work contract 
or day workers 
6 
(0.93) 
1 
(0.31) 
5 
(1.55) 
20 
(1.58) 
0 
(0.00) 
32 
(1.00) 
At least one provider with formal 
employment 
5 
(0.44) 
3 
(0.52) 
7 
(1.22) 
15 
(0.67) 
27 
(2.35) 
57 
(1.00) 
N/A 4 
(1.99) 
0 
(0.00) 
0 
(0.00) 
6 
(0.00) 
0 
(0.00) 
10 
(0.00) 
Total 28 14 14 55 28 139 
NB: Figures in italics are concentration indices, where 1 stands for average ratio of employment group to total refer-
ence income / vulnerability sub-sample, while 2, e.g. stands for double average ratio. 
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risks, such as chronic illness, loss of employment, 
the death of the main provider and a high number of 
children, led much more often to a substantial drop 
in well-being than short-term risks such as an acute 
illness or a wedding celebration. Short-term risks 
are characterised by limited negative effects and are, 
therefore, much easier for households to manage.  
There is also strong evidence that present poverty is 
closely linked to the occurrence of risks in the past: 
First, poor and probably poor households were 
found to have been hit much more frequently by 
risks in the past. For all categories of risks, the fre-
quency of past risk occurrence among poor house-
holds is above average (see Table A19). Second, 
while all poor households reported at least one risk 
occurrence in the past that led to a significant de-
cline in well-being, the same applies for only 75% 
of the non-poor households. 
In response to risks households adopt a large variety 
of risk coping strategies (see Table A20). Most in-
terviewed households, however, reported having 
applied for support - from public institutions, from 
family or from private organisations. The term  
Table A19: Past Risks 
all interviewed households poor and probably poor house-
holds 
 
absolute  
number 
in % absolute  
number 
in % of inter-
views 
Life-cycle risks 52 37 29 63 
- Death of the main provider  19 14 11 24 
- Work disability of the main provider 17 12 10 22 
- Old age 7 5 3 7 
- Marriage of son 5 4 1 2 
- Abandonment 4 3 4 9 
Health risks 39 28 19 41 
- Chronic illness 26 19 12 26 
- Acute illness 13 9 7 15 
Economic risks 39 28 13 28 
- Loss of employment 22 16 6 13 
- Bankruptcy 12 9 6 13 
- Underemployment 5 4 1 2 
High dependency ratio 23 17 9 20 
- Increasing number of children 18 13 6 13 
- Increasing number of dependants 5 4 3 7 
Sudden and high expenditures 9 6 3 7 
- Funeral costs 5 4 3 7 
- Wedding costs 4 3 0 0 
Property risks 4 3 4 9 
- Loss of house 3 2 3 7 
- Property damage 1 1 1 2 
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‘support’ was understood in a rather broad sense 
and included recurrent cash grants as well as occa-
sional in-kind assistance. Therefore little can be said 
about the effectiveness of such support. 
Other frequently mentioned coping strategies are (1) 
looking for additional or better employment oppor-
tunities and (2) borrowing. For the latter, house-
holds have addressed mainly family members or 
friends and neighbours when in need for a loan (in- 
formal borrowing), whereas formal loans from pub-
lic institutions or from private banks were of only 
minor importance. This finding may partly be due to 
the often very small amount of money borrowed but  
Table A20: Coping Strategies 
 absolute number in % of number  
of reported  
coping strategies 
Ask for support 72 33 
- Apply for assistance at public institutions 30 14 
- Ask relatives for support (family assistance) 21 10 
- Apply for assistance at private institutions 16 7 
- Ask friends or neighbours for support 3 1 
- Apply for assistance at the Royal Court 1 0 
- Try to use wasţa 1 0 
Mobilise new / additional labour 54 25 
- New / additional job of household head 21 10 
- Children start to work or work more 14 6 
- Wife starts to work 12 5 
- Emigration of family member to work abroad 7 3 
Borrow 50 23 
- Borrow money from relatives 38 17 
- Borrow from friends / neighbours 9 4 
- Receive advanced salary payments / borrow from employer 1 0 
- Borrow from private lending institutions / banks 1 0 
- Borrow from public lending institutions 1 0 
Reduce or modify consumption 16 7 
- Reduce or postpone consumption expenditures 16 7 
Dis-save or draw from assets 18 8 
- Sell gold / jewellery 6 3 
- Dissolve cash-savings 5 2 
- Sell other assets (e.g. business) 6 3 
- Sell land 1 0 
Other strategies 7 3 
Classification as per Sebstad / Cohen (2000), p. 11. 
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may also be due to the limited accessibility of these 
institutions for low-income groups. Surprisingly, 
reduction of consumption was reported in only 16 
cases of risk occurrence. Probably in most cases the 
households reduced expenditures at least to some 
degree. However, this measure is often not uncon-
sciously registered by households and may therefore 
be mentioned less than other strategies. 
The coping strategy used by households depended 
on the particular kind of risk involved (see Table 
A21). For example, in case of chronic illness or 
death of the main provider households frequently 
asked for support from outside, whereas in cases of 
unemployment or business failure, households main-
ly looked for new employment opportunities. Un-
fortunately, due to a small number of cases, sig-
nificant patterns could not be observed for all risks. 
Table A21: Coping Strategies in Response to the Occurrence of Risks in the Past 
Coping strategies Risks 
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Chronic illness 6 5 1 3 2 2 3 4 3 2 3 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Loss of employment 2 2 11 0 2 2 2 0 2 1 2 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Work-disability 6 5 0 3 0 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Death of the main provider 6 5 0 2 1 5 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bankruptcy 1 4 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Acute illness 2 1 1 2 2 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Increasing number of children 2 1 1 1 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wedding costs 3 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Loss of house 2 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Old age 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Underemployment 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Abandonment 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Funeral costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Increasing no. of dependants 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Marriage of son 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Property damage 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Current Degree of Social Protection 
To assess and understand the need of the poor and 
near-poor in Jordan for improvements in the field of 
social protection, some interview questions ad-
dressed their current coverage by and satisfaction 
with operating schemes of social protection: 
The GDI survey’s results indicate areas of weakness 
in the coverage, organisation, administration and 
many other aspects of the current social protection 
network. No conclusions should be drawn, however, 
from these results as to the nation-wide coverage, or 
outreach, of the operating protection systems: The 
survey is in no way representative. Still, many re-
sults are confirmed by representative surveys.  
To name an example, only 55 household heads 
(41 %) from the GDI survey sample were found to 
be eligible for pensions (or to receive a pension at 
the time of the interview) and no more than 21 % of 
the interviewed households reported that all mem-
bers were covered by health insurance. Nation-wide 
surveys confirm that the Jordanian social insurance 
schemes suffer from very low coverage rates, even 
though the concrete figures differ substantially. 
Table A22 shows that the households heads of most 
of the interviewed households (59 %) are not eligi-
ble for an old-age, survivor or work-disability pen-
sion. Of the insured household heads, 53 % were 
found to be insured with the Social Security Corpo-
ration (SSC), 22 % with the Civil Pension Pro-
gramme (CPP) and 29 % with the Military Pension 
Programme. 
The health insurance coverage of the interviewed 
households was low as well (see Table A23). In 
60 % of the households, no member had any kind of 
health insurance (Civil Health Insurance, Royal 
Medical Services, green-card, employer’s or private 
health insurance), and in only 29 % of the house-
holds were all members health-insured.  
For poor households, the green-card issued by the 
Ministry of Health is of special relevance. It permits 
needy households to refer to MOH hospitals free of 
charge However, in only 11 households did all or 
some members have a green-card. 
In terms of coverage, UNRWA is still an important 
provider of health services. Almost half of the inter-
viewed households were found to be eligible for free 
medical treatment in UNRWA health care facili-
ties. However, only 29 % of the interviewed hou-
seholds reported claiming their right to do so. 
Decreasing numbers of services provided and lack of 
medicine was mentioned as the main reason for the 
low utilisation rate of UNRWA’s health services. 
Of the 139 interviewed households, 27 reported 
receiving social assistance from public or private 
organisations (19 %). Table A24 shows that 19 of 
the 27 beneficiary households had been classified as 
‘poor’ or ‘probably poor’; not one of these house-
holds was non-vulnerable. While the failure of inclu-
sion of Jordan’s social assistance schemes seems to 
be moderate (29 % non-needy among the beneficiar-
ies), the error of exclusion is substantial: No more 
than 50 % of the poor households and 43 % of those 
classified as ‘probably poor’ receive monthly cash 
benefits from official social assistance schemes. 
No less than 69 of the 139 interviewed households 
(50 %) reported having taken out a loan in the past 
(see Table A24). However, the majority of reporting 
households have borrowed from relatives (31), 
friends or neighbours (23) or from their employers 
(8). No more than 40 households (29 %) have ever 
applied for a formal sector credit. Despite the 
household survey’s focusing on low-income urban 
quarters, commercial banks are by far the most im-
portant providers of interest-bearing credits: 
21 households reported having or being in need of a 
bank credit, while the outreach of public social loan 
providers and micro-credit companies remains mar-
ginal. 
Households, however, have found a solution to cope 
with the difficulties in formal credit market access: 
Almost half of the households participate in Ğama-
ciyyāt as a strategy to cope with fluctuations in lev-
els of income and spending. Ğamaciyyāt are rotating 
savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), shared 
with neighbours or friends (67 %) or colleagues 
(22 %). Participants contribute between 5 and 50 JD 
per month to a joint fund which is in turn paid out to 
one of the members (see Table A25). 
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Similarly, a high number of households reported 
sharing in mutual insurance funds with their rela-
tives or with other families from the same town of 
origin (in Palestine in most cases). Such ‘family’ 
and ‘solidarity’ funds are also financed by monthly 
contributions, though these are considerably lower 
than for ROSCAs and range between 1 and 20 JD 
per month. The funds, however, accumulate the  
 
collected contributions and pay back only in certain 
predefined cases or when a member family is in 
need. 42 and 24 interviewed households respec-
tively reported to be member of family and solidar-
ity funds. Most funds cover funeral costs, expensive 
health treatments, social events like weddings or the 
education of children from needy families (see Ta-
ble A26). 
Table A22: Eligibility of Household Heads for Pensions 
 absolute number in % of valid interviews 
Not eligible  78  59 
Eligible  55  41 
- SSC  29  22 
- CPP  11  8 
- MPP  14  11 
- Professional association  2  2 
- Foreign country  1  1 
- Multiple eligibility  2  2 
N/A  6  - 
Table A23: Coverage by Health Insurance 
 whole 
household
in % of 
valid inter-
views 
some 
members 
in % of 
valid inter-
views 
no member in % of 
valid inter-
views 
No insurance 82 60 26 19 29 21 
Insurance 29 21 26 19 82 60 
- Civil Health Insurance Programme 10 7 9 7 118 86 
- Green-card 8 6 3 2 126 92 
- Royal Medical Services 7 5 12 9 118 86 
- Health insurance by employer 1 1 6 4 130 95 
- Private health insurance 2 1 1 1 134 98 
Free access to UNRWA facilities 67 49 4 3 66 48 
NB: Only 137 households were considered; for two households no data were available. 
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Table A24: Social Assistance, Mutual Support and Access to Credits 
 all  
house-
holds 
poor proba-
bly poor
near- 
poor 
non-
vulner-
able 
not  
classifi-
able 
Memo: total number of households in sample 139 14 28 55 28 14 
Receive any kind of recurrent assistance 52 8 18 17 6 3 
receive recurrent social assistance 27 7 12 6 0 2 
have ever applied for social assistance 42 10 16 10 3 3 
receive assistance from MOSD / NAF 13 4 7 2 0 0 
have ever applied for assistance from MOSD / NAF 26 8 11 5 1 1 
receive assistance from zakat committee 9 4 4 1 0 0 
have ever applied for zakat  14 7 5 1 0 1 
receive assistance from UNRWA 10 1 4 4 0 0 
have ever applied for assistance from UNRWA 12 2 4 5 0 1 
receive assistance from Royal Court 2 0 1 0 1 0 
have ever applied for assistance from Royal Court 4 0 1 0 2 1 
receive assistance from Islamic NGO 5 3 2 0 0 0 
have applied for assistance from Islamic NGO 8 5 2 1 0 0 
receive assistance from other NGO 7 0 5 2 0 0 
have ever applied for assistance from other NGO 7 0 5 2 0 0 
receive assistance from other organisation 4 0 2 2 0 0 
have ever applied for assistance elsewhere 4 0 2 2 0 0 
receive any kind of support from  
friends or neighbours 
35 8 10 12 5 0 
occasional or recurrent borrowing 23 5 4 10 4 0 
occasional or recurrent cash grants 10 4 3 3 0 0 
occasional or recurrent in-kind assistance 9 2 4 2 0 0 
receive any kind of support from relatives 71 4 18 28 14 7 
occasional or recurrent borrowing 31 0 5 16 6 4 
occasional or recurrent cash grants 50 4 15 20 8 3 
occasional or recurrent in-kind assistance 24 2 8 10 3 1 
provide any kind of support to  
friends or neighbours 
17 0 0 8 8 1 
provide any kind of support to relatives 37 2 4 16 10 5 
Have ever borrowed money from a friend, a relative, a 
bank, a credit organisation or any other source 
69 7 8 31 15 8 
Have ever borrowed money from a friend 23 5 4 10 4 0 
Have ever borrowed money from a relative 31 0 5 16 6 4 
Have ever borrowed money from their employer 8 0 0 1 5 2 
Have ever taken out a credit 36 2 4 13 11 6 
Have ever applied for credit 40 4 5 13 11 6 
Have ever taken out a loan from a bank 21 1 4 7 5 4 
Have ever applied for a loan from a bank 27 3 5 7 7 5 
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Table A25: Spread of ROSCAs 
Participation  absolute number of households in % of interviews  
with data available 
Households participating at present 57 42 
Households have ever participated 66 49 
Households have never participate 70 51 
Number of ROSCAs  shared  
at a time 
absolute number of households in % of interviews  
with data available 
0 79 58 
1 45 33 
2 4 3 
3 7 5 
> 3 1 1 
Spending on all ROSCAs 
in JD per month 
absolute number of households in % of participating households 
with data available 
< 5 5 9 
5 - 10 2 4 
10 - 20 14 26 
20 - 50 17 31 
> 50 15 28 
N/A 4 --- 
 
 (Table A24 continued) 
 all  
house-
holds 
poor probably 
poor 
near- 
poor 
non-
vulnera-
ble 
not  
classifia-
ble 
Memo: total number of households in sample 139 14 28 55 28 14 
Have ever taken out a loan from DEF   1 0 0 0 0 1 
Have ever applied for a loan from DEF   2 1 0 0 0 1 
Have ever taken out a loan from an NGO   5 1 0 1 1 1 
Have ever applied for a loan from an NGO   5 1 0 1 1 1 
Have ever taken a out loan from a micro-credit co.   2 0 0 1 1 0 
Have applied for a loan from a micro-credit co.   2 0 0 1 1 0 
Have ever taken out a loan from other institutions   6 0 0 4 2 0 
Have ever applied for a loan elsewhere   7 0 1 4 2 0 
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(Table A25 continued) 
Number of participants per ROSCA absolute number of households in % of participating households 
with data available 
< 10 1 2 
10 - 20 24 48 
>20 25 50 
N/A 7 --- 
ROSCA in most cases shared with... absolute number of households in % of participating households 
 ... relatives 8 14 
... neighbours or friends 37 65 
... colleagues 12 21 
Total benefit (in JD) paid out in turn absolute number of households in % of participating households 
with data available 
< 100 3 16 
100 - 200 6 32 
> 200 9 47 
N/A 39 --- 
Benefit in most cases used for... absolute number of households in % of participating households 
with data available 
(double counting  
possible) 
durable consumer goods, house, apart-
ment 
31 55 
paying bills or debts 10 18 
social events (weddings, feasts, ...) 8 14 
saving 7 13 
gifts and support of family 5 9 
business projects 5 9 
health treatment costs 4 7 
education 4 7 
Improving the Social Protection of the Urban Poor and Near-Poor in Jordan 141 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A26: Spread of Family and Other Funds 
 family funds other solidarity funds 
Participation  absolute  
number of 
households 
in % of inter-
views with data 
available 
absolute  
number of 
households 
in % of in-
terviews with 
data avail-
able 
Households participating at present 31 25 24 22 
Households not participating but interested 
in access to a fund 
11 9 0 0 
Fund used to exist 18 15 4 4 
No fund ever existed 62 51 82 75 
N/A 17 --- 29 --- 
Fund shared with  absolute  
number of 
households 
in % of house-
holds with access 
& with data 
available 
absolute  
number of 
households 
in % of 
households 
with access 
& with data 
available 
neighbours   4 14 
colleagues   3 11 
people from the same town of origin   21 75 
Monthly contributions      
< 5 22 69 11 92 
5 - 10 6 19 1 8 
10 - 20 4 13 0 0 
N/A 28 --- 16 --- 
Monthly contributions to be paid by...     
... household heads only 9 43 
... all males 7 33 
... all working males 2 10 
... all working household members 3 14 
N/A 39 --- 
no data available 
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Prospects of Micro-Insurance 
The last part of the interview was dedicated to mi-
cro-insurance. First, the idea of micro-insurance was 
introduced to the households by describing to them 
the example of the Self-Employed Women’s Asso-
ciation (SEWA) in India, which implemented a 
micro-insurance scheme covering illness, death of 
the main provider, work disability and property 
damage. After having explained the concept of mi-
cro-insurance, the households were asked for their 
opinion about micro-insurance, their willingness to 
participate in such a scheme, their ability to pay as 
well as about problems concerning the implementa-
tion of micro-insurance. Finally, they were asked 
about their preferences regarding the design of a 
micro-insurance scheme: what risks should be cov-
ered, what kinds of benefits should be provided and 
what agent they would trust (see guidelines of inter-
views with households and with possible agent 
institutions at the end of this annex). This part of the 
(Table A26 continued) 
 family funds other solidarity funds 
Benefits granted in cases of...  (double counting 
possible) 
 (double count-
ing possible) 
... funeral costs 37 74 13 52 
... assistance of poor member families 5 10 6 24 
... assistance of the work-disabled 2 4 1 4 
... assistance of widows and orphans 3 6 1 4 
... expensive health treatment 11 22 11 44 
... education of children  12 24 4 16 
... wedding, birth, other festivities 15 30 3 12 
... liability problems  9 18 4 16 
... loans for housing or business 8 19 2 8 
... bankruptcy 0 0 2 8 
... property damage (e.g. fire in house) 1 0 1 4 
No predefined cases 6 10 5 20 
N/A 4 --- 3 --- 
Table A27: Opinion of Poor and Near-Poor Households about Micro-Insurance 
 absolute number of households in % of poor and near-poor 
households with an opinion 
Very positive 11 13 
Positive 57 68 
Indifferent 7 8 
Negative 7 8 
Very negative 2 2 
N/A 13 - 
Sum 97 100 
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tutions at the end of this annex). This part of the 
questionnaire was the most open; for this reason a 
quantitative analysis of the information obtained is 
possible only in part. 
An overwhelming majority of the urban poor and 
near-poor households responded positively or even 
enthusiastically to the concept of micro-insurance, 
(see Table A27). Consequently, most of the house-
holds also expressed their willingness to participate 
in a possible scheme (see Table A28). However, 
when asked about the viability of micro-insurance in 
their surroundings, some households feared a lack 
of solidarity among the insured, noting that existing 
institutions might lack the capacities to act as micro-
insurance agents. Households were also asked about 
appropriate contribution levels. Most of the inter-
viewed households considered monthly contribu-
tions between JD 1 and JD 20 as the highest amount 
affordable for them (see Table A29). The level was 
found to be markedly correlated with income. Near-
poor households in Jordan are willing and able to 
pay for micro-insurance, the average maximum 
contribution being 8.25 JD per household and 
month. 
The Design of Micro-Insurance 
With respect to the risks to be insured, i.e. illness, 
death of the main provider, work disability and prop-
erty damage, the target group clearly favoured illness 
Table A28: Willingness of Poor and Near-Poor Households to Participate in Micro-Insurance 
 absolute number of households in % of valid interviews with poor and 
near-poor households 
Yes 65 81 
No 15 19 
N/A 17 - 
Sum 97 100 
Table A29: Preference of Households for Risks to be Insured 
 absolute number in % of poor and near-
poor households 
Risks mentioned to be covered:    
Illness 62 64 
Death of the main provider 48 49 
Work-disability 25 26 
Property damage 21 22 
Other(s) 65 67 
Most important risk to be covered:   
Illness 42 43 
Death of the main provider 18 19 
Work disability 6 6 
Property damage 2 2 
Other(s) 7 7 
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(see Table A30): 64 % of the poor and near-poor 
households preferred coverage for illness. Still, al-
most half of the interviewed would like to see the 
death of the main provider covered, while work dis-
ability and property damage were mentioned less 
frequently. 
The households were also asked for the risk to 
which they would assign the highest priority. Again, 
illness was mentioned in the first place (43 %), fol-
lowed by the death of the main provider (19 %).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The importance the focus group assigned to illness 
and, though to a smaller extent, the death of the 
main provider corresponded to risk occurrences in 
the past, since illness and the death of the main pro-
vider were the single risks most frequently reported 
by the households (see Table A19). Thus there is 
sufficient evidence that the coverage of both or of 
one of these risks would meet the needs of the urban 
poor and near-poor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A30: The Ability of the Poor and Near-Poor to Pay for Micro-Insurance 
Maximum affordable contribution 
(in JD per month and household) 
absolute number in % of valid interviews with poor 
and near-poor households 
Not able 8 12 
1-2 11 17 
2-5 21 32 
5-10 11 17 
10-20 9 14 
20-50 5 8 
N/A 32 - 
Sum 97 100 
Average contribution: 8.25 
Correlation between income and contribution: 0.50 
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Guideline for Household Interviews 
 
Questions Areas of Interest / additional questions Dimensions 
1. Means test  
(to be carried out 
during the  
interview) 
– Endowment of households with: 
– TV / colour TV 
– Refrigerator / defrost refrigerator 
– Telephone 
– Furniture / quality of furniture 
– Quality of building and roof 
– Number of rooms 
means-tested poverty 
1a. Household composition: 
– Number of household members 
– Number of children under 16 
– Number of old aged over 60 
– Number of working (men and women) 
– Number of work-disabled 
1b. The interviewed /  
1c. The household head 
– Gender 
– Age 
– Employment status 
– Profession 
– Working contract 
– Marital status 
– Education 
2. Apart from you: 
who is living in this 
house? 
 
Which persons in-
cludes your fam-
ily? 
1d. Other household members 
– Relation to interviewed 
– Gender 
– Employment status 
– Profession 
– Working contract 
– Marital status 
– Education 
Composition of  
household 
Causes / factors  
of current crisis  
(present risk group) 
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Questions Areas of Interest / additional questions Dimensions 
3. How would you describe the 
situation of your household? 
 Subjective poverty;  
Existing problems 
4. Were there times when you 
were in a different  
situation? 
 a. If yes: What happened at 
 that time? 
 b. Did you experience  
any other change of your 
situation? 
– Any change in economic well-being? 
– When? 
– Gradual or sudden change? 
– Identifiable factors of change? 
– Ranking of factors 
Occurrence of risks in 
the past 
– What did you do to manage the situation? 
– Did you receive any help in this situation? 
If yes: go to 4., 5. and 6. 
Preference for  
risk coping strategies 
in the past 
Coverage by  
transfer systems 
– How did your situation develop since that time? 
If other events: go back to 3 a. 
Success of coping 
strategies 
5. Have you ever (again) ap-
plied for social assistance? 
 a. If yes / if no: Why? 
 b. If yes:  
 What happened when you  
 aplied? 
 c. If other applications go 
 back to 4b 
– Successful access to assistance? 
– What happened? Did you receive it? 
– Opinion about application? 
– Provider of assistance (family, neighbours, 
government, NGOs...)? 
– Amount and kind of support? 
– Regular assistance? 
– Opinion about the support? 
– Expected kind of support? 
Effectiveness of social 
assistance,  
Quality of application 
procedures 
6. Have you ever (again) ap-
plied for credit?  
 a. Have you ever borrowed 
 money from friends or  
 neighbours? 
 b. If yes / if no: Why? 
 c. If yes:  
 What happened when you  
 applied for?  
 d. If other  
 applications: go back to 5 b. 
– Successful access to credit? 
– Opinion about application? 
– Provider of credit (family, neighbours, govern-
ment, banks, MFI, employer, NGOs...)? 
– Amount of credit? 
– For which purpose did you use the credit? 
– Opinion about the credit provider? 
– Expected kind of support? 
Effectiveness of  
credits 
Quality of application 
procedures 
Borrowing from  
relatives, friends, 
neighbours 
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Questions Areas of Interest / additional questions Dimensions 
7. Do you receive 
support from 
your family, 
neighbours or 
friends? 
 a. If yes:  
How does your 
family support 
you? 
 
– Within your family/ among your friends and neighbours, 
do you support one another? 
– From whom do you receive assistance (family, friends, 
neighbours)? 
– From abroad / Jordan? 
– Kind of support? 
– Amount of support? 
– Regularly / on occasions? 
– In which cases do you receive support? 
– Are you providing support? 
– To whom? 
 b. Optional:  
Do you support 
relatives, neigh-
bours or friends? 
– To whom (family, friends, neighbours) 
– Amount of support 
Out-reach of networks 
8. Does your income 
differ from month 
to month? 
(not spending!) 
9. Do you often  
have to postpone 
urgent expendi-
tures? Which 
ones? 
e.g. telephone, electricity, water bills 
10. How much do you 
spend on average 
per month? 
 
11. How much  
of this do you 
spend on food? 
 
12. Do you own a 
house or land? 
– Do you own your house / flat? 
– Is the land of house your own? 
– Do you own additional land in Jordan? 
– How did you buy it? (By credit?) 
Capability to pay  
for social protection 
13. Do you sometimes 
think about what 
might happen in 
the future? 
– Are you worried about financial crisis in the future? 
– Why? 
– What are you afraid of? 
– What do you fear most for the future? 
Future risks 
Awareness about risks  
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Questions Areas of Interest / additional questions Dimensions 
14. How do you hope 
your future could 
be? 
– What could mainly influence your present situation? 
– Are you afraid of financial shocks? 
15. What are you do-
ing to provide for 
the future? 
– Do you have savings for emergency cases? 
– What else are you doing? 
16. Is there anything 
you could do now 
to protect from fu-
ture risks? 
 
17. How would you 
like to care for the 
future? 
– Is there any kind of protection that you would like  
to have but that you cannot afford? 
– What kind of system would you like to exist for  
this purpose? 
Risk prevention efforts 
Wishes for future pro-
tection 
Ideas about ideal pro-
tection system 
18. What would  
happen, if the main 
provider was dis-
missed / lost her / 
his job? 
– Do you have entitlements to support? 
– From which institution? 
– Will any assistance be sufficient? 
– What else could you do? 
– Will you need further assistance? 
– Aware about risk? 
19. What happens, 
when the main 
provider is getting 
older? 
– Does the main provider receive a pension? 
– From which institution? 
– Will any assistance be sufficient? 
– What else could you do? 
– Will you need further assistance? 
– Aware about risk? 
20. What happens, 
if s.o. in the house-
hold  
needs an urgent 
but expensive sur-
gery? 
– What health system do you usually refer to? 
– Are you entitled to cheaper health treatment? 
– Where? At UNRWA, MOH hospitals or the RMS? 
– Do you have health insurance? 
– Does anyone in the household have a green card  
from the Ministry of Health? 
– Will any assistance be sufficient? 
– What else could you do? 
– Will you need further assistance? 
– Aware about risk? 
– Do you regularly go to the doctor’s? 
Current state of  
protection from  
- unemployment 
- health risks 
- life-cycle risks 
Preference for coping 
strategies in case of  
future risks 
Risk prevention efforts 
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Questions Areas of Interest / additional questions Dimensions 
21. Are you in  
regular medical 
treatment  
– Has anybody in the household ever needed an  
expensive medical treatment? 
Spread of health risks 
22. Do you share a 
ROSCA? 
 a. If yes: How does it 
work? 
– To how many ROSCAs do you contribute? 
– Size of contributions 
– For what purpose do you use the benefits? 
– Benefit mechanisms 
– Administration (organising person or institution) 
– Satisfaction / opinion 
Spread of ROSCAs 
23. Do you  
participate in a 
family fund or 
some other fund 
shared with your 
neighbours,  
colleagues or 
friends?  
– Size of contributions 
– Frequency of contributions 
– Case of benefit 
– Administration (organising person or institution) 
– Satisfaction / opinion 
Spread of family funds 
and other funds 
24. SEWA story; 
 
What do you think 
about a mutual 
fund like the 
SEWA-fund to op-
erate in your 
neighbourhood? 
– What do you think about the SEWA-fund in general? 
– Could you imagine to participate in such a fund? 
– What would you be afraid of? 
– Where do you see problems? 
Opinion about micro-
insurance; 
Concerns 
a. How much 
would you be 
ready to pay to 
such a fund? 
– Would you pay contributions? If yes: 
– How much would you contribute per month? 
– Would you contribute per person or for your family? 
Ability and willingness 
to pay for micro-
insurance 
b. Which risk 
would you like to 
be covered by this 
fund? 
– In which cases should the fund pay out a benefit for you? Preference for risks to 
be covered by micro-
insurance 
c. What kind of 
benefits do you ex-
pect to receive? 
– With a monthly / weekly contribution of ........ JD,  
what benefits do you expect in case of  
– the death of the main provider, 
– the work-disability of the main provider, 
– a property damage, 
– illness? 
– ... 
– What would you prefer: limited treatment costs covering 
all diseases or unlimited treatment costs covering only se-
lected diseases?  
Preferred Benefits  
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Questions Areas of Interest / additional questions Dimensions 
continued: 
c. What kind of 
benefits do you ex-
pect to receive? 
– What would you prefer: regular primary health care or rare 
cases of tertiary health care? 
– What would you prefer: public health care or private 
health care, but with a more limited range of services? 
– How much would you be ready to pay in order to ..... 
– have full insurance against 
– the death of main provider, 
– the work-disability of main provider, 
– a damage of property, 
– illness? 
– get reimbursed all costs for treatment in public hospi-
tals? 
– get reimbursed all treatment costs in the public health 
sector? 
– get reimbursed all costs for treatment in any hospi-
tal? 
– receive 2,500 JD in case of either the death or the 
work-disability of the main provider (before age 60)? 
[ready to pay 3 JD a month?] 
– get reimbursed all damage at the house from fire? 
continued: 
Preferred Benefits  
d. Which organisa-
tion would you 
trust to organise 
such a fund? 
– Who – do you think – could organise such a fund? 
– Would you trust local NGO, government institution, 
UNRWA, SSC, Noor al-Hussein-Foundation or Mukhtar? 
– Would you pay contributions to this organisation 
– Why? 
Potential actors 
25. Have you heard 
about private / 
commercial  
insurance  
companies? 
– Knowledge about insurance? 
– What have you heard of insurance companies? 
– Would you like to insure with private companies? 
– What do you think about life insurance? 
26. What do you think 
about the SSC? 
– What is your opinion about the SSC? 
– Would you like to insure with the SSC? 
Opinion about public 
and private insurance 
Opinion about life in-
surance 
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Guideline for Possible Agent Institution Interviews 
 
Criterion questions 
Confidence of target group 
in institution 
tested by household survey 
Out-reach of institution – How many clients does the institution have? 
– How many people are in regular contact with the institution? 
– How many additional households could the institution reach? 
– How many branch field offices / community centres does the institution have? 
How many organisations / committees are affiliated? 
Proximity of institution to 
target group  
– Does the institution have a decentralised structure? 
– How are the responsibilities shared between the head quarter (the apex institution) 
and the branches / affiliated organisations?  
– What is the institution’s main area of activities?  
Is it active in urban / rural areas?  
Could the institution imagine to extend its activities to urban areas? 
Commitment of institution 
to target group 
– What are the objectives of the institution? 
– Who defined these objectives? 
– Are the programmes aiming at reaching these objectives? 
– Who is the typical client of the institution’s programmes? 
– Whom does the institution address within the households?  
– Since when does the institution deal with its target group? 
– Has the structure of the group of clients undergone major changes in the past? 
Proficiency of institution’s 
staff 
– What are the institution’s criteria to select new staff members? 
– How are the salaries of staff members? 
– How are staff members trained for their job? 
– Does the institution suffer from a high fluctuation of staff members? 
– Would staff members be able to administer a micro-insurance programme? 
Experience of institution 
with financial products 
– Does the institution have experience with financial products? 
What kind of? 
– How are they financed? 
Are they sustainable? 
– Could micro-insurance products be linked to existing programmes? 
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Criterion questions 
Administrative capacity 
and performance of institu-
tion 
– What kind of programmes is the institution running now? 
– Which tasks does the institution have to fulfil in running these programmes? 
– Does the institution have experience with awareness campaigns? 
– Do the programmes regularly go through internal / external evaluations? 
– How do marketing and services (monitoring, enforcement, provision...) look like? 
– What are the strengths and weaknesses of the institution? 
– How will organisation look like in three years? 
– Does the institution feel capable of running micro-insurance? 
– What are the specific advantages of the institution in comparison with others?  
Organisational and finan-
cial stability of institution 
– Since when has the institution been existing / running its programmes? 
– Is the budget balanced? 
– Are the programmes sustainable? 
– How are the programmes financed? (external funding?) 
– What share of total spending is for administrative costs? 
Willingness of institution 
to participate in micro-
insurance and co-operate 
with commercial insur-
ance companies 
– Is the institution generally interested in broadening its activities? 
– Does it understand the concept of micro-insurance? 
– Is it interested in offering micro-insurance products? 
– Is it ready to deal with commercial partners (for-profit insurance companies)? 
– Are staff-members also willing to run a micro-insurance programme? 
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Annex B 
Tables and Statistics 
Tables B1 – B5: General Economic, Fiscal and Demographic Development 
Table B1: De-composition of GDP 
1990 – 1995 1995 – 1998 (share on GDP in %) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Private consumption 74 71 76 71 66 65 62 69 70 71 
Public consumption 25 25 23 23 24 23 24 26 27 26 
Gross saving 25 7 9 19 19 14 18 7 13 N/A 
% internal saving 1 3 2 6 10 12 14 5 3 3 
% external saving 24 4 7 13 9 2 4 2 10 N/A 
Consumption 99 97 99 94 90 88 86 95 97 97 
Gross investment 26 24 30 34 33 32 31 31 27 23 
% change in stocks 6 2 4 3 1 2 3 1 -0 1 
Current account balance -31 -23 -33 -31 -24 -21 -4 -3 0 0 
% trade balance -41 -35 -42 -42 -32 -29 -30 -37 -32 -28 
% tourism 5 1 3 5 4 4 4 6 6 6 
% other services 6 10 7 6 5 3 3 5 3 0 
% capital income -10 -7 -7 -6 -5 -4 -4 -5 -3 -2 
% remittances 11 9 14 17 17 17 17 22 21 18 
% public transfers 10 4 7 6 5 5 5 6 6 5 
Net factor income excluding 
remittances 
1 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Change in assets -25 -4 -7 -13 -9 -2 -4 -2 -10 -6 
% capital balance  -6 2 3 -3 -1 3 -3 -2 -4 -4 
% deficit financing  -19 -6 -10 -10 -7 -5 -1 0 -6 -2 
GDP at market prices  
(JD billion) 
2.67 2.86 3.49 3.80 4.20 4.65 4.56 4.71 4.95 5.18 
Source:  
1990 - 1995: IMF (1997), pp. 4 and 29; own calculations 
1995 - 2000: SSC (1998); own calculations 
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Table B2: Selected Monetary Indicators 1995-2000 
(%) 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Change in cost of living index  N/A N/A 6.5 3.0 3.1 0.6 
Change in wholesale price indexa 4.1 -2.4 2.0 1.6 0.7 N/A 
Exchange rate change (to US$) N/A N/A -1.2 0 0 0 
Exchange rate change (to EURO) N/A N/A 1.9 11.9 1.0 5.3 
Money growth (M2) N/A N/A 0.3 7.8 7.6 11.4 
Demand deposit interest rate 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.4 N/A 
Savings deposit interest rate 4.9 4.9 5.3 5.0 4.6 N/A 
Time deposit interest rate 7.1 7.7 8.5 9.2 8.3 N/A 
Overdraft interest rate 10.9 11.4 12.4 13.0 12.5 N/A 
Loans and advances interest rate 10.5 10.7 11.3 12.3 12.9 N/A 
Discounted bills interest rate 11.3 11.6 12.4 13.3 13.8 N/A 
Share price index weighted by market capitalisa-
tion for Amman Stock Exchangeb 
N/A 10.9 -3.6 10.2 0.5 -1.6 
Source:  
CBJ (1999), pp. 80, 81, 84, 94;  
aSSC (1998), p. 75;  
bSSC (1999), Table 7 
 
 
 
Table B3: Size of Economic Sectors 1997 
(%) share on GDP share on employees 
Agriculture 3.0 6.4 
Industry and mining 11.5 10.6 
Electricity and water 2.5 0.7 
Construction 4.6 7.0 
Transportation and communication 13.7 6.7 
Trade and tourism 10.0 15.1 
Finance 16.2 2.9 
Public administration and social services 20.8 50.6 
Source: EIU (1999) 
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Table B4: Central Government Budget 
(JD million) 1993 1995 1997 1999 
Total receipts 1404 1669 1651 1607 
Taxes 643 758 841 874 
% sales tax / value added tax 174 264 346 435 
% income and property taxes 119 152 157 153 
% customs duties 238 210 247 279 
Other revenues 548 693 585 706 
% fees 113 151 166 172 
% licenses 62 66 32 25 
% revenues from post and telecommunication 136 158 6 6 
% interest and profits 65 39 19 197 
Transfers from abroad 160 170 225 27 
Total spending 1466 1746 1763 1703 
Current expenditure 1182 1252 1446 1369 
% wages and salaries 247 313 356 313 
% interest payments 251 248 240 248 
% defence and security 321 390 431 390 
% subsidies 54 64 102 64 
% direct transfers 191 235 257 235 
Capital expenditure 254 334 327 334 
Balance deficit  62 77 113 84 
Net lending from internal sources 23 35 47 64 
Net lending from external sources 24 186 3 1 
Source: EIU (1999); for 1999: CBJ (1999), p. 103 (data given not completely compatible) 
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Table B5: Age Structure of the Jordanian Population 1999 
Age cohort (years of age) total urban rural 
0 - 4 13.6 % 13.2 % 14.8 % 
5 - 9 14.1 % 13.8 % 15.2 % 
10 - 14 12.8 % 12.6 % 13.7 % 
15 - 19 12.4 % 12.3 % 12.7 % 
20 - 24 10.2 % 10.2 % 10.1 % 
25 - 29 7.9 % 8.0 % 7.5 % 
30 - 34 6.6 % 6.7 % 6.4 % 
35 - 39 5.3 % 5.5 % 4.5 % 
40 - 44 3.8 % 3.9 % 3.5 % 
45 - 49 3.0 % 3.0 % 3.0 % 
50 - 54 2.8 % 2.9 % 2.4 % 
55 - 59 2.3 % 2.5 % 1.7 % 
60 - 64 2.0 % 2.2 % 1.5 % 
65++ 3.2 % 3.3 % 2.9 % 
Source: DOS (2000b), Table 1 / 1 
Tables B6 – B9: Poverty and Income Distribution 
Table B6: Poverty Indicators by Region and Urban / Rural 1998 
(urban / rural in %) Amman Zarqa 
& Ma-
fraq 
Balqa 
& Mad-
aba 
Irbid Jarash 
&  
Ajlun 
South 
Income less than 1450 JD per capita 23 / 41 27 / 31 31 / 47 25 / 26 30 / 27 17 / 32 
Reduction in income during last years 25 / 23 28 / 15 23 / 21 15 / 9 14 / 14 20 / 18 
No health facility nearby 25 / 48 25 / 48 42 / 56 37 / 40 60 / 63 38 / 45 
Children with low birth weight 7 / 13 9 / 14 9 / 21 8 / 16 11 / 18 15 / 20 
Stunted 11 / 17 14 / 27 14 / 22 10 / 13 15 / 20 15 / 24 
Drinking water problems 19 / 25 22 / 34 9 / 9 9 / 16 15 / 19 7 / 11 
More than 1 person per room 84 / 88 88 / 91 88 / 93 88 / 87 92 / 94 86 / 90 
Unemployed 16 / 17 21 / 14 21 / 19 16 / 15 20 / 16 14 / 15 
Household head outside labour force 27 / 21 24 / 21 26 / 20 27 / 27 26 / 27 18 / 27 
Household head has basic education or less 59 / 69 70 / 80 66 / 81 68 / 72 72 / 80 63 / 80 
Female headed household 10 / 10 12 / 6 11 / 7 12 / 14 13 / 11 10 / 11 
Females not in labour force 85 / 88 85 / 90 80 / 80 88 / 89 84 / 90 78 / 82 
Persons 17 - 23 (years of age) not enrolled 63 / 58 72 / 78 61 / 69 63 / 63 66 / 71 67 / 67 
Source: Shteiwi (1999b) 
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Table B7: The Extent of Poverty among Households According to Different Sources 
Source 1987 1991 / 92 1995 1997 
Subjective definition of poverty 
Hanssen-Bauer/ Pedersen/ Tiltnes (1998)   14.0%  
Absolute definition of poverty, national poverty lines 
MOSD (1993) as quoted in Shteiwi (1999b)a 18.7% 21.3%   
Bakir (1996) as quoted in Shteiwi (1999b)b  24.0%   
IBRD (1999d)c based on DOS surveys 3.0% 14.4%  11.7% 
DOS (1991) as quoted in IBRD (1994c)  19.8%   
Mrayyan / Kamal (1997) as quoted in IBRD (1999e)   21.0%  
Al-Khasawneh et al. (1998) as quoted in IBRD (1999e)f   26.0%  
Hanssen-Bauer / Pedersen / Tiltnes (1998)g   27.0%  
Bakir (2001)    23.0% 
Absolute definition of poverty, universal poverty lines 
Chen et al. (1993) as quoted in Tabatabai (1996)h  18.3%   
IBRD (1999c)j  23.5%   
IBRD (1999c)k  2.5%   
a      Household expenditure poverty line of 1068 JD per year in constant 1986 prices. Also quoted in Tabatabai 
(1996). 
b      Individual expenditure poverty line of JD 148 per year in constant 1986 prices  
(about JD 1068 per household and year in constant 1986 prices). 
c     Individual expenditure poverty line of JD 148 per year in constant 1986 prices  
(about JD 1068 per household and year in constant 1986 prices). 
f      Individual expenditure poverty line of JD 148 per year in constant 1986 prices  
(about JD 1068 per household and year in constant 1986 prices). 
g Household expenditure poverty line of JD 1450 per year in 1996 prices. 
h      Individual expenditure poverty line of PPP-US$ 1 per day in constant 1985 prices. 
j     Individual expenditure poverty line of PPP-US$ 2 per day in constant 1985 prices. 
k      Individual expenditure poverty line of PPP-US$ 1 per day in constant 1985 prices. 
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Table B8: Poverty Head Count Ratios by Governorates 1989 / 1993 
destitute absolute  
poverty ratio 
absolute  
poverty ratio 
(%) 
1989 1993 
regional 
distribution 
1993 1989 1993 
regional 
distribution  
1993 
Amman 1.1 4.7 29.0 14.5 16.2 31.0 
Zarqa 1.4 5.3 11.9 17.9 19.5 15.0 
Irbid 1.7 8.6 31.7 21.9 26.2 29.2 
Mafraq 4.8 9.8 5.3 28.5 29.5 5.4 
Balqa 1.9 9.4 7.9 28.6 27.2 8.1 
Karak 1.5 10.9 6.9 20.4 28.6 5.8 
Tawfileh 0.8 7.9 2.1 19.8 25.6 1.9 
Ma’an 2.5 7.3 4.2 19.6 23.5 3.4 
Jordan 1.5 6.6 100.0 18.7 21.3 100.0 
Source: Shteiwi (1999b) 
 
 
 
Table B9: Measures of Poverty and Income Distribution 
 Gini coeffi-
cient 
head-count 
index  
 
(%) 
poverty 
depth  
 
(%) 
poverty  
gap index 
 
(%) 
squared 
poverty gap 
index  
(%) 
number of 
poor  
 
(thousand) 
poverty  
gap  
(JD mil-
lion) 
1976 A 0.380 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1982 A 0.322 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1986 B 0.397 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1988 C 0.450 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1991 D 0.434 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1992 D 0.494 14.42 24.87 3.58 1.33 543.8 35.3 
1997 D 0.384 11.70 21.71 2.54 0.87 538.4 36.6 
Source:  
A: Haddad (1990), pp. 22ff. 
B: Ali Sha’ban (1990), pp. 66ff. 
C: Shteiwi (1999b) 
D: IBRD (1999e), pp. 7 - 9 
 
Improving the Social Protection of the Urban Poor and Near-Poor in Jordan 159 
Tables B10 – B12: The Labour Market 
 
Table B10: Unemployment and Labour Force Participation 1998 and 2000 
(%) CSS 
1996 
FAFO 
1998 
DOS 
2000 
Population 100.0 100.0 100.0     
% under 15 41.4 42.5 40.5     
% over 15 58.5 57.5 59.5 100.0    
% out of labour force 35.7 32.1 36.2 60.9    
% student 12.0  11.2 18.9    
% house keeping  20.0 33.7    
% wealthy 
14.9 
 2.5 4.2    
% work disabled 1.4  1.4 2.4    
% other 5.0  1.0 1.7    
 
% given up looking for em-
ployment  
2.4  2.2 3.8   8.9 
% in labour force 22.8 25.4 23.3 39.1 100.0  91.1 
% unemployed 5.1 4.3 3.3 5.6 14.4  13.1 
% employed 17.8 21.1 19.9 33.5 85.6 100.0 78.0 
% part-time employed  3.9 7.6 12.8 32.7 38.2  
0 - 14 h per week   1.3 2.2 5.6 6.6   
15 - 36 h per week   6.3 10.6 27.0 31.6  
% full-time employed  14.8 12.3 20.7 52.9 61.8  
37 - 50 h per week   6.3 10.6 27.1 31.7   
More than 50 h   6.0 10.1 25.8 30.1  
% looking for additional 
employment 
  2.5 4.3  12.7 9.9 
Insufficient earnings   1.7 2.9  8.6 6.7 
Does not meet educational 
qualifications 
  0.1 0.2  0.5 0.4 
Short hours   0.0 0.0  0.1 0.0 
 
Other   0.0 1.1  3.3 2.6 
 
 
% not looking for additional 
employment 
  17.4 29.2  87.3 68.0 
% in labour force or outside as 
invisible unemployed 
  25.5 42.9   100.0 
% full-time   17.4 29.2   68.0 
 
 
 
% unemployed or underem-
ployed 
  8.2 13.7   32.0 
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Table B10 continued (Unemployment and Labour Force Participation 1998 and 2000) 
N B: 54% of the employed have no formal working contract. 
 11% of households have only one (female) family-head. 
Source:  1996: CSS (1996a), pp. 36, 44 and 79; own calculations 
 1998: Hanssen-Bauer / Pedersen / Tiltnes (1998), pp. 228ff. 
 2000: DOS (2000b), Tables 1/1, 2/5, 3/1, 8/1, 8/3; own calculations 
 
 
 
 
Table B11: Labour Market Development 1993-1999 
 working age 
population 
15-64 years 
(thousands) 
size of la-
bour force 
 
(thousands) 
number of 
employed 
 
(thousands) 
number of 
unemployed
 
(thousands) 
labour force 
participation 
rate  
(%) 
un-
employment  
rate 
(%) 
total 
dependency 
rate 
(%) 
1987 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 14.9 N/A 
1993 2192 958 770 188 42.4 19.6 4.2 
1994 2295 977 823 151 41.3 15.8 4.0 
1995 2261 963 833 130 41.4 15.3 4.0 
1996 2344 N/A N/A N/A N/A 12.1 N/A 
1997 2665 N/A N/A N/A N/A 14.4 N/A 
1998 2736 1179 1058 121 41.8 10.3 3.5 
1999 2803 1176 993 183 39.2 15.6 3.9 
Source: DOS (1999), pp. 5, 39 and 40; SSC (1998), p. 82; own calculations 
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Table B12: Labour Force Participation, Unemployment and Education 
in labour-force  total 
sub-total employed unemployed 
outside la-
bour force 
By education level 
Illiterate 100.0 % 11.3 % 9.7 % 1.6 % 60.9 % 
Less than secondary 100.0 % 36.4 % 30.6 % 5.8 % 63.6 % 
Secondary 100.0 % 35.4 % 30.9 % 4.5 % 64.6 % 
Intermediate diploma 100.0 % 61.8 % 52.8 % 8.9 % 38.2 % 
Bachelor or above 100.0 % 80.0 % 70.9 % 9.2 % 20.0 % 
By gender 
Male 100 % 72 % 61 % 11 % 28 % 
Female 100 % 15 % 11 % 4 % 85 % 
By region 
Amman 100 % 44 % N/A N/A 56 % 
Zarqa / Mafraq 100 % 45 % N/A N/A 55 % 
Balqa / Madaba 100 % 47 % N/A N/A 53 % 
Irbid 100 % 41 % N/A N/A 59 % 
Jarash / Ajlun 100 % 42 % N/A N/A 58 % 
South 100 % 48 % N/A N/A 52 % 
Total 100.0 % 39.1 % 33.5 % 5.6 % 60.9 % 
Source: DOS (2000b), Table 2 / 5; own calculations 
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Tables B13 – B14: Social Protection Spending 
Table B13: Share of Public Social Spending on Total Government Spending 
(%) 1980 1990 1993 1996 1999 
Subsidies 14.2 7.2 3.8 5.7 3.7 
Government and military pensions N/A 6.8 9.9 10.6 10.0 
Social Security Corporation 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Social assistance 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.4 0.5 
Other transfers 2.8 3.6 2.5 2.3 2.4 
Health (MOH only) 3.9 4.6 5.8 5.5 5.6 
Health (RMS only) 2.9 2.3 2.0 N/A N/A 
Health (JUH only) 1.0 1.2 1.5 N/A N/A 
Education 17.8 16.2 N/A 16.5 N/A 
Source: DOS (1999), p. 177; IBRD (1986), p. 42; IMF (1995), p. 112  
 
 
Table B14: Weight of Jordan’s Social Protection Systems as a Share of GDP Spending 
 inter-temporal 
re-distribution 
inter-personal 
re-distribution 
inter-regional 
re-distribution 
Solidarity networksa::  ... transfers: 0.6 % remittances: 1.5 %
Co-operative  
associationsb: 
mutual insur-
ance: 
... ROSCAs:     N/A  
NGOsc: social credits: 0.1 % social welfare 
and health: 0.1 %
social welfare 
and health: 0.1 %
UNRWAd:  ...  social welfare:  
health: 
0.2 %
0.2 %
Statee social insurance: 
– SSC  
(contributions)
– CPP and 
MPP 
(contributions 
and subsidy) 
3.9 %
4.6 %
social assistance: 
subsidies: 
health: 
1.5 %
0.1 %
2.8 %
 
Marketf saving: 
credits: 
insurance: 
      N/A
~ 13.0 %
1.1 %
  
Source: 
a IBRD (1999d), pp. 33 - 34; 
c Brandsma / Chaouali (2000), p. 21; Hermann (2000), pp. 61 and 109. 
d UN (1999); S. 47; own calculation 
e CPP (1999); MOF (2001); SSC (1999); Shteiwi (1999b); own calculation 
f  Banks et al. (2000) 
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Tables B15 – B16: The Health Sector 
Table B15: Health Sector Components 1998 / 1999 
a) Spending 
Item source MOH RMS JUH UNRWA private total 
E 106.8 48.8 11.3 7.5 198.8 375.0 
(7.5%/ 
GDP) 
Spending (Mio. JD) 
F 150.7 70.0 27.9 7.5 183.5 454.0 
(9.1%/ 
GDP) 
Share of spending 
- for curative care 
 
F 
 
51 % 
 
63 % 
 
91 % 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
58 % 
- for primary care F 34 % 21 % 0 % N/A N/A 27 % 
- administration F 2 % 11 % 9 % N/A N/A 5 % 
- for training F 2 % 5 % 0 % N/A N/A 3 % 
Share of spending 
- for salaries 
 
F 
 
47 % 
 
36 % 
 
42 % 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
- drugs & supplies F 24 % 35 % 38 % N/A N/A N/A 
- food & cleaning F 5 % 6 % 2 % N/A N/A N/A 
- treatment F 7 % 6 % 3 % N/A N/A N/A 
- training F 1 % 2 % 0 % N/A N/A N/A 
- maintenance F 7 % 5 % 2 % N/A N/A N/A 
- equipment F 2 % 4 % 3 % N/A N/A N/A 
- construction F 6 % 4 % 4 % N/A N/A N/A 
- other F 2 % 2 % 4 % N/A N/A N/A 
b) Financing 
A 80% gov’t; 
6% CIP; 
14% fees 
85% gov’t; 
9% MIP 
6% fees 
60% gov’t; 
40% fees 
Foreign 
donors 
20% pri-
vate insur-
ance pri-
mes; 
80% fees 
62% hh 
(14% prime;
48% fees) 
36% gov’t; 
2% donors 
B N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 42% hh; 
39% gov’t; 
19% pri-
mes 
Sources of financing 
F 68% gov’t; 
16% CIP 
primes; 
16% do-
nors 
 
80% gov’t; 
11% fees; 
3% firms; 
1% donors 
73% gov’t 
11% firms; 
12% hh; 
4% donors 
100% 
donor 
78% fees; 
20% firms; 
2% gov’t; 
43% hh; 
42% gov’t; 
8% firmsh; 
7% donors;
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Table B15  continued (Health Sector Components 1998 / 1999) 
c) Beneficiaries 
Item source MOH RMS JUH UNRWA private total 
Population groups 
treated for free 
E blood 
donors, 
uninsured 
poor & 
disabled 
(6%/ users)
public 
employees 
& their 
dependants 
(48% of 
users) 
members 
of armed 
forces and 
their de-
pendants 
students, 
university 
employees 
registered 
Palestine 
refugees 
(1.5 mil-
lion) 
private 
insured 
(higher 
middle and 
upper class 
private 
sector 
employed) 
 
F 21 % 33 % 1 % 18 % 8 % 68 % 
C 23 % 25 % 1 % 5 % 5 % 55 % 
B 23 % 35 % 1 % 9 % 12 % 80 % 
Share of total population 
treated for free 
A 27 % 24 %  21 % 6 % 78 % 
A 21 % 24 % 1 % 18 % 5 % 68 % % insured 
G      50 % 
(without 
UNRWA) 
% other A 6 %   3 % 1 % 10 % 
Average annual pre-
mium of insured 
G ca. JD 40 JD 9 – 18 N/A 0 JD 650 
(full cov-
erage) 
JD 90 
(limited 
coverage) 
N/A 
Population groups 
treated for pay 
F patients 
able to pay 
fees, but 
highly 
subsidised 
primary & 
curative 
care (46% 
of users) 
referrals 
from MOH 
and JUH 
referrals 
from MOH 
and RMS 
none 
 
patients 
willing to 
pay fees 
referrals 
from MOH 
& 
UNRWA 
 
Share of population 
treated for pay 
A 6 % - - - 14 % 22 % 
% 1 – 3 JD/ consultation 4 % - - - 6 % 12 % 
% 4 – 5 JD/ consultation 1 % - - - 4 % 5 % 
% over 5 JD/ consultation 1 % - - - 4 % 5 % 
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Table B15 continued (Health Sector Components 1998 / 1999) 
d) Quality 
Item source MOH RMS JUH UNRWA private total 
Preference of users for 
providers 
F 52.8 % 2.7 % 39.0 % 100 % 
% insured F 70.4 % 1.7 % 27.3 % 100 % 
% non-insured F 37.8 % 4.0 % 53.5 % 100 % 
% less than 900 JD j F 60.5 % 4.5 % 30.5 % 100 % 
% 1450-1800 JD j F 62.6 % 2.8 % 32.5 % 100 % 
% 2900 - 3600 JD j F 54.5 % 0.7 % 44.0 % 100 % 
% over 3600 JD j F 60.3 % 0.7 % 37.5 % 100 % 
Number of hospitals E/F 23 10 1 0 50 84 
E 3207 1787 506 0 2535 8035 Number of hospital beds 
F 3192 1828 494 0 2852 8366 
Share of beds F 38 % 22 % 6 % - 34 % 100 % 
E 68.5 % 68.9 % 70.0 % - 52.1 % 63.3 % Occupancy rate  
F 69.7 % 69.9 % 67.0 % - 45.0 % 60.1 % 
E 3.5 4.4 4.8 (4.0)d 2.7 3.5 Average length of stay 
(days) F 3.3 4.6 5.0 - 2.6 3.4 
Share of admissions F 43 % 19 % 4 % - 34 % 100 % 
Number of admissions  F 234504 102711 22376 - 180271 539862 
Public cost per admis-
sion (JD) 
F 373 510 1141 - 0 460 
Death rate F 1.2 % 2.2 % 2.4 % - 0.8 % 1.3 % 
Clinics F 223 5 0 0 N/A N/A 
E 1050 81 0 23 0 1154 Health stations & cen-
tres F 1180 81 0 23 0 1284 
Physicians E 32% 12% 4 % N/A 52 % 100% 
Dentists E N/A N/A N/A N/A 77 % 100% 
Nurses E 40% 18% 7 % N/A 41 % 100% 
Pharmacies E 8% N/A 92 % 1470 
h public firms: Potash Co.; Jordan Refinery Oil and Petroleum Co.; Jordan Phosphate Co.; Royal  Jor-
danian Airlines; Central Bank of Jordan. Some firms have in-house facilities, most have contractual 
 agreements with JUH or/ and RMS. 
j annual household income 
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Table B15 continued (Health Sector Components 1998 / 1999) 
Sources:  
A (1998):  Banks / Milburn / Sabri (1999), p. xi 
B (1994):  IBRD (1995), p. 17 
C (1996):  Hanssen-Bauer/ Pedersen/ Tiltnes (1998), pp. 189ff. 
D (1998):  UN (1999), p. 44. In-patient treatment through other providers only, financed through reimburse-
ment. 
E (1998):  Hijazi / Al-Ma’aitah (2000), pp. 105ff. 
F (1999):  Brosk et al. (2000) 
G (1996): CSS (1996b), pp. 110 - 115 
 
Table B16: Average Pay per Consultation for Non-insured Households by Income 1999 
Annual household income Average Pay per Consultation 
up to JD 1450 JD 1451-2900 over JD 2900 total 
Free 18% 12% 5% 12% 
JD 1 - 10  55% 59% 52% 55% 
More than JD 10 27% 29% 44% 33% 
Average 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Share on total group of non-insured 32% 40% 28% 100% 
Source: Banks/ Milburn/ Sabri (1999), p. xii 
Tables B17 – B22: Social Insurance 
Table B17: The Three Social Insurance Schemes in Jordan 1997 
 Social Security 
Corporation 
Civil Insurance 
Program 
Military Insur-
ance Pro-
gramme 
Judicial base law 30.1978 law 104.1965 N/A 
Covered population group public and 
private sector 
employees 
(firms with 5 
or more 
employees 
active and retired 
civil servants & 
their 
dependants 
armed forces 
public security 
intelligence 
service 
Number of covered employees 410137a 127019 (2000) N/A 
Number of contributors 336021 112560 (2000) N/A 
Coverage (share of insured on total population): 26.4% pensions: 8.8 % 
health: 19.6 % 
ca. 23% 
Coverage (share of contributors on labour force) 30.4% pensions: 10.2 % 
health: ca. 20 % 
ca. 30 % 
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Table B17 continued (The Three Social Insurance Schemes in Jordan 1997) 
 Social Security 
Corporation 
Civil Insurance 
Program 
Military Insur-
ance Pro-
gramme 
Covered risks old-age, survi-
vor & dis-
ablement pen-
sions; 
occupational 
injuries and 
diseases 
old-age, survivor 
& disablement 
pensions; 
occupational 
injuries and dis-
eases 
Health care 
old-age, survi-
vor & disable-
ment pensions; 
occupational 
injuries and 
diseases 
Health care 
Contribution rate  
(employee’s share) 
5.0 % pensions: 8.75 % 
of “basic salary” 
(in average 40% 
of total salary) 
health.: 3.00 %  
of “basic salary” 
(max. 30 JD 
p.m.) 
pensions: 8.75 
% of “basic 
salary” (in av-
erage 40% of 
total salary) 
health: 1.5 JD 
p.m. 
Contribution rate  
(employer’s share) 
10.0 % state covers rest 
(80% of total 
costs) 
state covers rest
Average total contribution of employee  
(JD per annum) 
32.4 11.6 (pensions) N/A 
Average taxable income (JD per annum) 216.0 N/A N/A 
Average number of contributing years  ~ 22 years ~ 17 years 
Number of old-age pensioners 18947 28192 (2000) 90054 (2000) 
Total number of pensioners 39759 42148 (2000) 149476 (2000) 
Technical dependency ratio  
a) Old-age pensioners/ contributors 
b) Pensioners/ contributors 
 
5.64 % 
11.83 % 
 
25.05 % 
37.44 % 
N/A 
Total spending for benefits (JD million) N/A 71.1 (2000) 184.7 (2000) 
Average annual old-age pension (JD) 1000 2232 (2000) 1787.5 (2000) 
Average of all pensions per annum (JD) N/A 1686 (2000) 1236.0 (2000) 
Ratio of average old-age pension to average contribu-
tion 
30.86 % 192.41 % N/A 
Ratio of total benefits paid to total collected contribu-
tions 
45.4 % 206.5 % N/A 
Source: SSC (1998), pp. 83, 89, 112, 125; DOS (1999), p. 28; Dr. Umar Umari, Civil Insurance  Pro-
gramme, Ministry of Health, 26 February 2001 
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Table B18: Coverage of Population by Social Security Corporation by Age Group 1999 
non-Jordanian Jordanian (%) 
female male female male 
< 25 17.0 15.5 20.9 20.2 
25 - 29 21.4 27.7 30.9 21.4 
30 - 34 17.0 22.2 21.7 16.8 
35 - 39 15.2 13.4 12.2 13.4 
40 - 44 12.8 8.8 7.1 10.2 
45 - 49 9.6 6.4 4.0 7.2 
50 - 54 5.5 3.8 2.9 5.8 
55 - 59 1.5 2.3 0.3 5.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: DOS (1999), p. 156 
 
 
 
Table B19: Social Insurance Indicators 1995 – Comparison with Other World Regions 
(%) coverage:  
 
ratio of contributors 
to total labour-force 
technical depend-
ency ratio:  
ratio of pensioners to 
contributors 
old-age pension 
coverage:  
ratio of old-age 
pensioners to popu-
lation aged 60 and 
more 
demographic de-
pendency ratio: 
ratio of population 
aged 60 and more to 
working age popu-
lation 
OECD 93.9 39.2 84.1 34.0 
Latin-America 38.3 21.0 30.8 18.0 
Asia 23.5 11.4 22.3 13.5 
Africa 6.4 8.5 24.0 12.5 
MENA 41.3 27.5 57.5 13.5 
Egypt ca. 45.0 37.7 34.3 14.4 
Jordan 26.1 11.8 9.5 12.0a 
Source: 
Jordan: SSC (1998), p. 83; aDOS (2000b), Table 1 / 1; own calculations 
Egypt, MENA and other regions: IBRD (1997a), vol. III, p. 52 
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Table B20: Balance of Jordan’s Social Security Corporation 
(JD thousands)    1997      1998     1999 
Contributions + 118919 + 126577 + 142624 
% for pension insurance component 105185 111979 126387 
% for work-injury insurance component 12883 13698 15392 
% transfers from other insurance schemes 850 900 844 
Return on investment  + 74758 + 49063 + 90194 
Benefits - 50179 - 57496 - 66565 
% work injury benefits 13779 16136 18226 
% old age pensions 18957 23444 29680 
% survivor pensions (natural death) 4445 4625 5243 
% survivor pensions (work injury) 867 2795 3041 
% medical treatment of work-injuries 863 982 1169 
% sick leave pay (work injury) 483 545 575 
% lump-sum compensations  8185 7919 7568 
% other 888 1050 1063 
General and administrative expenses - 6037 - 6367 - 7341 
% wages & SSC contributions 4567 4810 4563 
Adjustments - 1310 - 17123 - 23383 
Net surplus 136107 109554 151811 
Plus provisions + 7269 + 33569 + 11051 
Plus advances from government + 7271 + 49835 + 58014 
Gross surplus 150647 192959 220876 
Gross investment 150647 192959 220876 
% Deposits at banks 92213 130027 158877 
% Government bonds  30000 41931 3200 
% Equity shares 29564 15503 43912 
% Investment in real estate 251 120 2086 
% Loans 42009 0 0 
% Other investment 14915 5370 12801 
Benefit/ contribution ratio 42.2% 45.4% 46.7% 
Benefit/ contribution ratio (only pensions) 43.1% 46.5% 48.0% 
Benefit/ contribution ratio (work injuries) 17.2% 31.6% 31.1% 
Cost/ contribution ratio 47.3% 50.5% 51.8% 
Surplus/ income 70.3% 62.4% 65.2% 
Expenditure/ GDP 1.01% 1.11% 1.26% 
Reserves/ GDP 20.0% 21.9% 24.0% 
Source: SSC (1998), pp. 112 ff.; SSC (1999), Table 9 and appendix; own calculation 
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Table B21: Balance of the Social Security Corporation – International Comparison for 1996 
Region expenses 
(% of GDP) 
income  
(% of GDP) 
surplus 
(% of GDP) 
surplus  
(% of income) 
OECD 9.2 9.1 -0.1 -1.1 
Latin-America 2.0 2.4 0.4 16.7 
Eastern Europe 8.0 7.9 -0.1 -1.3 
Africa 0.5 0.7 0.2 28.6 
Asia 1.9 5.2 3.3 63.5 
MENA 2.8 4.4 1.6 36.4 
Egypt 2.5 7.7 5.2 67.5 
Jordan 1.4 3.9 2.5 64.1 
Source:  
Jordan: SSC (1998), p. 112; own calculation 
Other countries: IBRD (1997a), vol. III, p. 52 
 
 
Table B22: Assets of the Social Security Corporation 
(JD million) 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Cash on hand and at banks 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.9 5.5 11.2 
Deposits at banks and other financial 
institutions 
336.2 385.6 446.8 476.1 599.5 751.4 
Development and corporate bonds 33.6 38.9 39.4 32.7 74.6 64.8 
Equity securities 
% not listed on Amman Stock Exchange 
92.5 117.0 134.5 161.2 
18.3 
148.4 
22.2 
205.4 
Loans 
% to government 
140.0 150.4 180.5 252.4 
232.2 
204.5 
190.9 
166.5 
Subscribers receivables 18.2 18.1 19.5 20.8 42.2 46.3 
Fixed assets (net) 32.3 33.9 33.9 35.7 3.7 2.2 
Other assets 33.5 48.4 53.5 66.9 109.2 113.2 
Total assets =  liabilities 687.0 792.9 908.9 1046.9 1187.6 1361.0 
Net assets (beginning of the year) 583.2 668.2 771.2 887.3 1023.6 1132.9 
Net revenue for the year 
% net investment income 
85.0 102.9 116.2 136.1 
74.8 
109.5 
49.1 
171.8 
Accounts payable 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.3 4.5 2.9 
Other liabilities 18.1 21.0 20.9 22.9 50.0 53.4 
Source: CBJ (1998), p. 145; CBJ (1999), p. 90; SSC (1998), pp. 119 - 120; own calculation 
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Table B23: Social Loan and Micro-credit Programmes 1998 
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DEF 2,587,525 834 1,483 3,103 22 10,000 6 1 0 check 9 0 
NAF 2,066,468 909 1,364 2,273 0 4,000 10 1/3 0 2 guarantors 0 24 
Industrial Development Bank 727,530 100 150 7,275 25 10,000 7 ½ 0 2 guarantors 9 2 
Agricultural Credit Corporation 14,367,057 5,291 5751 2,715 7 --- 15 5 10 - 20 2 guarantors 6 - 8.5 18 
HUDC 9,800 10 10 980 23 1,500 3 1/4 15 2 guarantors 7 1 
The Orphan’s Corporation 1,011,600 371 371 2,725 5 10,000 7 1 50 2 guarantors flat: 8,5 11 
SUB-TOTAL 20,768,980 7,515 9,029 2,764 9 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
UNRWA 0 0 0 -- -- 7,000 4 1/4 10 – 20 2 guarantors 12 2 
Save the Children N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 300 1/3 0 0 group loan flat: 24 3 
Near East Foundation 150,000 150 160 1,000 28 1,500 3 1/6 0 group loan 12 0 
Coop. Society for Development N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 150 3 0 0 2 guarantors 9 4 
CARE International 37,000 50 50 540 21 1,000 2 1/6 0 group loan 10 0 
Coop. Housing Foundation 801,500 2,083 2,083 375 61 N/A 4 0 0 2 guarantors 16 0 
SUB-TOTAL 978,500 2,283 2,293 429 28 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Noor Al-Hussein Foundation 106,493 172 172 619 34 1,000 3 1/2 0 1 guarantors flat: 5 11 
JOHUD 505,040 172 258 2,936 14 6,000 6 1/2 10 2 guarantors 7.5 46 
GUVS 387,521 278 417 1,394 45 1,000 2 1/6 0 1 guarantors flat: 7.5 471 
Jordanian Women’s Develop-
ment Society 1,387,175 11,846 11,846 117 100 450 
1/3 0 0 group loan flat: 24 0 
Jordan Micro-Credit Company 0 0 0 0 0 650 1/2 0 different 1 guarantors flat: 21.6 2 
SUB-TOTAL 2,386,229 12,468 12,693 191 96 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
TOTAL 22,798,209 19,779 21,341 1,153 67 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Source: DEF (1999a), pp. 56ff. 
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Tables B24 – B28: Public and NGO Social Welfare Programmes 
 
Table B24: Social Transfer Programmes 1996 
Programme total spending 
per year 
(JD ‘000) 
number of 
beneficiaries 
assistance per 
beneficiary and 
annum (JD) 
assistance 
spending as  
% of GDP 
NAF 13,500 44,000 307 0.29% 
Zakat Fund and zakat committees 2,100 5,600 375 0.04% 
UNRWA 3,300 40,000 83 0.07% 
GUVS 2,000 12,000 167 0.04% 
Queen Alia Fund  
(now JOHUD) 
300 5,500 54 0.01% 
Total social assistance  21,200 107,100 268 0.46% 
Source: IBRD (1999d), p. 34; Noor al-Hussein Foundation (2000), Shteiwi (1999a);  
Shteiwi (1999b), pp. 283ff.; UN (1999), pp. 44 - 45; own calculation 
 
 
Table B25: Social Assistance and Welfare Institutions 1996 
Public  
institutions 
quasi-public  
institutions 
private  
non-governmental insti-
tutions 
international  
institutions 
Ministry of Social Devel-
opment (MOSD) 
National Aid Fund 
(NAF) 
Development and Em-
ployment Fund (DEF) 
Zakat Fund and  
affiliated zakat commit-
tees 
Ministry of Health 
(MOH) 
Ministry of Education 
(MOE) 
Ministry of Food 
Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) 
Queen Aliah Fund 
(now: JOHUD) 
Noor al-Hussein Founda-
tion 
National Council for the 
Care for the Disabled 
National Works Agency 
for Children 
General Union of Volun-
tary Societies (GUVS):  
721 members 
189 charitable societies 
registered with the MOSD 
25 Islamic and foreign 
societies under the aus-
pices of the MOSD 
UNDP and other UN 
agencies 
UNRWA 
branches of foreign volun-
tary service agencies 
Source: Shteiwi (1999b), p. 282 
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Table B26: Estimated Financial Budget of Voluntary Societies in Jordan (1995) 
(thousand US$) revenue estimated 
foreign 
contribution 
estimated  
local donor 
contribution 
estimated 
government
contribution 
GUVS and its member-NGOs 17,077 0,517 5,940 5,895 
Queen Aliah Fund (now JOHUD) 7,100 6,033 N/A 1,070 
Noor al-Hussein-Foundation 2,800 2,711 N/A 70 
Zakat Fund and affiliated zakat commit-
tees 
2,285 0 2,285 0 
Independent zakat committees 5,365 0,500 4,865 0 
Foreign and international NGOs 1,600 1,600 0 0 
Other NGOs 1,000 N/A N/A N/A 
Total 37,227 11,361 13,090 7,051 
Source: El-Khatib (1996), Tables 7 – 10 
 
 
 
 
Table B27: Major Areas of Spending of Voluntary Societies in Jordan (1995) 
 spending  
(thousand US$) 
share on total spending 
(%) 
Health care and family planning 8,437 22.8 
Education and culture (including schools, 
kindergartens, baby nursing, cultural lectures) 6,216 16.7 
Social services 5,361 14.4 
Care for the disabled 5,065 13.7 
Community development 4,275 11.7 
Social assistance (cash and in-kind) 4,267 11.6 
Income generation projects 1,520 4.2 
Rehabilitation and vocational training 1,430 3.7 
Awareness and advocacy programmes 0,317 0.9 
Total 37,227 100.0 
Source: El-Khatib (1996), Table 11 
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Table B28: Social Activities of GUVS Member-NGOs 1999 
 number of societies 
active in the field 
number of benefi-
ciaries 
number of  
employees 
number of institu-
tions 
Child nurseries 67 1,317 127 118 homes 
Kindergartens 321 25,727 1,026 953 kindergartens 
Schools 25 24,929 N/A 49 schools 
Higher education 
student loans 
69 1,547 N/A (average grant: 
26.936 JD) 
Health clinics and 
health centres 
129 552,115 252 3 hospitals,  
77 general clinics, 
67 specialised clin-
ics,  
2 pharmacies,  
15 laboratories 
Orphanage homes 24 933 N/A 13 homes 
Old-age homes 2 82 N/A 2 homes 
Disabled  
rehabilitation 
808 14,936 N/A 45 centres; 3 schools
Credit fund projects 46 1,144 N/A (total lending: 
599,565 JD) 
Financial and in-
kind assistance 
375a 44,359a N/A  
Adult education 15a 211a N/A  
Libraries 60a 765a N/A  
a data for 1996 
Source: GUVS (1996); update by Dr. Arafat Al Tamemi, GUVS, 24 February 2001 
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Tables B29 – B32: The Private Financial Sector: Stocks, Bank Loans and Insurance 
 
Table B29: Amman Stock Exchange Indicators 
 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 1999 
Number of registered stocks N/A N/A 150 N/A N/A N/A 
Millions of shares traded 134 345 134 101 155 177 
Volume of shares traded (JD million) 266 878 430 211 414 343 
% bought by Non-Jordanians N/A N/A N/A N/A 111 94 
% sold by Non-Jordanians N/A N/A N/A N/A 81 79 
Index of traded shares (1991=100) 80.4 129.9 143.5 148.0 N/A N/A 
Market capitalisation (JD million) N/A N/A N/A N/A 3782 N/A 
Market capitalisation (Share on GDP) N/A N/A N/A N/A 62.7 % N/A 
Source: 1990 - 94: IMF (1997), p. 26; 1996 - 1999: CBJ (1999), p. 93; Gillion et al. (2000), Table A.15 
 
 
 
Table B30: Loans Provided by Jordan’s Commercial Banks (including The Housing Bank) 
(JD million) 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Agriculture 53.7 54.4 75.5 84.7 115.3 119.6 
Mining and quarrying 12.3 20.0 51.7 88.3 85.9 84.3 
Industry 224.6 265.8 419.9 501.9 615.9 660.0 
Trade 407.8 525.1 798.6 970.4 1104.7 1131.1 
Construction 422.7 463.2 687.0 782.9 791.4 759.7 
Transportation 45.5 54.0 198.3 782.9 223.6 197.2 
Tourism 33.3 37.3 38.1 58.3 108.7 135.3 
Private households 288.5 375.3 --- --- --- --- 
Stocks 71.1 90.8 --- --- --- --- 
Financial services --- --- 175.3 163.5 161.2 178.6 
Public services and infrastructure --- --- 150.5 211.7 223.0 232.6 
Other 110.8 160.8 653.5 800.1 855.6 950.4 
Total 1670.3 2046.7 3248.4 3938.8 4285.3 4448.8 
N B.: The CBJ introduced a new classification of bank loans as of 1993. 
Source:  
1990 - 1996: IMF (1997), p. 25 
1998 - 2000: CBJ (2000), p. 25 
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Table B31: De-composition of Jordan’s Commercial Insurance Sector 
1995 1997 1999  (JD million) 
premiums claims premiums claims premiums claims net profit 
Maritime 12.0 4.0 9.3 3.2 7.1 2.3 1.4 
Fire 11.6 7.3 10.7 5.5 10.3 3.2 0.8 
Motor vehicle 34.2 20.6 38.4 32.1 43.6 35.1 - 0.4 
Accidents 8.4 2.7 8.0 2.6 7.6 3.4 0.4 
Life 14.8 4.4 1.3 
Medical 
15.3 5.5 18.7 10.4 
14.8 14.0 - 0.4 
Total 81.5 40.1 85.1 53.8 98.2 62.4 3.1 
N B.: Health insurance was reported under life-insurance until 1997, as it used to be coupled  
 with life-insurance. 
Source: CBJ (1999), p. 92; Insurance Regulatory Commission (2000) 
 
 
 
Table B32: Major Indicators of Jordan’s Insurance Sector 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Number of companies 18 24 24 27 27 
Value of shares trades (JD million) 7.4 3.1 4.5 5.1 N/A 
Number of shares traded (million) 2.5 1.1 1.9 2.7 N/A 
Number of employees 1348 1632 1592 1590 N/A 
Gross output (JD million) 44.9 44.6 39.9 47.7 N/A 
Value added (JD million) 36.5 35.4 29.4 36.0 N/A 
Operating surplus (JD million) 28.8 25.3 18.1 23.2 N/A 
Gross fixed capital formation  
(JD million) 
2.2 3.2 1.9 2.0 N/A 
Total premiums collected (JD million) 81.5 89.7 90.2 99.6 99.8 
Total claims (JD million) 40.1 48.0 53.6 56.0 64.0 
Source: CBJ (1999), p. 93; DOS (1999), p. 173; Insurance Regulatory Commission (2000) 
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 Tables B33 – B34: Development Co-operation 
 
Table B33: Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Jordan 
(US$ million) 1992 1996 
Bilateral assistance 216 536 
% USA 124 78 
% Germany 50 68 
% Japan 132 182 
Multilateral 186 316 
% World Bank 73 129 
% EU 57 113 
% UNRWA 63 65 
% Arab institutions -19 n.a. 
Total 402 852 
% transfers 235 318 
% credits 167 534 
Source: EIU (1999); MOP (2000a); MOP (2000b) 
 
 
 
Table B34: German-Jordanian Development Co-operation 1999 
financial co-operation (DM million) 
loans grants 
technical  
co-operation 
total 
Water sector 321 3 52 376 
Small and medium enterprises 0 8 0 8 
Poverty-oriented infrastructure projects in 
urban areas 0 20 3 
23 
Sectoral adjustment agriculture 10 0 18 28 
Promotion of women-NGOs 0 0 3 3 
Administrative reforms 0 0 58 58 
Environmental protection 0 0 29 29 
Other 0 6 15 21 
Total 331 37 138 506 
Source: MOP (2000a); MOP (2000b) 
 
  
